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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The discovery of oil and its exploitation by the developing 
economies of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia helped to ease their foreign 
exchange constraints. As a result, their financial needs for economic 
development are no longer a serious obstacle. The terms of trade were 
not favorable to these small oil.-based open economies until the oil 
price adjustment of the 1970s. The moderate oil price increase of 1970-
71, known as "the Tehran Agreement," which raised the average price of 
crude oil to $2.29 a barrel by 1972, was followed by the two major price 
hikes of 1973 (effective on January 1, 1974) and 198o.< 1) 
These oil price increases changed the structure of the world oil 
market, corrected the terms of trade in favor of the oil exporters and 
recognized the collective power of the oil producers as demonstrated by 
the policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
(OPEC). The oil price upsurge, in fact, came at a time characterized by 
world economic instability and, therefore, aggravated the problems 
facing the international financial system. It resulted in an 
unanticipated, substantial transfer of wealth and income from oil-
consuming countries to oil-producing countries. The oil payments no 
doubt have been felt by most oil-importing countries in terms of high 
inflation, higher import bills, Balance of Payments (BOP) adversity, 
and a detrimental effect on their standard-of-living, especially by the 
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non-oil LDCs. ( 2 ) However, the oil reserves flow and the effie ient 
recycling of these funds have had their adverse impact on all the 
countries of the world of which the oil-exporting countries of Libya, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are a part. Although it lessened the problem of 
the availability of financial funds, the events of the 1970s created 
external and internal problems and contributed to the existing problems 
of higher inflation, resource waste, income maldistribution, sectoral 
imbalances, and rapid depletion of oil reserves, as well as social 
problems. 
Statement of the Problem 
The oil-induced imbalances in the external sector of these small 
oil-based open economies present policy issues fundamentally different 
from those normally associated with the process of international 
adjustments. Moreover, the policies conducted by the governments in 
order to mitigate the adverse effects of the world economic instability 
on the domestic economies have made the link between the internal and 
external economic forces more complex. Foreign exchange volatility, 
which followed the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement, resulted in 
an unstable international system of payments which had its adverse 
effect on trade, finance and economic growth and development within the 
world community. All these factors indicate that the adjustment of the 
external oil-induced imbalance of these small open economies may not be 
achieved through the nonmonetarist adjustment presented by the 
elasticities and absorption approaches. 
It should be pointed out that the oil-based developing economies of 
Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia share common basic characteristics which 
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include: (i) the rudimentary nature of their financial structure, which 
makes the choice of wealth holdings very limited outside money and real 
assets: (ii) the absence of independent central banking authorities; 
(iii) the strict government control over interest payments; ( i v) the 
problem of sectoral imbalances; ( v) the shortages of certain labor 
skills, natural resources and water resources; and (vi) very limited 
arable land and severe dry climate. Given the above factors, in these 
oil-based economies, oil alone as an export oriented resource dominates 
almost all their economic activities. Accordingly, all three small 
economies are highly open to the rest of the world (ROW) through foreign 
trade and this makes them extremely vulnerable and sensitive to external 
shocks as small open economies under fixed exchange rates. 
The huge oil revenues have enabled the government in each country 
to launch massive development programs and invest an increasing portion 
of the foreign reserves surpluses in long-run development projects aimed 
toward improving the well-being of the people, correcting the sectoral 
imbalances of the domestic economy and breaking down the dependency on 
oil. The escalated public spending has led to an important transform-
ation in the economic structure of these developing economies. The 
result of the public and private spendings was a rapid increase in 
almost all components of the aggregate demand, as contrasted with a 
limited domestic production base. The logical outcome of such 
expansionary policies has been increasing excess demand which was 
satisfied by imports and increased trading links to the ROW. 
This study emphasizes the problem of the foreign exchange flow in 
these small oil-based developing economies and its impact on the 
domestic economies. In other words, the adjustment process of external 
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imbalances in the oil-exporting economies of Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia is to be studied during a period characterized by world economic 
instability and a volatile international monetary system. (3) 
In the existing literature there are at least three major and 
distinct approaches or theories to the analysis of the flow of foreign 
exchange. The "elasticities" and the "income-absorption" approaches, 
the nonmonetarist approaches, may not be considered as sui table tools 
for analyzing the flow of foreign reserves of the oil-exporting 
countries. Since both approaches use a partial equilibrium analysis and 
consider the BOP primarily in light of the trade balance, they either 
neglect the role played by money, or they consider the role of money to 
be of secondary importance( 4 ) [P. G. Wilferd, (1977)]. The 
"elasticities" approach, by relying on exchange rate changes, is an 
inadequate analytical tool to study the oil-induced external imbalance 
because oil is highly price inelastic and paid for in dollars, not in 
the domestic prices of the oil exporting countries. The "income-
absorption" approach, by relying on macroeconomic policies of the 
aggregate demand management, has limited impact on studying the oil-
induced surpluses because the institutional and economic structures in 
these small developing oil-based economies impose limits on the level of 
absorption; besides, demand management is not the problem as far as the 
LDCs are concerned [Park, ( 1976)]. In brief, the nonmonetarist 
traditional approaches' short-run, partial equilibrium analysis 
presented by exchange rate changes (devaluation or revaluation) and the 
income policies may seem to be inadequate tools to study the problem of 
the foreign exchange flow of the oil-exporting countries. 
The monetary approach, which is the long run general equilibrium 
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approach integrating the current and capital accounts into the money 
account or the overall balance of payments, presents itself as a 
suitable tool for the study of the foreign reserves flow in these oil-
exporting economies. The monetary approach, which emerged from the 
works of Mundell (1968, 1971), Johnson (1972, 1976), Zecker (1974), Kemp 
(1975), Swoboda (1976) and Genberg (1976), among others, treats the flow 
of foreign reserves as essentially a monetary phenomenon which can be 
analyzed in relation to the small country's domestic money market. By 
defining the overall BOP or the money account as changes in the foreign 
reserves of the banking system, it views the BOP as an adjustment 
process to the small country's imbalances in its domestic money 
market. Thus, the monetary approach to international reserves flow 
provides the basis for the analysis presented in this research. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to study the changes in the net 
foreign reserves adjustment mechanism in the oil-based small open 
economies of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This study uses a simple 
monetary model and relies on the domestic monetary eq uil i br i urn 
conditions to derive an equation of the overall BOP position of the 
economies. Given a fixed exchange rate system, a direct link between 
the BOP and the money supply process is established. Hence, any 
imbalance in the domestic money market will spill over into the external 
sector and ultimately result in a surplus or a deficit in that country's 
BOP. These BOP surpluses or deficits will continue until all imbalances 
in the money market are removed. This direct link between the BOP and 
the money market imbalances enables one to explain the foreign reserves 
flow by the changes in the variables which determine the demand for and 
supply of money. Therefore, an excess supply of (demand for) money 
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implies a BOP deficit (surplus), while a money market balance implies a 
BOP equilibrium. This study relies on a simple mor.etary model, which is 
a variant of the so called monetary approach to the balance of payments 
(MABOP). Such a model is used in the case of the small open economy 
under fixed exchange rates to study the adjustment process to monetary 
imbalances caused by exogenous factors. This basic model wi 11 be used 
to analyze the foreign reserves flow in these oil-exporting countries. 
The study is of both a theoretical and empirical nature. 
The Objectives of the Study 
This study, as mentioned above, uses a simple monetary model 
similar to the basic model developed by H. Johnson (1972) after 
accounting for some of the institutional constraints which are imposed 
by the nature of these developing oil-based economies. The model uses 
the monetary forces in the domestic money market to derive the version 
which will be referred to as the standard model of the MABOP. An 
econometric testing will then be conducted using data from Libya, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. The study covers the following three major steps: 
1) In the tradition of the monetary approach, the monetary 
characteristics of the BOP are analyzed by testing the relation between 
changes in net foreign reserve holdings of the central banks of Libya 
and Kuwait, and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, SAMA, against changes 
in net domestic credits of these central banks and other exogenous 
variables. The model to be used assumes the 1 i ne of causation to run 
from domestic credits (the money variable) to the reserves. ~1oreover, 
it assumes all basic propositions of the standard model presented by the 
proponents of the monetary approach hold. This basic or standard MABOP 
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model is empirically estimated for the case countries using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique. 
2) The econometric validity of the empirical results, in fact, hinges 
crucially on the assumption of statistical exogeneity of the right hand 
side variables of the single equation model of the BOP. The violation 
of the exogenei ty assumption means the estimates of the BOP single 
equation are both biased and inconsistent. To avoid this problem, known 
as the simultaneous equation bias( 5 ), as well as to examine for the 
possibility of reverse causation, the standard monetary model is 
modified. The modification involves the use of a simple simultaneous 
equation system in which domestic money is treated as an endogenous 
variable. A reaction function was specified to account for the behavior 
of the monetary authorities in these countries. Both the BOP equation 
and the reaction function equation were then estimated simultaneously 
using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique. The results of the 
estimation show that the monetary authorities in these oil-exporting 
developing small open economies do act to sterilize the impact of 
foreign reserves flow (BOP) ·in favor of maintaining a stable money 
supply. 
3) The basic monetary model assumes that the "integrated market 
hypothesis" holds where prices in the small open economy move in line 
with their world counterparts. When this assumption was tested, it was 
rejected by the Saudi data. This calls for another modification of the 
standard model. The second modification allows for the presence of non-
traded goods into the analysis, which is done by the introduction of a 
price adjustment equation. Then the model ls examined for both the 
price and the BOP development in the context of a short-run dynamic 
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adjustment against a monetary disturbance. This modified model was 
estimated for the Saudi case using the Polynomial Estimation method 
( PDL) . 
The econometric testing of all these relations was conducted on 
quarterly data covering: 1970-II-1979QIV for the Libyan case, 1973QI -
1982QIV for the Kuwaiti case, and 1970II-1982QIV for the Saudi Arabian 
case. (For data sources see Appendix A). 
The aims of the research are the following: 
(1) The study aims to test the monetary relations hypothesized by 
the standard monetary approach to the BOP, particularly the one-to-one 
inverse relation between changes in the net foreign reserves (BOP) and 
changes in net domestic credits (net domestic assets of the central 
bank). It also investigates the negative relations between the BOP and 
the rates of change in interest rates (or expected inflation) and the 
money multiplier. The objective is thus to accept or reject the 
assumption that an increase in these variables worsens the BOP 
position. It also tests the assumption that the BOP relates positively 
to changes in prices and real income, which implies that growth in real 
income and prices improves the BOP position. It also aims to 
investigate whether the monetary authorities in the sample countries 
have acted so as to sterilize the impact of foreign reserves flow in 
favor of maintaining a stable money supply. The study also considers 
testing the validity of the integrated market hypothesis for the goods' 
market, as well as the short-run relations between domestic inflation 
and the BOP. 
(2) This research work aims to provide a theoretical framework 
that could be used to analyze the various policy decisions and help 
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guide the pol icy-makers in dealing with devaluation, sterilization, 
credit expansion, inflation, etc. 
(3) The study aims to participate in providing a building block 
for a consistent and more detailed open macroeconomic analysis of the 
small oil-based developing open economies of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Organization of the Study 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter I ls a general 
introduction in which an overview and prospective of the dissertation is 
presented. It presents the problem identification, the objectives of 
the study and outlines the chapters of the study. 
Chapter II focuses on the Libyan economy as an example for these 
oil-based developing small open economies. It gives special emphasis to 
the development of its BOP and the structure of its financial system. 
It shows the link between the BOP and the monetary sector in this small 
open economy which operates under a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
Libyan economy is actually a very close representation of the other two 
cases, the economies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter III reviews the theoretical development of the monetary 
approach's analysis of the BOP adjustment. It utilizes a simple 
monetary model to derive the standard model of the BOP adjustment, 
building on the work of H. Johnson. The chapter then presents two 
methods which may be used to represent and estimate the standard model 
to the BOP determination. Finally, the chapter addresses the issues of 
policy and critique of the monetary approach to the BOP theory. 
Chapter IV undertakes the empirical testing of the MABOP using data 
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from Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The chapter begins the econometric 
testing with the standard model of the MABOP. It estimates the single 
equation of the BOP directly; then it estimates the demand for money in 
each country and uses the estimates of the demand for money balances to 
estimate the BOP equation indirectly. After the single equation 
estimation, the standard model is modified by specifying a reaction 
function for the monetary authorities in an effort to examine the 
interaction between the BOP and the monetary policies in these case 
countries. All the results obtained from the econometric tests are 
reported and the working of the proposed models is discussed. 
Chapter V is an extension of the previous chapter since both 
chapters are considered the heart of the dissertation. The chapter 
undertakes the empirical testing of the integrated market hypothesis. 
It presents a special measure of the world inflation variable which is 
used in the empirical testing of the hypothesis in light of the domestic 
inflation in the case countries. Only the data in Saudi Arabia rejected 
the integrated market hypothesis. The chapter then modifies the 
standard model by introducing the non-traded goods sector into the 
analysis. The modified model then captures the short-run dynamic 
adjustments in prices and the BOP taken together. For the empirical 
testing, data from Saudi Arabia were used to estimate this modified 
version. The results of the estimation are reported and discussed. 
Chapter VI presents a summary of the major points obtained from the 
empirical results and provides some concluding remarks as well. 
Finally, two appendixes are presented. Appendix A contains the 
data sources, the technique used to generate quarterly income figures 
from the annual series and the method used to obtain the expected 
11 
inflation. Appendix B presents a derivation of the prices and BOP 
equations of Blejer's model used in Chapter V. 
ENDNOTES 
1 The average price of a barrel of crude oil exported by OPEC 
increased from $2.29 in 1972 to $10.49 in 1974, and from $12.70 in 1978 
to $31.50 in 1980. However, in the 1980's oil prices started to decline 
from their peak of $35.37 in 1981 to $27.00 in 1982 and fell to around 
$12.00 a barrel in January of 1986. The average price of crude oil then 
started to rise slowly and settled around $19.50 as of September of 
1987. For more on this topic, see A. McGuirk (1982), S. Bell and B. 
Kettell (1983), chapter II and W. Mead (1986), p. 213. 
2In fact, the energy crunch hit hard on the LDCs, but it did not 
affect the big industrialized countries as much since oil accounts for 
only about 5 percent of their expenditure. For example, in a country 
like Japan which imports all its oil needs, a fall in oil prices by 30 
percent would cut the inflation rate by about 1. 5 percent and add 1. 5 
. percent to its real income (Bell and Kettell, (1983) p. 57). Moreover, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, has 
estimated that the rate of increase in consumer prices was about five 
percentage points higher in the twenty-four OECD countries in 1980 than 
it would have been in the absence of the oil price increases. See Bell 
and Kettell (1983), p. 53. 
3The instability of the world economy no doubt has its effect on 
these oil-exporting developing economies. Aside from the openness, 
these economies have maintained a relatively free system of trade and 
payments, at least during the period covered by this research. In fact, 
their national currencies have been pegged to the U.S. dollar despite 
the floating of most world currencies since 1973. 
4In fact, the partial equilibrium nature of the "elasticities 
approach" left monetary policy completely out of the picture and 
neglected the effect of devaluation on the level of income. But, the 
integration of income movements with the "elasticities approach" led to 
1 2 
1 3 
the inclusion of the income elasticities in the analysis. See Harberger 
(1950). 
5For more on the problem of the simultaneous equation bias. See J. 
Johnston (1972) and Koutsoyiannis (1977). 
CHAPTER II 
THE LIBYAN ECONOMY: ITS BALANCE Of 
PAYMENTS AND fiNANCIAL SYSTEM 
The Libyan Economy 
Libya has a very important geopolitical location. The country is 
located in the heart of North Africa, with a large size that exceeds 
1,760 thousand square kilometers. Despite its huge area, the country is 
sparsely populated. Population was estimated in 1983 to be about 3. 5 
million. Libya is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, 
Egypt and the Sudan to the east, Tunisia and Algeria to the west and 
Chad and Niger to the south. This important location has exposed the 
country to foreign invasion throughout its long history. The last 
foreign invasion was the Italian colonialism during 1911-1939, which was 
followed by the British and french mandate after World War II. 
In the pre-oil era, the country was considered among the poorest of 
the world. The economy suffered from extreme shortages of all kinds, 
such as lack of mineral resources, poor natural resources, lack of 
skills of all types, limited water resources, severe climate and limited 
arable lands. The result was numerous bottlenecks which hindered the 
country's chance of ach1eving real economic development. These hopeless 
conditions led the development economist B. Higgins (1968, p. 37) to 
state that " ... there is no hope for the Libyan economy to develop, and 
1 4 
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if it does, then there will be a chance for all the less developed 
countries to do so." Therefore, in that era the Libyan economy 
represented an example of a most hopeless and impoverished economy. 
Libya entered the oil club in the late 1950's and by mid-1960's the 
country had become one of the major oil producers. Since the discovery 
of oil in 1959, the oil sector started to play a vital role in shaping 
the structure and characteristics of the economy of Libya. As a major 
oil exporter and an active member of OPEC, Libya began to play an 
essential role in the organization's policy formulations and decision-
making. On the domestic front, the domination of oil has resulted in 
transforming the Libyan economy into a single-export economy. Foreign 
trade b~gan to have a great impact on the overall performance of the 
economy, and made the whole economy more vulnerable and sensitive to 
external shocks. The oil discoveries and exploitations have their 
fingerprints on the economic development of all sectors of the 
economy. The foreign exchanges generated from oil exports have made the 
economy able to overcome its problem of capital funds shortages. Oi 1 
revenues indeed did break the financial constraints and furnished 
enormous supplies of capital funds. The surpluses generated from oil 
exports, especially after the 1973 oil price adjustment, led to 
considerable sectoral imbalances and created new problems which did not 
exist under the traditional economy. The economy's huge foreign 
exchange surpluses were more than what the economy could absorb. In 
spite of its sectoral imbalances and the limited absorptive capacity, 
the economy grew at an average real rate of growth of 4.7 percent during 
the period 1960-81. Now, Libya is classified among the highest per 
capita income countries in the world. The per capita income jumped from 
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50 U. S. dollars in 1952 to more than 8,450 dollars in 1982 [The World 
Bank Atlas , ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 1 6] . 
The rapid increase in the country's gross national product (GNP), 
in response to the expansion of the oil sector accompanying the oil 
price increases of the 1970's and early 1980's, made possible the 
enormous investment expenditures adopted by the three-year economic plan 
of 1973-75 and the two-five year plans of 1976-80 and 1981-85. These 
plans envisioned structural changes to remedy the economic imbalances 
through concentration on the diversification of the national economy. 
All the economic plans have stressed the development of non-oil 
sectors, particularly the production sectors, agriculture and 
industries, in an effort to reduce the future dependence on the 
externally-oriented oil sector.< 1) However, in spite of the efforts to 
reduce the dependence on oil and to correct sectoral imbalances, oil is 
still the dominant source of income. For example, the gross domestic 
product, GOP, of 1981 reached $27,460 million; its structures still 
emphasizing the dominance of the oil sector, where oil contributed 71 
percent of that year's GOP, hence, leaving only 29 percent as the 
combined contribution originated by all non-oil sectors in the economy. 
The two major production sectors' contribution to that year's GOP did 
not exceed two percent for the agricultural sector and three percent for 
the manufacturing sector [The World Bank Annual Report, (1983)]. 
The massive increase in the country's oil revenues made such 
immense investment allocations possible, but the Libyan economy could 
not effe~tively absorb these huge capital funds. In fact, the mis-
allocation of resources, bottlenecks, shortages, etc. are clear mani-
festations of the socio-economic restraints which exercised severe 
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limits on the Libyan econpmy's capacity to absorb the oil-generated huge 
capital funds. Among the social and economic constraints, the most 
limiting factors are: U) labor shortages, even at the nonsk i lled 
level; ( ii) the sectoraiJe imbalances, between internal and external 
sectors, as well as betwee~ the oil sector and other traditional sectors 
of the economy, especiall~ the main production sectors, agriculture and 
industry; (iii) severe nqtural resource problems, such as a lack of 
~ · • water resources and the~climited area of arable land;( 2 ) and (iv) 
inflation, despite the . 1 ~overnment's effort to control prices and 
suppress the domestic infJ,ation. The increases in the price level in 
Libya have been associated with large increases in the domestic money 
supply. For example, th~, money supply was more than tripled between 
1975-1980, when it jumpe9 from LD 844.45 million in 1975 to reach LD 
2,856.83 million by the .e!Jd of 1980 [CBOL Economic Bulletin, Jan-Mar. 
(1982)]. 
Although the empirical study will cover the three oil-based 
economies of Libya, Kuwai,t and Saudi Arabia, this chapter is devoted 
entirely to study the Libyan economy as a yardstick or a pattern. Since 
the main characteristics, ~onditions and structures of these Arab Muslim 
oil-based economies are very similar, the analytical expositions in the 
case of Libya are to a large extent applicable to the other two cases. 
The rest of this .~hapter will be devoted to presenting an 
analytical exposition oL·. the role and influence of the economy's 
external sector and its f~nancial system. The purpose is to focus on 
= their effect and role -.in influencing the behavior and overall 
performance of this develqping small open economy. The aim is to pave 
the road for understanding the application of the proposed monetary 
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model to the Libyan, Kuwaiti and Saudi experiences which are the 
cornerstone of this research work. 
The Balance of Payments of the Libyan 
Economy and the Foreign Exchange 
The structure of the BOP records is expressed in major components 
or accounts. These accounts are presented in a double-entry bookkeeping 
system(3) which shows the flow of real assets and financial obligations 
into and out of the country for the given time period. The BOP 
statement is divided into four separate accounts or sub-balances: ( i) 
the merchandise balance; (ii) the balance on current account; (iii) the 
liquidity balance (balance on regular transfers) or capital account; and 
(iv) the overall balance or official settlements balance.( 4) Drawing a 
line through each account leaves some credit and debt items "above the 
line" and the rest "below the line". Taking all entries above the line 
for each account, when credits exceed debts the account is in surplus, 
however, the account is in deficit, whenever credits fall short of 
debts.(S) 
An individual country in the world economy resembles a household in 
the closed economy; it cannot indefinitely run deficits on its BOP 
without taking strong measures to correct these continuous deficits. 
The deficit country is required to correct its external imbalance for 
two major reasons. First, deficit means that in terms of "autonomously" 
determined transactions debits exceed credits. This indicates that the 
deficit country's import purchase and its long-term world commitments, 
private or public or both, have exceeded its capability of meeting its 
foreign obligations through its foreign exchange earnings from national 
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exports and foreign investment reserves inflow in the country. C6) This 
situation puts the country into a fundamental external disequilibrium 
which is made possible by the inflow of short-term foreign loans. This 
position must not be allowed to continue indefinitely. Second, 
regardless of the form of holding these foreign debts, (7 ) the inflows of 
these short-term loans constitutes a potential claim on the deficit 
country's monetary reserves which are mostly made up of convertible 
foreign assets and gold. When the BOP imbalances persist the foreign 
claims may lead to a "crisis of confidence" when the deficit country is 
declared unable to repay its foreign lenders. These imbalances in the 
BOP, particularly in the case of deficiency, must be corrected to 
restore equilibrium in the external sector in order for the country to 
restore the world trust and achieve internal economic stability. 
From a monetary analysis point of view, there exists two basic 
characteristics which distinguish a less developed economy from that of 
a developing one. They are: ( i) the prevailing conditions of the 
financial sector; and (ii) the importance of the external sector. The 
rest of this chapter aims to cover these major points. It wi 11 study 
the foreign sector and the financial system of small open economy of 
Libya. As a starting point, the analysis focuses on the openness of the 
economy and the prime role of foreign trade and payments in this oil-
exporting economy. Then a brief exposition of the financial system and 
monetary policy will be the subject of what remains of the chapter. 
The Libyan Balance of Payments 
As an oil exporter, the Libyan economy is highly linked to the rest 
of the world. The oil sector has contributed more than 50 percent of 
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the gross domestic product, GDP, and more than 99 percent of the 
country's foreign exports during the en tire period of study. The high 
dependence on oil is reflected in the large degree of openness of the 
economy relative to the rest of the world (ROW)(B). Over the period of 
study, which is dominated by the oil sector, the ratio of total 
trade/GDP (the absolute sum of exports and imports divided by GDP) or 
the ratio of openness has been growing over time. This finding, in 
fact, is common to all oil-based countries, where their economies are 
characterized by a large degree of openness, especially, through foreign 
trade. When the degrees of openness of the three oil economies of 
Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are compared with the relatively closed 
economy of the United States, the ratios of openness are found to be 
significantly greater than that of the economy of the USA by nearly 5.8, 
6.2 and 6.1 times for Libya, Kuwait and Saudia Arabia, respectively.< 9 ) 
The other common characteristic of these open oil economies is the fact 
that their openness is largely shown through foreign trade more than 
through the international capital flows. In the following we present a 
structural analysis of the different items of the Libyan BOP with more 
emphasis being put on the balance of merchandise trade. 
The reason for studying Libya's external sector and its BOP 
statement is an at tempt to understand the economic conditions that 
prevail in this mono-economy and to point out some of its strengths and 
weaknesses. We know that a permanent unfavorable BOP position in any 
economy is an indicator of existence of certain economic problems that 
economy is facing. The Libyan economy, during its pre-oil era, 
especially before 1964, suffered chronic external imbalances. The 
foreign trade sector widely reflected the harsh economic and business 
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conditions that dominated Libya's major economic activities. The 
leading exports of agricultural-based commodities (Esparto grass, olive 
oil, peanuts, hides, and live animals) were the most important 
exports. On the import side, all types of food and industrial products 
were Libya's major imports. In fact, the poor economic conditions and 
limited natural resources combined with a very low degree of economic 
development resulted in a severe and permanent unfavorable BOP 
situation. Foreign exchange earnings, as a result, were extremely 
limited and fell short of covering the country's foreign obligations. 
The BOP deficits were covered by loans, aid and grants from foreign 
sources. 
In 1959, oil was discovered and by 1961 the country joined the 
group of oil exporters. Since the early 1960's the exploitation and 
exportation of oil in commercial quantities has introduced a new and 
vital element in the country's economic scene. The BOP statement began 
to show-a favorable position on the current account balance. In fact, 
since the fiscal year of 1963/64, the external balance has recorded 
surpluses with the exception of a few years ( 1973 and 1975). The oil 
sector is solely responsible for the improvement of the country's 
external balance. However, foreign trade is concentrated on the export 
side, with crude oil exports consisting of more than 99 percent of the 
country's total exports [CBOL Balance of Payments (1975-1980)]. In 
Libya as is the case in other OPEC countries, the public authority is 
the sole recipient of the oil revenues. And through domestic public 
spending, the government injects the oil proceeds into the mainstream of 
the non-oil sectors. Because the domestic production base is limited, 
the aggregate domestic supply falls short of meeting the economy's ever-
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increasing effective aggregate demand. As a result, large sums of 
private and public funds leaked out of the main income stream and found 
their way into the world markets as payments for the increased import 
demand for foreign products. In fact, the structure of the Libyan BOP 
reflects a typical example of an oil surplus economy, a case which will 
be made clear through the structural exposition of the Libyan BOP: (See 
Table I). 
(1) The external payment position is determined to a large extent 
by the balance on current account, or the foreign trade side. The 
structural analysis of the merchandise exports shows that almost 100 
percent were fuel-based products; metals and minerals. This composition 
had dominated the Libyan exports and maintained unchanged since the 
first shipment of oil exports began. 
agricultural and animal-based exports. 
The traditional exports are 
Their relative share has been 
declining over time, because of the increasing home demand for those 
products on one side, and their limited competitiveness in world market 
on the other side. The dominant and leading export is oil which 
constitutes nearly 99 percent of Libya's total exports with the 
exception of 1975 in which the share of oil exports declined to 94.1 
percent due to reduction in world oil demand caused by the 1975 world 
recession [Secretary of Planning 1972-75 Report (1976)]. 
Although the Libyan imports reflect the dynamic process of 
developmental projects in the economy, the composition still, to a large 
extent, reflects the domestic limited resource base and the stage of 
development of this oil surplus economy. The structural analysis of the 
imports shows that foodstuffs, machinery and transport equipment 
continue to be the major items following the oil boom, [World Bank 
TABLE I 
THE LIBYAN BOP: 1970-1979 
IN L.D. MILLIONS 
It eon 1970 1971 1972 1911 197~ 1975 1976 1917 1978 1979 
A. 011 Sector 58].2 7]].9 666.0 755.5 18-0.2 1-]].2 2152.9 2786.- 2752.0 
--1-.7 
Exports l re-exports (f.O.B.l 85].2 960.8 9-6.2 119- .] 2U5.0 200].6 28211.7 nn.8 29.-.8 ~728.5 
l11ports (C. I. f. l -]1. 9 -19.- -18.] -u.s -15.5 -21.5 -]0.0 --5.0 -]1.5 -65.8 
lnvest•ent lnca.e -196.7 -197.6 -227.11 -265.6 --]8.2 -]50.~ -11]5.7 -]511.5 -]18.6 -9~8.0 
. 
B. Non-0 II Sector -]06.6 
--06.1 -517.8 -780.2 -1]07.8 -18]5 ... -1769.- -2].-.6 -2-08.9 -]080. 3 
( I l Goode and Services -260.8 -)71 .I 
-552.- -71111.11 -1327.- -1595.0 -1117-.6 -19-11.8 -219] ... -3071.7 
(I) EKporte and Ra-EKports ].0 1.7 ].9 5.3 -2.2 2.6 -].0 ].- 2.9 2.6 
(II) l•porte (C.I.f.) -2]5.1 
-]-6.- --53 •• -652.6 -1215.9 -11127.3 -1215.2 -1571.0 -11112.1 (N/AI 
(2) Unrequited Transrer (net) 
--2.7 -]5. 1 -]9.9 --9.9 -21 .II -50.3 -52.1 -66.6 -9.9 -271.0 
(]) Capital non-.anetarr sector (net) -]. 1 •0.1 -711.5 58.1 -111.- -190.1 -2112.7 -299.2 -116.5 --0.9 
Private (net) -].2 ].9 119.5 11).7 11].- -176.9 ].115 15.11 -]0.6 (N/Al 
Public (net l 0.1 
-3.8 -15.0 -55.6 -72.0 -267.0 -281.2 -]111.6 -85.9 (N/A) 
c. Net errors and o•lsslons -]6.] -19.1 -7.8 -]05.0 26.8 -71.0 -116.5 -18.- -5.11 -112. I 
D. Total A • B + C ( 1 •) ·2-0.] +]08.7 +1110.'1 -329.7 •505.6 -~79.2 ]36.0 -5].2 -1-7.] 686.9 
E. Honetary Hove•ente -2QO.] -]08. 7 
-1-0.- •129.7 -505.6 ·-79.2 -])6.0 --53.2 -1-7.] -686.9 
(lncreaee In net aseets) 
Sourcer Central Bank or Libya "Econo•lo Bulletin,• Vol. XXII Nos. 7-12 (Julr-Deo. 1982). Table ]0. 
(•) Provision (•) Inflow, (-) out (low. 
( 11 ) The country started to participate In DSRa onlr In 1978. 
(N/A) Not available. 
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Report (1983)]. The analysis of food imports indicates that cereals and 
their by-products constitute the largest portion in total import demand 
for food. This may be attributed to the harsh climate and severe 
droughts, which hit the country in some years, combined with the use of 
large quantities of cereals as an animal feed [CBOL Econ. Bulletin Jan.-
Mar., ( 1982)]. The economic development efforts and the implementation 
of the socio-economic plans are the major contributors to the large 
increases in the total volume of imports, which have been increasing to 
meet the increased demand for machinery, tools and transport equipment 
required by the plans. For example, the building of social overhead 
capital, or infrastructure of the economy such as the new port 
facilities, storage facilities, roads, which has been a major economic 
goal during our period of study, led to an increase in the demand for 
machinery and equipment. The expansion of the agricultural projects and 
the establishment of the industrial bases in the economy as intended by 
the 1976-80 transformation plan, as well as the above factors, all 
resulted in increasing the import demand for capital goods. All the 
mentioned factors have led to an increase in the marginal propensity to 
import and diversified the composition of the Libyan imports. 
(2) The impact of oil on the Libyan external balance is quite 
immense, a fact which is shown by the overall payments which indicates 
an outcome of net surplus in the BOP over the entire period of study 
with the exception of the years 1973 and 1975; (see Table I). However, 
the 1973 deficit is due primarily to the big record on the net errors 
and omissions item, which seems to be responsible for nearly 90 percent 
of the total deficit of 329.7 million Libyan dinars (L.D.). It also 
coincides with the interruption of oil exports and the oil embargo to 
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the USA and Holland as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 
deficits of 479.2 millions L.D. on the 1975 overall balance may be 
attributed to the large decline in the world demand for oil which 
resulted from the 1975 world-wide recession that followed the 1974 oil 
price increase. During the rest of period of study (1970-79), Libya's 
external balance enjoyed a net BOP surplus. However, the current 
account surpluses of the oil sector are contrasted with a net deficit in 
the non-oil traditional sectors of the economy as illustrated in Figure 
1. This situation leads one to conclude that Libya's external balance, 
exclusive of oil, continues to suffer from the chronic deficit problem 
which prevailed and characterized the pre-oil era. 
Also, the oil sector has played a dominant role in shaping the 
structure of the BOP in Libya on the asset side as well. This situation 
is made clear by the dominance of public assets of the capital movements 
of the non-monetary sector [see i tern 3 in Table I]. In brief, the oil 
sector's dominant role is expected to continue in the near future, until 
the economy builds up its infrastructure and its productive base is 
highly developed. When the economy takes off, the dual situation will 
start to be removed and the economy's dependence on oil exports will be 
reduced. 
(3) In Libya the public authorities (government) are the sole 
owner of oil and mineral resources in the economy. Therefore, the oil 
sector's net surplus of foreign exchange accrues totally to the public 
sector. Less than one percent of total assets in this balance is 
provided by the non-oil traditional activities. ( 10) However, the non-
oil sector is expected to play a vital role in the export receipts side, 
when the agricultural development projects are completed. The aim is to 
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diversify the production base and break the dependence on oil through 
the agricultural and industrial development. In fact, the future role 
of agricultural exports in Libya is promising, since the country is very 
close to the major world market of Europe. Taking into consideration 
the advantages of the closeness to that large market, Libya could be a 
major exporting source of many early agricultural products. In brief, 
the development of a modern agricultural sector will work to achieve two 
simultaneous goals. The production increase will lead to a reduction of 
foodstuffs imports and to an increase of exports from the early yields. 
(4) The "Errors and Omissions" item in the Libyan BOP statement 
fluctuates from year to year as shown by Table I. It represents some of 
the unidentified capital outflows and also reflects some unspecified 
payments which are not included in other items and need to be recorded, 
for example, the smuggling of commodities to neighboring countries as 
Egypt, Chad and Tunisia. Besides, the item reflects the smuggling of 
invisibles, since some individuals, including nationals and foreigners, 
do purchase foreign exchanges in the black market and smuggle them 
outside the borders. Therefore, the item serves to capture those trade 
and payments items which do not show in the normal recording procedure. 
(5) The last item in Table I, which is designated by the letter E, 
shows the monetary movements. This i tern reflects the change in net 
foreign assets holdings of the banking system in Libya.< 11 ) It recorded 
a net increase in foreign reserves over the whole period of study 
exclusive of the deficit years of 197 3, 1975 and 1979. These BOP 
deficits were financed by a reduction in the inter11ational reserve 
holdings of CBOL. 
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Foreign Exchange in Libya 
Libya has used a fixed exchange rate system since 1953, when the 
first monetary authority was established. But the value of the Libyan 
national currency had undergone various changes. ( 1 4 ) Changes in the 
foreign price of the domestic currency (devaluation or appreciation) 
produce its effect on the external sector of the economy through its 
effect on export supply and import demand. However, in the case of 
Libya, as mentioned above, oil constitutes almost the entire volume of 
exports. But its price is immune to changes in domestic currency, since 
oil is paid for in U.S. dollars. This means that the appreciation of 
the dollar produces no effect on the export side. On the import side, 
the appreciation (devaluation) of the dollar reflects a devaluation 
(appreciation) of its intervention currency, such appreciation 
(devaluation) is expected to raise (reduce) the imported inflation. In 
Libya, given that the national currencies of the country's major trading 
partners rose as a result of the devaluation of the U.S. dollar, an 
offset in the Libyan price may occur as a result [Baryun (1980)]. 
This research draws on the monetary approach to the BOP views, 
which identifies the BOP of a country as the rate of change of the 
foreign reserve holdings of its banking system. Therefore, the 
country's BOP is linked directly to its monetary base and money 
supply. Since the Libyan BOP statement recorded surpluses with the 
exception of few deficit years, a direct link between the Libyan 
external balance (BOP) and the monetary sector is a major proposition in 
this analysis. This link necessitates the study of the Libyan financial 
and monetary system. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to study 
the structure of the Libyan financial system and its financial 
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institutions in order to understand the performance of the money market. 
The Financial System in Libya 
The financial sectors in the LDCs are characterized by the low 
degree of development of both their capital and money markets. Libya's 
financial sector is no exception. The capital market in Libya is 
completely absent, a fact which is reflected in the weak link between 
the monetary and real sectors. The money market is narrow with its 
activities limited to the large urban centers. As in the case of most 
LDCs, the variety (spectrum) of financial assets available to wealth 
holders is extremely limited; mostly to the choice between money and 
real estate. In Libya the market for government securities started in 
1973, however their trade is limited to the banking sector. Their major 
holder is the CBOL with a small quantity sold to the commercial banks. 
The dealers and brokers who bear the risk of fluctuations in the capital 
value of the securities do not exist. Moreover, the private securities 
and commercial papers which do exist are of limited scale and quantity. 
The financial sector plays an essential role in bringing both 
savers (lenders) and investors (borrowers) together and the degree of 
separation between these agents reflects the level of development of the 
financial sectors. The Libyan financial system is rudimentary and is 
not capable of performing efficiently the important role of mobilizing 
savings and allocating them to investment. The narrowness and low 
development of the capital and money markets result in a lower degree of 
monetization, therefore limiting the financial and money deepening in 
the national economy. These facts enable one to conclude that the 
financial system in Libya tends to be fairly simple in its structure and 
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in terms of instruments as well as types of institutions. The structure 
of the system is summarized in Figure 2. The system comprises of the 
following financial institutions: (i) the monetary authorities or the 
CBOL and the Libyan Treasury; (ii) the banking system excluding the 
CBOL; and (iii) the non-banking saving institutions which are comprised 
of the country's two insurance companies and the national investment 
corporation. After this introduction, the rest of the chapter will 
analyze briefly the modern development of the above mentioned financial 
institutions and their roles in the economic development in the Libyan 
economy. 
The Central Bank of Libya (CBOL) 
The Central Bank of Libya (CBOL), which will be referred to as the 
Bank, is the body responsible for carrying out the monetary policy 
decisions of the country. The financial structure reflects the 
constraints and opportunities facing the central banking institution. 
The first stage toward the establishment of the Bank was in 1956, when 
the "National Bank of Libya" started its operation as the new monetary 
authority in the country. It was established to carry out the functions 
of: (i) managing the issue of paper money and coins; (ii) keeping the 
reserves needed for maintaining internal and external balances; (iii) 
acting as a banker for the Federal government and the local 
administrations; and ( i v) conducting credit policies with the aim of 
serving the economy's credit needs [CBOL Annual Report (1967)]. The 
National Bank of Libya was established with the intention of performing 
the functions of a central banking entity, of achieving the credibility 
of a responsible and effective body that is capable of installing 
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domestic and foreign confidence in the domestic currency and financial 
system. However, the laH which established the Libyan National Bank 
made a radical departure from the conventional pattern of central 
banking status by alloHing the national bank to undertake ordinary 
commercial activities. The second stage in the development of the Bank 
came Hi th the Banking Law of 1963 which renamed it as the "Bank of 
Libya" and empowered it with more tools to conduct its functions. 
HoHever, the final step for the Bank to undertake all its functions as a 
full-pledged central bank came in 1970 when the Bank was called "The 
Central Bank of Libya." The CBOL became fully responsible for 
conducting the traditional central banking functions. The law empowered 
the bank to serve as: 
for the government; 
( i) the banker of banks; ( ii) the fiscal agent 
and (iii) the responsible body for the 
implementation of the country's monetary policy. 
The 1970 amendment of the Banking Law separated the Commercial 
Operations Department from the Bank to enable the central entity to 
devote all its efforts to the central banking activities. In order to 
undertake the responsibilities of a monetary authority, the Bank is 
reorganized into major departments: one is the Central Banking 
Department, through which the Bank performs its functions as a banker to 
banks, a controller and regulator to credit facilities in the economy, a 
banker to the government and a manager of the country's investment 
abroad. ( 1 3) The Bank has performed its function as the banker to the 
government by acting as buyer and seller of government securities since 
1973. The function of conducting monetary policy will be covered later 
in this chapter. The second department is the Issue Department through 
which the Bank manages and controls the currency issuance in the 
33 
country. 
The CBOL, like many central banks in the LDCs, attempts to 
encourage and assist- the economic development process in the country. 
In fact, the institution has undertaken its traditional functions such 
as managing the currency issue, supervising the commercial banks, 
managing the nation's foreign exchange results, including the operation 
of exchange controls and serving as the government's agent. Moreover, 
it encourages the extension of the commercial banking services in the 
rural areas and influences the allocation of long-term investment 
credit. The Bank, in fact, has carried out these assignments with 
considerable skill and succeeded in assisting in the accomplishment of 
the economic Plans' goals. 
The Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks are the major and important financial institutions 
that operate in the Libyan economy. Over the last 30 years, commercial 
banking in Libya has changed substantially due to increasing Libyani-
zation (Libyan-owned) and higher government control over the banking 
operations. Prior to 1960, there were eight commercial banks operating 
in the Libyan economy, all of them subsidiaries of foreign banks and 
entirely under foreign ownership and control [Baryun (1966)]. The 
commercial banking market, excluding the small operations of commercial 
banking transactions carried by the Libyan National Bank, was completely 
a market for foreign banks. In efforts to correct this situation, the 
Banking Law of 1963 ordered the Libyanization of 51 percent of these 
foreign branches. The Libyanization process was slow. However, by 1970 
all the foreign banks' shares were nationalized. Since 1970 the number 
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of commercial banks was reduced to five major banks( 14 ) and the entry 
door was closed, see Figure 2. The expansion of banking services, 
therefore, is limited to opening new branches by the existing banks. 
The growth of the economy and the expansion of banking habits have 
reflected an increasing demand for the banking services. By 1981, the 
banking services were supplied all over the country by 142 branches 
spread in various cities, towns and villages [CBOL Annual Report, 
(1982)]. The reorganization of the banking structure aimed at: ( i) 
widening the geographical coverages and spreading banking services into 
rural areas; (ii) increasing mobilization of deposits; and (iii) 
reallocating bank credits in favor of sectors and activities previously 
neglected. The achievement of these goals requires increasing the 
public ownership and control over these financial institutions. This 
change took place in the decade of the seventies. 
The commercial banks as profit-seeking firms concentrate their 
activities in the low-risk and high-return short term credit 
facilities. Under their old structure as private firms, the banks 
extend most of their credit services to the trade and service sectors. 
The limits to their operations were the domestic economy's absorptive 
capacity and the public's desire to hold currency rather than bank 
deposits. The commercial banks in Libya are required by law to hold at 
least 15 percent of their portfolio in a form of liquid assets as 
indicated by Article 36 of the Banking Law No. 4 of 1963. The full 
takeover of the banks by the public sector guaranteed their cooperation 
toward the fulfillment of the economic policies as presented by the 
economic plans. The public control of commercial banks intends to 
achieve wide spread use of bank credit, direct a large flow of credit to 
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priority sectors, and make banks more effective instruments of economic 
progress. The analysis of the banks' credits by purpose indicates that 
commercial banks credits to the productive sectors, particularly in 
agriculture and industries, recorded a large increase since 1975, 
accompanied by "relative" decline in the share of the traditional 
customers of these banks as the trade, commerce and service sectors. In 
fact, the data on credits offered to the traditional sectors recorded an 
extreme decline since 1978 due to the liquidation of private 
enterprises, which started to be replaced by publically owned companies 
and corporations.< 15) In short, the significant changes in commercial 
banking aim to increase the role of banks as catalytic agents of 
development in order to influence the allocation of credits given by 
commercial banks among various uses, in accordance with any investment 
strategy and public policies. 
The Non-Commercial Specialized Banks 
The specialized banks were established with the purpose of 
extending credit needs for commercial activities. These banks were seen 
as feasible alternative financial institutions filling the gaps created 
by the commercial banks' profit motives. These specialized institutions 
are state owned banks set up to cater loans to those economic agents 
which meet the conditions as stated by the law. These banks do not 
accept deposits from the public. The specialized banks which operate in 
the Libyan economy are as follows. 
1. The Agricultural Bank: The bdnk was set up in 1955 with the 
aim of stimulating agriculture and animal production through extending 
low cost loans, aids and encouragements in such productive fields. The 
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bank carries out the government's policy via loans and various 
facilities to farmers as well as its direct participation in some 
projects and companies which work in the bank's area of interest. The 
bank offers three types of loans: ( 16 ) ( i) Short-term loans to enable 
farmers to purchase seeds and fertilizers; (ii) Medium-term loans to buy 
machines and equipments; and (iii) Long-term loans to finance land 
reclamation and drilling wells. 
2. The Industrial and Real Estate Bank: The bank was set up in 
1966 with the purpose of offering long-term loans to build housing for 
low-income 
industries. 
groups and to support existing and establish new 
In 1981, the bank was replaced by two specialized banks: 
[CBOL Annual Report (1984)] (a) The Saving and Real Estate Investment 
Bank: This new bank was set up in January 1981 with the purpose to 
extend credits to housing and construction projects. This bank conducts 
credit policies in accordance with the framework of the goals of the 
social and economic plans. (b) The Development Bank: This bank was set 
up by the Law No. 18 of 1981 for the purpose of extending credit 
facilities to finance agricultural, industrial and tourism investment 
projects. 
3. The Libyan Arab Bank: The bank is wholly owned by the CBOL. 
It was established for the purpose of managing and supervising the 
government's foreign investments. The bank's scope of activities is 
outside Libya, with its operations limited, in various cases, to 
participation in the ownership of some banks and companies abroad. The 
bank also finances some investment projects in some friendly countries 
[Baryun ( 1981)]. 
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The Non-Bank Saving Institutions 
This group of financial institutions includes the "Libyan" and "Al-
Mukhtar" Insurance companies and the National Investment Corporation 
( N IC) . ( 1 7) These two insurance companies are publically-owned. 
Besides, they are the only insurance providers to the whole economy. 
The NIC was established in 1970 with the purpose to help pool the 
available financial resources in the economy. The scope of its 
activities are concentrated in the area of housing and tourism [El-
Sharif (1980)]. 
In short, financial intermediation in Libya is conducted by the 
above mentioned institutions. The CBOL is the apex institution of the 
financial system while the commercial banks play the predominant role. 
The specialized banks were founded for the purpose of extending credit 
for specific economic activities. Meanwhile, the non-bank saving 
institutions' activities have been limited mostly to real estate. The 
last two agents have a very limited monetary impact which can be 
ignored. However, the structure and evolution of the Libyan financial 
system since the early 1970's have been subject to an increasing degree 
of public ownership and control. Practically, all financial 
institutions are now under public control and almost all financial 
assets flow through the public sector. The extensive control of the 
financial system is aimed at ensuring the flow of financial assets into 
desired directions, in particular, to priority areas of development such 
as agriculture, industries and rural areas in accordance to the Plans' 
goals. The dominant impact on the system is to be limited to the CBOL 
and the commercial banks operating in the economy. In conclusion, the 
financial system of Libya is dominated solely by the banking sector. 
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The Libyan Financial Policy 
The official financial policy is expected to support the goal of 
the resource allocation mix adopted by the economic plans which aims to 
achieve growth and price stability in the domestic economy. The 
financial policy, therefore, is directed toward providing adequate 
liquidity in the economy to meet the transaction purposes and to help 
pool domestic savings. The official government policy is to control 
credit in the economy with the objectives: ( i) to ensure a planned 
credit expansion for the economy as a whole; and (ii) to make sure that 
credits flow to desired regions and sectors in order to meet increasing 
production, to fulfill output targets and to achieve other national 
social and economic objectives. In addition, the mobilization of the 
available domestic resources and their reallocation aim to support 
achievement of the plans' economic goals. The financial policy is, in 
fact, affected by two major factors which exert their strong effect on 
the conduct of the financial and monetary policies. 
First, as in the case of many LDCs, Libya suffers from the problem 
of financial dualism as presented by the existence of two money markets 
that operate in the economy. ( 18 ) However, the case in Libya is less 
severe since the role of the unorganized money market is limited and 
declining. The oil boom help spread the monetization of the economy, 
while Islamic teachings help remove all interest charges since Islamic 
laws condemn all types of interest rate payments. In Libya, the absence 
of a developed capital market prevents the exercise of a sound financial 
policy and affects the policy's role in mobilizing, directing and 
channeling domestic savings. However, the money market in Libya is 
relatively more developed as compared to the capital market, which makes 
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financial assets other than money extremely limited. Hence, the 
available spectrum of real assets is dominated by the low-risk, high-
yield real estate. The available choices of financial assets are very 
narrow and limited to some commercial papers, some stocks and shares of 
a few joint companies and a limited quantity of government securities 
along with money as the dominant financial asset. Therefore, if money 
is excluded, the market for financial assets is extremely narrow and 
concentrated in few hands, mostly the banking system and a very small 
number of high income individuals. In fact, the limiting factor on the 
role of financial policy is not only the narrow range of available 
securities, but also the size of their market as well, which explains 
why the financial assets are mainly in the form of money that is 
currency and bank deposits. 
Second, the low state of development of the non-bank saving 
institutions and the wide spread hoarding on the part of the public have 
resulted in malallocation of resources and insufficient mobilization of 
savings. As a result, banks have become the major provider of liquidity 
needs in the economy. These facts are reflected in the form of savings 
which exist in the economy. In any society, savings are dominated by 
the type of financial assets available to savers (i.e. in Libya most 
savings are in the form of cash and bank deposits, which are essentially 
liabilities to the banking system). Thus, given the structure of the 
Libyan economy, the banking sector is responsible for furnishing 
sufficient liquidity in the economy to finance transactions and to 
facilitate exchanges, as well as pooling domestic savings. The Libyan 
economy, in general, enjoys a high liquidity because of the limited size 
of its money market and the slow spread of banking habits among the 
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Libyan society, especially in the early 1970's. The fact that financial 
securities are mainly limited to money indicates that financial policy 
is impotent and makes the monetary authorities play an essential role in 
the management of the monetary sector in the economy. 
The Libyan Monetary Policy 
The exact quantitative role that monetary policy plays in 
determining money and credit in any economy is not a matter of general 
agreement among economists. Thus, every government tries to execute the 
proper money and credit management that it sees as suitable for 
achieving the ultimate goals of economic stability, growth, and internal 
and external balances. However, when the financial system is imperfect 
and still in its early stage of development, the quantity of money and 
the availability of credit are the only targets which can be managed [El 
Hassia, (1~79)]. Moreover, the specific tools of money and credit 
management in practical use differ among the monetary authorities 
(central banks) due to reasons related to the institutional circum-
stances in each country. The monetary authorities in Libya have to 
decide on the optimal quantity of money and credit, taking into account 
the objectives of its economic policy. The CBOL's ability to control 
the quantity of money (i.e. reserve money) in Libya is directly related 
to the Bank's experience and capability in controlling its balance 
sheet. The structure of the Bank's balance sheet reflects the fact that 
foreign assets (i.e. the BOP) and government deposits (i.e. the 
government budget) are two dominant factors in that statement, and both 
elements are exogenously determined. Foreign assets is a function of 
the price and quantity of oil and both are exogenous to the Bank.( 19) 
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And government deposits, which are determined by the budgetary actions, 
are exogenous to the Bank as well. Therefore, the oil revenues 
materialize as increases in private liquidity (money supply) only when 
the government conducts domestic spending, hence using its deposits at 
the CBOL. Accordingly, fiscal policy actions do, in fact, exert a 
strong and effective control over the rate of domestic money 
growth. ( 20) Hence fiscal and monetary policies in Libya are not quite 
separable since they are not independent. 
The Banking Law of 1963 and its amendments have empowered the Bank 
with all the tools of monetary policy which are available to central 
banks. The Bank, however, uses the policy tools in various degrees with 
the exception of the tool of open market operations. Open market 
operations is not a viable tool due to the rudimentary nature of the 
Libyan financial structure. Given the institutional set-up CBOL has at 
its disposal the rest of the traditional monetary control tools are: 
(1) The bank rate: although the Law empowered the Bank to change 
the discount rate (the bank rate), the rate has remained unchanged at 5 
percent since February 1961 .C 21 ) In practice, the discount of bills and 
other papers has not been of significance in influencing the commercial 
banks' ability to extend credits, due to the excess liquidity they 
enjoyed particularly in the 1960s and early seventies. Since, 
commercial banks rely less on borrowing from the BOL, the discount rate 
is rendered an ineffective tool of monetary controls. 
( 2) The required reserves ratio: the Law requires commercial 
banks to keep a portion of their deposits with the CBOL. Changing the 
reserve requirement is considered an important tool in managing the 
monetary sectors in the LCDs [Goode and Thorn (1959)]. In Libya the 
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reserve requirement ratios were set at 15 percent on demand deposits and 
5 percent on time and savings deposits since the early sixties. ( 22 ) 
However, despite the importance of variation in reserve requirement 
ratios, the CBOL never practiced its right to influence the lender power 
of banks, with the exception of 1966 when the ratio on time and savings 
deposits was raised to 7.5 percent. 
( 3) Credit controls: the CBOL is empowered to undertake direct 
quantitative and qualitative credit controls to promote monetary 
stability and economic growth. The CBOL requires commercial banks to 
hold a liquidity ratio of liquid assets to deposit liabilities. The 
actual liquid assets and the required liquidity ratio are affected by 
the deposit liabilities as well as by the commercial banks' utilization 
of these liabilities and both terms have gone various changes till 
1970.( 23) However, in order to expand credit facilities to the private 
sector to stimulate the economic activities and to insure a more 
effective participation in the country's economic development, the 
required liquidity ratio was reduced to 15 percent on November 1970, 
which is still in effect since [CBOL (1982)]. This policy aims to help 
banks enjoy more liquidity, therefore, to be able to extend more credit 
to the private sector. 
(4) Direct credit control is among the control tools available to 
the CBOL. So the Bank relies heavily on credit regulations. This prac-
tice of direct credit controls aims to control the potential capacity of 
the commercial banks' ability to extend credits. Therefore, the focus 
of the Bank is on reducing commercial banks' credit to nonproductive 
acti viti es, (i.e. trade and services) and encouraging credit flows to 
the productive ones. The Bank practices selective credit controls as a 
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device to direct bank's resources towards specific economic activities 
in the sectors of agriculture, industries and real estate. ( 24 ) As the 
case in many LCDs, the CBOL depends on the use of moral suasion as an 
effective tool of money management. The banking system reorganization, 
brought about by the 1971 amendment of the Banking Law No. 3 of 1963, 
made the Bank able to carry out effectively its decisions, since it owns 
the largest three out of five commercial banks. 
Given the structure of the financial institutions and the character 
of the money market in this oil-based LDC, the monetary management 
conducted by the monetary authorities is of limited role: ( i) The 
Central Bank of Libya's prime credit policy is to manipulate the banks' 
credit rather than its cost. Influencing the size of credit instead of 
the cost is of prime importance. Such policy is reflected in the Bank's 
decision to fix the rate of interest charged by commercial banks. 
Accordingly, a ceiling was imposed on the maximum interest charged by 
commercial banks of 7 percent for secured loans and 7. 5 percent for 
nonsecured ones. Moreover, demand deposits are interest free, and the 
interest rate on time and savings deposits was fixed at 4 percent. 
These ceilings imposed on the interest rates meant to limit the 
commercial banks ability to raise the interest charges to their 
customers. Since all rates are linked to the bank rate (discount rate), 
any increase in the rate wi 11 increase the Bank's rate by the new 
interest rise, but as demonstrated above, the discount rate was kept 
constant. The policy of having an interest ceiling resulted in 
preventing the use of the discount rate as an effective tool of monetary 
controls. Moreover, such policy may help the development of an active 
securities market.< 25 ) In general, due to the imperfection of the money 
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market in addition to the rudimentary nature of the capital market, the 
quoted rates of interest fall short of reflecting the market 
conditions. Therefore, the existing rates of interest neither reflect 
the resource allocation function nor the true market forces. ( i i) The 
Bank, therefore, considers the selective credit controls and moral 
sausion as the major important instruments of monetary controls. 
Therefore, the Bank utilizes such tools with the aim to provide a degree 
of flexible monetary policy and to help regulate credit flows to the 
various sectors of the economy in accordance with the goals of the 
development plans. (iii) Given the relative free trade and fixed 
exchange rate, the Libyan economy is linked closely to the outside 
world. This inter-dependence with the world economy causes the domestic 
economy to be sensitive to the world economic conditions. ( i v) Given 
the nonexistence of open market operations as an effective tool of 
monetary controls, it makes the monetary authorities unable to influence 
the stock of available funds.C 26) 
Generally, in a world of a fractional reserve banking system, the 
stock of money in the economy is a product of base money (reserve money, 
high-powered money, or monetary base) and the money multiplier. 
Therefore, the efforts to control the aggregate money stock or to make 
changes in the money supply will depend on the monetary authorities' 
capability to control the monetary base and/or the factors which effect 
the behavior of the money multiplier. ( 27) The control of the money 
multiplier is not solely under the influence of the monetary 
authorities. Thus, sound monetary controls will rely on the effective-
ness of the authorities' control over base money. The control of base 
money requires the control over its domestic and foreign components. 
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Indeed, it is crucial for the maintenance of monetary stability to 
acquire a ceiling on the growth of base's components in order for the 
authorities to be able to control the aggregate money supply in the 
economy. 
In brief, the CBOL is the sole holder of foreign assets since the 
law requires the government to keep its foreign exchange earnings (oil 
revenue) in its account at the Bank. Since the foreign assets i tern is 
completely exogenous to the Bank and is determined by the volume and 
prices of oil exports, changes in government accounts actually are the 
dominant effect on the monetary base. By law the CBOL is the agent 
responsible for the management of the country's monetary policy. It 
operates through regulating the amounts of credits and via influencing 
the overall level of loans and deposits of the banking sector. The 
domestic component of base money is the domestic credits creation of the 
CBOL. Its major items are net claims on banks, net claims on government 
and net claims on public corporations and institutions. However, claims 
on government is the essential item of the net domestic assets of the 
CBOL. 
Finally, as indicated above, most of the tools of monetary control 
used by the CBOL are ineffective with the exception of the selective 
controls and moral suasion. Adding to this the strong fiscal influence 
on monetary controls, the Libyan economy furnishes a clear example where 
fiscal and monetary policies are not quite separable, but form part of a 
single unified policy. In fact, such special institutional character-
istics are not unique with Libya, but rather are shared by a large group 
of oil exporting less developed countries including Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. 
ENDNOTES 
1The 1981-85 transformation plan stresses the goal of building a 
sound economy to be achieved through: (i) concentrating the efforts on 
increasing domestic production, by putting more emphasis on agriculture 
and industry with the hope of achieving annual growth rates of 8.8 
percent and 19.9 percent for these activities respectively; (ii) 
reducing the dependence on oil exports as the major source of income; 
and (iii) raising the yield and efficiency of all available resources 
whether human, material, or natural, through the acceleration of the 
development of all non-oil sectors in efforts to reduce the costs of 
production. See the Secretary of Planning, Draft of the 1981-85 Plan, 
(1980). The 1980-85 economic plan called for a total investment 
allocation of Libyan Dinar (LD) 18.5 billion (about $60 billion) over 
the five-year plan period. The investment allocation to agriculture 
development accounts for 16.7 percent (about $10.00 billion) of the 
plan's total investment allocations. See CBOL Annual for report (1981 ), 
p. 55. 
2In spite of the large area of the country, less than five percent 
of the country's total area is considered arable lands, and the 
remaining 95 percent is a harsh desert dry climate. 
3The double-entry accounting system requires that total debits must 
equal total credits with the net balance (difference) equal to zero. 
4The overall balance or the official settlements balance is the 
balance which focuses on the country's effort to defend its own currency 
and shows its capability in meeting the country's obligations toward the 
rest of the world (ROW). See Lindert and Kindleberger (1982) p. 276. 
5To make the concept of "above and below the line'" more clear, 
consider the following example: dealing with the current account, all 
above the line entries show credit and debt items which represent flows 
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of goods and services including gifts, or flows of resources which are 
currently used. Meanwhile, the below the line entries show all asset 
flows between the country in consideration and its trade partners. 
Thus, a surplus on the current account reflects a net foreign investment 
while a deficit on the account indicates disinvesting abroad because the 
country is importing more goods and services, hence, becoming a net 
debtor to its trade partners. See Mason (1975), pp. 72-73. 
6when the basic balance includes only trade flows (i.e. excluding 
the autonomous capital flows) deficit would mean the deficit country is 
absorbing more real resources than what its national economy produces. 
See Mason, (1975), p. 66. 
7The short-term inflows can take various forms. They could take 
the form of an increase in private foreign-held bank deposits in the 
deficit country or short-term government obligations purchased by a 
foreign central bank. 
8For more details on the measures of the openness of the economy to 
the ROW. See Marina N. Whitman (1969) pp. 729-753. 
9using the ratio of total trade/GOP (the absolute sum of exports 
and imports divided by the gross domestic product) as an indicator for 
the degree of the economy's openness to the (ROW), the findings show 
that our oil-surplus countries are characterized by a large degree of 
openness through their foreign trade as indicated by the following: 
The Ratio of TT/GDP 
1971 1975 1979 1982 Average 
Libya 0.86 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.93 
Kuwait 0.85 0.94 1.07 1.10 0.99 
s. Arabia 0.89 1.02 1.02 1 0. 2 0.98 
U.S.A. 0. 11 0. 1 6 0.19 0. 18 0.16 
Source: Data for total trade (TT) and GOP are obtained from the 
IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986. 
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10The one-good dominant situation, in fact, is shared by most 
developing countries which are dominated by a mono-economy, where a 
single cash crop or mineral resource is dominating the structure of its 
exports. The coffee, copper and crude oil exporting LDCs are good 
examples. 
11 In Libya, as it is the case of most LDCs, the Central Bank of 
Libya (CBOL) is the principle holder of the country's international 
reserves (foreign assets). 
12The unit of account of the Libyan currency was called the pound 
till September 1, 1971 when the dinar was introduced. The Libyan pound 
(L.P.) was linked to the Sterling Block, therefore, it was affected by 
the position of the pound sterling and reflected its strength and 
weakness. The link continued until the Libyan monetary authorities 
broke up with that Block in December, 1971. The monetary authorities 
chose to link the Dinar to the U.S. dollars, when the dollar was chosen 
as an intervention currency. The market rate of the Dinar (the rate set 
by the CBOL) was set at $2.80 per dinar. But the 1970's development in 
the international monetary system joined by the devaluations of the 
dollar (1971 and 1973) resulted in a "managed floating" system. In 
order to keep pace with the declining value of the dollar, the L.D. was 
appreciated twice. The dollar devaluation of 1971 led the CBOL to raise 
the market rate of the Dinar to $3.04 per dinar. The second 
appreciation followed the 1973 dollar devaluation, and again the rate 
was raised to $3.3778 per dinar. Both changes in the market rate of the 
Dinar reflected the official changes in the value of the U.S. dollar. 
However, since 1985 the Libyan dinar has been pegged to the SDR. See 
IFS, Year Book (1973), pp. 336-7, and IFS (March 1983), p. 15. 
l3The Central Bank of Libya manages the country's investment abroad 
via its subsidiaries, especially, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, which is 
totally owned by the CBOL. 
14The five commercial banks operating in the Libyan economy since 
1970 are (i) the National Commercial Bank, (ii) Al-Jamahiriya Bank, 
(iii) Al-Umma Bank, (iv) Al-Wahda Bank; and (v) Sahara Bank. 
15For example, the credit share to general commerce dropped from 
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185 m/L.D. in 1977 to only 14 m/L.D. in 1979. Whereas, the credit 
extended to agriculture had increased from about 1.5 m/L.D. in 1970 to 
9.3 m/L.D. in 1975, then jumped to 32.2 m/L.D. and 39.1 m/L,D. in 1978 
and 1979 respectively. See BOL (1984) Table 12. 
16 Although the interest paid on these types of loans was extremely 
low, in 1966 all loans became interest-free. See CBOL Annual Report 
(1982), p. 43. 
17 The corporation is jointly owned by the commercial banks, the 
insurance companies, the General Agency for Social Securities and the 
General Housing Corporation. See El-Sharif (1980) p. 30. 
18The money market dualism is presented by the coexistence of 
organized and unorganized markets that service the economy. The 
organized market is serving the urban areas whereas the unorganized one 
is more active in the rural areas. In the rural agricultural areas the 
local money lenders who charge high interest rates are the major 
suppliers of financial funds to farmers. See Nasser, (1972) p. 39. 
However, in the Libyan economy the activities of the unorganized money 
markets are very limited, and if they exist, the loans given are mostly 
interest free due to the religious influence. 
19The inflow of oil revenue by itself has no effect on the domestic 
monetary aggregates because the transactions are all within the 
government sector. For example the sale of oil abroad will affect the 
CBOL's balance-sheet as follows: 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign reserves + Government deposits + 
But, it is the difference between these two items of the balance sheet 
that affects the monetary base. 
20When the government spends in the domestic economy via its 
purchases of goods and services from the private sector, the government 
deposits will be transferred to the private sector. These changes in 
government deposits reflect the fiscal actions of the government. 
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Another important factor affecting monetary growth in Libya is private 
sector imports. When the private sector imports goods and services, 
there will be a corresponding reduction in the foreign assets holdings 
of CBOL in exchange for domestic currency. Thus, the private sector 
imports have a contractionary effect on the domestic money supply and 
consequently play an important stabilizing role against the government 
expansionary monetary policy. However, due to a limited economic 
capacity to absorb imports, escalating domestic public spending has, in 
fact, outweighed the private sector imports, hence resulted in noticable 
acceleration in monetary growth. See A. Darat (1980) p. 12 and CBOL, 
Economic Bulletin (Jan-Mar 1984), tables 14 and 29. 
21 Prior to 1960 the bank rate was set at 4 percent, then it was 
raised to 5 percent on October of 1958. In August 1960 the rate was 
raised again to reach 6 percent. The final use of this instrument was 
February 1961, when the rate was reduced to 5 percent which remained 
unchanged since that date. See IMF, IFS (1980). 
22The Banking Law No. 4 of 1963 requires a compulsory legal reserve 
requirement on commercial banks' deposit liabilities that ranges between 
10 and 40 percent on demand deposits and from 5 to 20 percent on time 
and saving deposits. 
23The liquid assets have been redefined on May 1970 to consist of 
vault cash (domestic and foreign) and deposits in the commercial banks 
and the CBOL. Baryun (1980) p. 36. The liquidity ratio was set up at 
20 percent during 1958-66, then was raised to 25 percent on the 1966-70 
period. See CBOL Annual Report (1972/73) p. 70. 
24For a detailed itemization of credits extended to the different 
sectors of the economy. 
1984), table 12. 
See CBOL Economic Bulletin (January-March, 
25However, since April 1980, which is beyond our period the CBOL 
has adjusted the interest payment to savers in its effort to encourage 
savings, and removed the maximu~ limits for interest earning for 
savings. The decision covered both the terms of the level and the 
varieties of the rates according to maturity. The Bank, therefore, 
removed the 5000 L.D. limit on interest earning on savings. Since 
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March 9, 1981, the maximum limits for interest rates given to saving 
depositors was raised to 5 percent. Meanwhile, the rates on time 
deposits become: (i) for 1-3 months short-term deposits is 5 percent; 
for 3-6 months is 5 1/4; and for 6-12 months is 5 1/2 percent; (ii) for 
medium-term deposits of one year the payment is 6 percent; 7 percent for 
two years and 9 percent for more than four years deposits. See CBOL 
Economic Bulletin (July-December 1980) p. 10. 
26Government securities did not exist prior to 1973, and since that 
year their market is still limited to the banking system. 
27The factors which influence the behavior of the money multiplier 
are the commercial banks, individuals and central bank. This topic is 
studied in more detail in Chapter III. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MONETARY APPROACH TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Introduction 
Since the 1960s, the international economy has witnessed 
fundamental changes such as expansion in the international financial 
integration and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods-based international 
financial system in the early 1970s. (1) These changes in the 
international economic scene have stressed the essential role played by 
the monetary forces and reflected the dissatisfaction with the 
macroeconomic apparatus which was still dominated by the inherently 
Keynesian thinking and its capability of providing a satisfactory 
explanation of the current economic problems [Wilson (1986)]. The major 
changes in the international economic relations stressed the need for a 
more integrated treatment of the BOP which emphasized the role of money 
and capital in international payments. The "monetary approach to the 
balance of payments" (MABOP) is a newly developed theory of the BOP. 
Payments adjustment is viewed in terms of monetary adjustment instead of 
via relative price and income changes. By identifying the BOP problem 
as a monetary phenomenon, the "new" approach presents both a theoretical 
and an empirical a~ternative to the analysis of the BOP issues.C 2) The 
monetary approach, by integrating the current and capital accounts into 
the overall money account of the BOP, reformulated the BOP theory in a 
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general equilibrium approach and underlined the emphasis on the 
implication of monetary theory on the international economy. The MABOP 
stresses the importance of monetary variables in the BOP 
determination. It uses domestic monetary equilibrium conditions to 
derive an explanation of the overall BOP position of a country, a role 
which was ignored by the traditional approaches.(3) 
In contrast to the traditional approaches, the monetary approach 
assumes the inability of the monetary authorities to sterilize the 
monetary flows associated with the overall BOP surpluses or deficits so 
that the flows do influence the money supply [Johnson (1972)]. A 
disequilibrium in the BOP expresses a phase of stock adjustment in the 
money market (not an equilibrium flow as seen by the traditional 
approaches) and such a stock disequilibria initiates transitory 
adjustment flows [Fausten (1979)]. This explains why the monetary 
approach focuses on the stock formulation of the demand for and supply 
of money within the context of a simple macroeconomic general 
equilibrium model. The monetary approach looks to changes in trade and 
capital flows to play merely a transitory role in the adjustment process 
and considers the stock equilibrium in the domestic money market as 
being reflected in the net balance on the money account of the BOP. 
Since demand for money is a demand for stock, not a flow,( 4) a variation 
in the supply of money relative to the demand for it is associated with 
BOP disequilibrium, Therefore, in the event of a monetary disturbance 
the MABOP states that the foreign reserve variable will tend to carry 
the adjustment burden of equating the demand for and supply of money. 
Thus, the proponents of the approach argue that changes in foreign 
reserves can be explained by the variables contained in the model of the 
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sector without the need for referring to the variables conventionally 
used in the BOP analysis [Dornbusch (1971), Johnson (1972, 1976a), and 
Kemp (1975)]. Therefore, the monetary approach considers the role of 
demand for and supply of money stock the central factor in the BOP 
adjustment mechanism and relies on the fundamental empirical assumptions 
[Johnson (1975, 1977)]: ( i ) the existence of a stable demand for 
money; and (ii) given the economy is under a fixed rate regime, the 
domestic component of the money supply is determined independently of 
demand and is subject to policy control.(5) 
The task of this chapter is to present a comprehensive survey of 
the major theoretical development of the monetary analysis of the BOP 
adjustment. It attempts to cover the theoretical propositions and 
assumptions on which the monetary analysis to the BOP are based. It 
explains how the adjustment mechanism works. It introduces and develops 
a basic monetary model which is usually used in empirical studies. 
Finally, the chapter will present a general overview of the policy 
implications of the model and an evaluation and critique of the views of 
the monetary approach. 
The Fundamental Propositions 
The monetary approach asserts essential propositions concerning the 
nature of the balance of payments which are the following: 
(1) The approach's basic assumption views the BOP as an 
essentially (but not exclusively) monetary phenomenon in a context of a 
general equilibrium analysis. ( 6 ) Thus, at least in the long run, it 
considers the monetary factors to play a decisive role in the 
disturbance and the adjustment of the country's external balance. The 
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approach centers its activity on the direct influence of the money 
market disequilibrium on the BOP position [Johnson (1977c)]. It regards 
the BOP disequilibrium as originating and reflecting imbalances in the 
domestic money market which spilled over into the external sector of the 
economy. Such monetary disturbance cause the BOP imbalances and produce 
the processes through which these imbalances are eliminated. By doing 
so, the monetary approach relates the BOP directly to the demand for and 
supply of money [Girton and Nattress (1977)]. Because the monetary 
approach views demand for money as a stock demand, it considers BOP 
deficits or surpluses as stock adjustment to money market 
disequilibrium, or as continuous flow disturbances resulting from 
ongoing stock adjustment [Tullio (1974)]. Accordingly, the MABOP views 
a deficit in the BOP as being a result of an excess in the domestic 
money stock over what the society desires to hold. Hence, in a world of 
fixed exchange rates, the excess supply of money flows abroad and 
produces a deficit in that country's BOP. An excess demand over the 
country's domestic money supply leads to a BOP surplus. Therefore, a 
positive excess demand for money is satisfied by inflow of international 
money. The BOP flow is one of the mechanisms by which actual money 
imbalances are adjusted to their desired levels, and the resulted 
equilibrium in the money market leads to a corresponding equilibrium in 
the BOP.C7) Johnson (1976, pp. 21-22) summarized this basic proposition 
by stating " .•. since the money account is determined by the excess flow 
demand for money ... the BOP is essentially a monetary phenomenon." 
(2) The monetary approach looks at the BOP from the "bottom up" in 
contrast to the traditional approaches which view the BOP from "top 
down." It lumps together all the "above the line" items that constitute 
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the current and capital accounts without any analysis or explanation of 
these separate balances. By identifying the BOP with those items "below 
the line," the monetary approach focuses its attention on the official 
settlement balance. It defines the BOP as the changes in the money 
account, and focuses on the effects which a change in the overall 
balance has on the country's monetary base and its domestic money 
supply. Accordingly, the BOP contains all the transactions that reflect 
the adjustment of actual money balances to their desired level. By 
doing so, the approach is able to arrive at a meaningful and relevant 
analysis of the BOP issues. 
(3) The adjustment mechanism is assumed instantaneous and 
automatic in the sense that demand for money always equals its supply. 
Therefore, any BOP imbalance (or exchange rate change) represents a 
phase in the automatic stock adjustment in the money market. It 
reflects a disequilibrium between actual and desired money balances. In 
fact, the BOP is seen by the monetary approach as a part of an automatic 
adjustment process that works to restore equilibrium whenever a monetary 
disturbance takes place [Johnson (1977c)]. The monetary disturbance 
spills over into the external sector where the BOP surplus or deficit is 
treated as part of the adjustment process towards equili bri urn in the 
money market and the BOP. 
(4) The monetary approach is concerned primarily with the long run 
in which the economy is assumed to be at a state of full employment and 
the price levels and interest rates in all countries move rigidly in 
1 i ne with one another. Thus, the purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
interest rate parity are assumed to hold. 
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The Adjustment Mechanism 
The monetary approach views the BOP as part of an automatic 
adjustment process that works to restore equilibrium in the money 
market, whenever, the state of equili bri urn is disturbed. Accordingly, 
any disturbance in the monetary sector will spill over into the external 
sector and become a deficit or surplus in the BOP. The monetary 
approach analysis is based on a general equilibrium framework and the 
assumption of monetary equilibrium at least in the long run. (B) In 
addition to the money market equilibrium, the monetary analysis of the 
BOP extends to the money supply process. It utilizes the compositional 
definition of the base money in an open economy and combines it with 
stock flow equilibrium concept and the arguments of the demand for money 
function to arrive at a BOP which explains the BOP as a monetary 
phenomenon. It shows the overall BOP as a flow variable which 
represents an adjUstment between stock variables or changes in net 
foreign assets of the central bank.(g) By assuming a stable demand for 
money function to exist, the BOP determinants are then identified as 
dependent upon the demand for and supply of money. Therefore, starting 
from an initial equilibrium position, the monetary approach's 
presentation seeks to explain and illustrate the process of adjustment 
towards equilibrium when an exogenous shock disturbs the system from 
equilibrium. 
The adjustment process, or market clearing mechanism to restore 
equilibrium whenever a disturbance occurs, differs whether the economy 
in concern is closed or open to the rest of the world. In a general 
equilibrium context, when a disturbance takes place in a closed economy, 
equilibrium is restored in a Walrasian world through changes in relative 
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prices of goods traded in the market< 10 ) [Aghevli and Khan (1977)]. 
However, if the economy is open through foreign trade and payments, the 
market clearing process would work through not only the domestic market 
but the world market as well. The adjustment process in an open economy 
as viewed by the monetary approach goes beyond mere emphasis on the role 
of money in addition to real variables to the extent that it considers 
the monetary aspects as the core and essence of the adjustment mechanism 
[Kreinin and Officer (1978)]. 
The adjustment process which is presented by the monetary approach 
can be explained with the help of Walras' law, which states that for a 
system to be in equilibrium all excess demand in the whole economy must 
sum up to zero.< 11 ) According to the MABOP, the BOP adjustment 
mechanism works in the following manner: Suppose the economy is 
initially in a state of general equilibrium where all excess demands sum 
up to zero. If the country runs a deficit in the current account, it 
means the COW1try has an excess demand for goods and services. Since 
her imports exceed her exports, the excess demand in the real market is 
met by the outside world. If she runs a deficit in the capital accoW1t, 
it is an indication of an excess demands in her bond markets, which are 
satisfied by importing more securities than she is exporting to the rest 
of the world. But, when a country runs a deficit in her overall 
balance (BOP), according to Walras' law, she must have an excess supply 
in her money market. This follows since in a three-market economy 
according to Walras' law when two markets have excess demands, the third 
market must have an excess supply.< 12 ) 
The loss of foreign reserves is viewed by the monetary approach as 
the way in which a country "exports" money to the external world. This 
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shows why it views the BOP disequilibrium as the mechanism by which an 
excess supply of (demand for) money is removed from the domestic money 
market. In brief, an excess demand for money implies a BOP surplus, 
while a deficit in the BOP reflects an excess supply of money in the 
money market [Wanniski (1975), Johnson (1977b) and Kenen (1986)]. 
Therefore, when an exogenous shock occurs, the adjustment process starts 
and keeps on working until the excess demand for (supply of) money 
vanishes and the flow demand for money equates the flow supply of it and 
equilibrium is restored. At that point the flow demand for goods and 
the flow demand for bonds each equal their flow supplies and the economy 
achieves equilibrium as well as the BOP. 
The link between the money market conditions and the overall BOP 
may be illustrated by a simple graphical exposition. ( 13) As explained 
above, any disturbance in the money market will be corrected through the 
BOP adjustment process. To explain graphically the path to restore 
equilibrium in the money market and then the BOP, suppose the starting 
point is the initial equilibrium given by: 
where: 
MD 
MD demand for money 
MS money supply 
DC domestic credits 
R foreign reserves 
MS DC + R (3. 1) 
This equilibrium relation is plotted in Figure 3(a), by the line MM, 
where the demand for money OM equals the supply of it. Now assume the 
demand for money is constant since all arguments of the demand for money 
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function are either given parameters as the interest rate and the price 
level, or at its employment level such as output, MD.< 14 ) From equation 
(3.1), we obtain: 
R MD - DC M - D (3. 2) 
In Figure 3(a) the horizontal axis shows the demand for money (MD = M) 
and the domestic credit (DC= D), while money supply (M) and foreign 
reserves (R) are measured along the vertical axis. At the initial 
equilibrium in the money market the stock of domestic credit is OD and 
the stock of foreign reserves ls OR (=DM). Now consider an exogenous 
shock, where the monetary authority increased the quantity of domestic 
credit by DD 1• If foreign reserves do not adjust instantaneously, the 
economy shifts from point E to E1 on the new line M1M1. This action by 
the monetary authorities increases the money supply to DM1 and produces 
an excess supply of money equals MM 1 (=OM1 -OM). The economy moves to 
point E1 which is a point of disequilibrium. In order to restore 
equilibrium in the domestic money market, society needs to dispose that 
excess quantity of money. The adjustment process to restore equilibrium 
must occur over time where society gets rid of the excess money by means 
of buying foreign goods, the direct effect is running a BOP deficit. 
The outflow of foreign reserves, over time, reduces the quantity of 
money and eliminates the excess supply. The adjustment process works 
over time and the change in foreign reserves tends to reduce reserves 
from OR to OR 1 . The adjustment process is shown by the pointed arrows 
through movements from E1 to E2 , and at this final step, adjustment ends 
where money supply returns back to OM and the money market is at the new 
equilibrium position indicated by point E2 . The new state of 
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equilibrium in the money market is a long-run equilibrium, where all 
excess mol')ey balances have been spent, hence, what society desires to 
hold equals the actual money stock. ( 15) 
Figure 3(b) shows a brief presentation of the adjustment process 
using a stock-flow relationship as summarized in equation (3.4) below: 
BOP = Rt = S A(MD - MS) 
R = A(MD - MS) A(MD - DC) - AR t 
( 3. 3) 
( 3. 4) 
The balance of payments is given by the flow of foreign reserves Rt 
while R is the stock of foreign reserves. The relation given by 
equation (3. 3) is presented by QQ in Figure 3(b ). The first term in 
equation ( 3. 4) gives the position of the QQ curve which shows the 
difference or the gap between the money society desires to hold and the 
quantity of liquidity provided by the monetary authority. An increase 
in domestic money (DC) shifts QQ downward and vice versa. The negative 
slope of the QQ line reflects the inverse relation between the stock of 
foreign reserves and the BOP. Starting from an initial equilibrium in 
the money market (no saving nor dissaving), the BOP is in equilibrium 
and the stock of foreign reserves is OR as shown in Figure 3(a), and 
Figure 3(b). As the monetary authorities raise the domestic credit, the 
decision disturbs the initial monetary equilibrium, hence, shifting QQ 
line down to Q1Q1 , and leading to a BOP deficit given by OK. Over time 
the economy moves toward equilibrium as indicated by the movement along 
Q1Q1, the path shown by the pointed arrows, until the stock of foreign 
reserves falls to OR1 . At that point, the deficit in the BOP is 
completely eliminated, the changes in reserves (BOP) equals zero and the 
money market returns to equilibrium [Kenen (1986), and Batiz and Batiz 
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(1984)]. The adjustment process, which is carried out in an automatic 
manner, enables us to concentrate on the causes behind the foreign 
reserves flow as presented by the money market imbalances. The BOP 
disequilibrium is viewed as a continuous flow disturbance that results 
from ongoing stock adjustment [Tullio (1974) and Shone (1980)]. 
Finally, the achievement of flow equilibrium will eventually guarantee 
the achievement of stock equilibrium.< 16 ) However, the monetary 
approach analysis considers the BOP imbalance as self-correcting and 
transitory in nature unless continuously disturbed by exogenous shocks 
such as a continuous change in domestic money (domestic credit) in the 
case of stationary economies and/or changes resulting from real output 
growth in the case of dynamic economies [Wilford (1978)]. 
As indicated by Robin (1979), the monetary approach views the BOP 
as having two important aspects: (i) the monetary disequilibrium 
reflects and explains any BOP surplus or deficit;< 17) and (ii) the BOP 
is the channel or mechanism through which monetary adjustments are 
carried out. For these reasons, the monetary approach analysis assumes 
a consistent relation between the rate of growth of the money stock and 
the rate of growth in the determinants of the demand for money. 
The type of adjustment, in fact, depends upon whether the economy 
is under fixed or flexible exchange rates system. The adjustment 
process under the fixed rates regime works through the BOP surplus or 
deficit as explained above. While under the flexible exchange rates 
regime, the monetary approach shifts the focus from determining the BOP 
to the determination of the exchange rate. Therefore, the exchange rate 
not the BOP becomes the key variable in the adjustment process.< 18 ) 
In the next section a simple monetary model is to be used to derive 
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a BOP equation. The purpose is to stress and to focus on the role of 
the monetary forces on the overall BOP adjustment process, instead of 
the partial equilibrium relative price or real aspects of the BOP 
adjustment adopted by the non-monetarist approaches. The original model 
of the MABOP was presented by H. Johnson (1972) and over time that model 
has been modified by many economists. The modifications introduced to 
Johnson's original model is aimed to meet the institutional constraints 
imposed by the conditions of the economies under consideration. 
However, the basic features of Johnson's model remained the same. 
The Model 
The MABOP framework of analysis as demonstrated above views the BOP 
as an adjustment to a monetary disturbance caused by exogenous forces. 
In an effort to illustrate the essential role of the monetary forces in 
the BOP adjustment mechanism we will set up a simple model of the 
monetary sector in the economy, then utilize it to derive an equation 
for the BOP as a monetary adjustment. This simple model is comprised of 
some behavioral relationships which explain the determinants of the 
demand for money, a monetary stock equation and an equilibrium condition 
in the money market. The model will suffice to treat the BOP as the 
difference or gap between the money demand and money supply in the 
economy. The simple monetary model to be used is presented as follows: 
d 
m f(y, c) 
P•f(y, c) 
m·H 
(3.5a) 
(3.'Jb) 
(3. 6) 
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H DC + R (3.7) 
Ms Md (3. 8) 
Equation (3.5a) shows the real demand for money balances, (Md/P), as a 
function of real income, ( y) ' and an opportunity cost variable of 
holding money balances, (c), while the nominal demand for money, (Md), 
is given by equation (3.5b). Equation ( 3. 6) shows the money supply, 
(Ms), as a multiple of the base money (the high-powered money), (H), and 
the money multiplier, (m). Equation (3.7) states that the base money 
equals to the net level of foreign reserves, (R), plus the net domestic 
credits creation by the central bank, (DC). Equation (3.8) expresses 
the market clearing condition in the money market.< 19) 
The equilibrium condition which is given by equation (3.8) requires 
that demand for money equal the supply for it, and thus implies a zero 
excess demand for money, a condition that must be met in the long run. 
However, in the short run the domestic money market may exhibit a 
temporary disequilibrium which could lead to an excess demand or an 
excess supply of money [Batiz and Batiz (1985)]. If the money market is 
in disequilibrium an automatic self-correcting mechanism starts to work, 
since the society begins to adjust its money balances in an effort to 
equate actual and desired money balances. The adjustment process works 
automatically via the flow variables to correct the disturbance and push 
the monetary forces back to an equilibrium position [Humphrey and 
Keleher (1982)]. This simple model treats all goods as tradables. 
Because the economy is assumed to be a small open one which follows a 
fixed exchange rates regime, it implies that all prices (including 
interest rates) are exogenously determined. The model also assumes the 
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real sector output is affected only by real variables such as the 
available resource base and the existing state of technology and other 
variables which are exogenous to the monetary sector. We will start the 
analysis by studying the money demand function, followed by the money 
supply process. Then we derive the BOP equation which will be used in 
the empirical analysis of the next chapter. 
The Demand for Money Function 
The existence of a well-specified demand for money function is a 
key assumption in the MABOP theory. Almost all the various theories 
proposed to explain the public's demand for money indicate the.existence 
of stable relatipns between the stock of money demanded and few 
essential economic variables, as presented by empirical results 
[Goldfield (1973), Judd and Scadding (1982) and Boorman (1985)], The 
stability issue as expressed by Judd and Scadding (1982, p. 993) states 
that: 
... a stable demand for money function means that the 
quantity of money is predi.ctably related to a small set of 
key var-iables that link money to the real sector of the 
economy.). 
The standard form of the money demand function which has emerged from 
the theoretical and empirical studies is similar to equation (3.1a) of 
the model. The demand for money is a demand for stock, it is a derived 
demand for the services which flow from holding that stock of money. 
The postulated real demand for money function is specified as follows: 
where: 
f(y, i) f > 0 y 
Md the stock of nominal demand for money. 
f. < 0 
1 
(3. 9) 
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P the domestic price level. 
i the domestic interest rate. 
y the real current income, or real permanent income or real 
wealth. 
Equation (3.9) expresses the real demand for money, (Md/P), as a 
function of real income, y, and interest rate, i, as the appropriate 
measure of the opportunity cost of holding idle money balances. The 
real income argument is assumed exogenous and positively related to the 
quantity of money demanded. Although the demand for money theories 
differ on the type of interest rate used, all theories indicate that 
interest rate is negatively related to the quantity of money 
demanded.C 20) The demand for money function is generally written in 
real terms based on the assumption that the function is homogeneous of 
degree one in prices. The homogeneity property implies: (i) the public 
is free of money illusion, therefore, society is not able to distinguish 
between real and nominal economic magnitudes; and (ii) long run 
neutrality of money, which means in the long run output is determined 
independently ·or the behavior of money [Humphrey and Keleher (1983)]. 
To transfer equation (3.9) into terms of growth rates, differentiate 
with respect to time: 
ar .2.1 + af di 
Cly dt (li. dt (3.10) 
Multiplying both sides of equation (3.10) by P and dividing them by Md 
yields: 
(3.11) 
68 
Now, multiply the first term on the right hand side of equation (3.11) 
by (y/y) and the second term by (i/i). This yields: 
dMd 1 
--·--
dP 1 
-·-dt p 
d 
aM y 1 dy 
--·-·-- + 
ay Md y dt (3.12) 
Define a dot on a variable to indicate its time derivative, i.e., x = 
dx/dt, and the growth rate of x to be g 
X 
~lx. Also denote the 
symbol E to be the elasticity of demand. 
X 
Therefore, expressing 
equation (3.12) in terms of rates of growth yields: 
g - g = E •g + E. •g. Md P y y 1 1 (3.13) 
To specify equation (3.13) in nominal terms, we move the growth rate of 
prices to the right hand side of the equation: 
E ) 0, E.< 0 y 1 (3.14) 
Equation (3.14) expresses the nominal demand for money in growth 
terms. The sign for the elasticity of demand for money with respect to 
income, E , is expected to be positive, while an expected increase in y 
interest rates reduces it. The coefficient of inflation is constrained 
to be one, which reflects the homogeneity assumption. 
The Money Supply Process 
The examination of the balance sheet of the monetary authority or 
the analysis of its assets and liabilities indicates that the stock of 
reserves money< 21 ) (high-powered money, or monetary base) in a country 
equals the sum of international (foreign) reserves holdings of the 
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banking system and the domestic credit creation (the net domestic assets 
of the central bank) [Zecher (1974)]. A compact summary of a 
hypothetical monetary authority's balance sheet is given by Table II 
below: 
TABLE II 
A MONETARY AUTHORITY'S BALANCE SHEET 
Assets Liabilities 
International Reserves Base Money 
All Other Assets 
R 
AOA 
H 
AOL All Other Liabilities 
R + AOA H + AOL 
The domestic credit creation, DC, is the domestic source of base money 
which by definition: DC = AOA - AOL. The item AOL is all liabilities 
other than base money. ( 22 ) The base money consists of two major 
components, the international reserves, (R), and the domestic source 
given by domestic credit, (DC), as shown by equation (3.7) in the 
model. From the summarized balance sheet of the monetary authority 
given by Table II, we arrive at the base money equation (3.7) as 
follows: 
H R + (AOA - AOL) R + DC (3.7) 
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It is clear that changes in the monetary base are associated with 
changes in international reserves and/or changes in the domestic credits 
variable, (DC). 
Notice, in a closed economy R = 0, therefore, any change in the 
base money is linked to the changes in DC. In that case, the monetary 
authority is able to exert control over the monetary base, hence, the 
money supply can be used as an instrument of monetary control. However, 
once the economy is opened to foreign influence via foreign trade and 
payments R is not generally equal to zero.< 23) In such a case only the 
domestic source of the monetary base, DC may be controlled by the 
monetary authorities. However, the MABOP asserts that the control over 
domestic credit will be fully offset by inflows and outflows of foreign 
reserves in the long run. 
If domestic credit is largely composed of government debt which is 
held by the central bank, the credit creation may be looked at as a 
traditional form of debt monetization. Then changes in domestic credit 
will be ultimately constrained by the budget deficit and net sales of 
government securities. 
alternatively defined as: 
Hence, changes in domestic credit could be 
flOC (G - T - B) (3.15) 
Therefore, a rise in government spending (G), ceteris paribus, tends to 
increase domestic credit (DC), whereas more borrowing from the private 
sector (domestic or foreign) (B), and tax, (T), tend to reduce domestic 
credit [ Akhtor ( 1979)]. This alternative approach to domestic credit 
establishes a systematic relation between domestic credit and the fiscal 
policy structure. As equation (3.15) indicates, changes in domestic 
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credit, (ll.DC) are determined by fiscal constraints.C 24 ) The above 
analysis considers the creation of domestic credit a "residual" of the 
fiscal policy variables. This implies that, whenever G > T + B, the 
deficit in the budget needs to be monetized by the central bank's 
creation of domestic credit. Therefore, unless a ll.G (change in G) is 
completely offset by an exact ll.(T and B), then the difference, which 
is ll.DC (change in DC), must be met by the central bank's creation of 
domestic money to finance that government budget deficit [D. S. Wilford 
( 1977)]. This analysis shows how fiscal policy variables are linked to 
foreign reserves flow, since changes in R or DC lead to changes in the 
base money which causes change in the money supply. 
In a world of fractional reserve system, the banking sector can 
create money stocks according to the process which is indicated by 
equation (3.6) of this simple monetary model. Now, the substitution of 
equation (3.7) into equation (3.6) produces the money supply function: 
m • ( R + DC) m•R + m•DC (3.16) 
Equation (3.16) shows the money supply process in which the money stock 
equals the multiple of the base money, H, and the money multiplier, m. 
The base money consists of two components which indicate the domestic 
and foreign sources of money. The money multiplier is assumed to 
summarize the behaviors of the private sector, including the financial 
institutions, concerning the composition of their assets holdings and 
the monetary authorities' policy decision (i.e. changes in reserve 
requirement, the discount rate and the moral suasion) ( 25) [Herring and 
Marston (1977)]. Taking time derivatives and totally differentiating 
equation (3.16) with respect to time yields: 
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dR 
m•- + dt 
dm dDC dm R•- + m•-- + DC•-dt dt dt (3.17) 
In order to transform equation (3.17) in terms of growth rates, let us 
start by multiplying the two sides of the equation by 1/Ms. Using Ms = 
m(R +DC) in the right hand terms: 
m dR 
-...,.,_,;;;;;-..,-.- + 
m(R+DC) dt 
R dm 
-m 7( R~+"'::D~C~) • d-t + m .dDC + DC dm m(R+DC) dt m(R+DC).dt (3.18) 
Collecting terms in the right hand side simplifies equation (3.18), and 
yields: 
dMS ,_1_ 
dt Ms (R~DC + R~~c)·~·~~ + R:DC(~~ + d~~) (3.19) 
Multiply the second term in equation (3.19) by (R/R) and the last term 
by (DC/DC), then making the necessary reduction will lead to transform 
equation (3.19) into terms of growth rates. Define gx ( 1/x)·dx/dt, 
the money stock equation given in terms of growth rates is obtained as 
follows: 
g s 
M 
(3. 20) 
Equation (3.20) shows that the rate of growth of the money supply is 
equal to the summation of the rates of change of the money multiplier 
and the weighted average of the rates of change of net foreign reserves 
and net domestic credits. 
Now, an equation which expresses the BOP as a monetary phenomenon 
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may be derived from equation (3.20). Expressing equation (3. 20) in 
terms of the rate of change in the foreign reserves variable produces 
the following BOP equation: 
(3.21) 
Equation (3.21) shows the main characteristics of the MABOP theory. 
Given, the economy is under fixed exchange rates, the appropriate 
measure of the BOP is the rate of change in foreign reserves holdings of 
the central bank. 
In order to explain the BOP adjustment mechanism as a result of 
disequilibrium in the domestic money market, the monetary approach uses: 
g = g d which is the market equilibrium condition of equation (3.8) 
Ms M 
expressed in terms of growth rates. Resorting to the market equilibrium 
condition and substituting the nominal demand for money as flow for the 
growth of the monetary stock into the BOP equation (3.21), yields, 
(3.22) 
Equation (3.22) expresses the BOP as a function of the nominal demand 
for money, the money multiplier and the nominal supply of domestic 
money, where all variables are given in terms of growth rates. 
Actually, the variables are presented in terms of adjustments to 
different levels of stocks, or rates of changes in stocks. In essence 
these variables are flow variables since a rate of change in a stock is 
a flow variable. This explains, why the monetary approach resorts to 
the flow equilibrium condition in the money market to derive the BOP 
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adjustment function which is given by the reserve flow equation 
(3.22). This equation indicates that the long run steady state 
equilibrium takes place as the actual money stock equals the desired 
demand for money.C 26) 
The money market equilibrium condition and the correct specifi-
cation of the demand for money function are the cornerstones in treating 
and deriving the BOP relationship as a monetary adjustment. Therefore, 
the basic equation which constitutes the theoretical foundation of the 
MABOP theory can be obtained when we substitute the real money demand of 
equation (3.13) for g din the reserve flow equation (3.22). Thus, '.Te 
m 
arrive at the fundamental equation used often in testing the monetary 
approach as flows: 
(3.23) 
and 
Given the expected signs of the elasticities, any rise in real income 
and inflation leads to reserves inflow or an improvement in the BOP. A 
rise in the growth rate of the interest rate, the money multiplier and 
the domestic credits will cause a reserve outflow, hence, worsen the BOP 
position( 27) [Johnson (1972), Aghevli and Khan (1976) and Wilford and 
Wilford (1978)]. The model assumes that causality runs from the demand 
for money to the supply of it, since excess domestic money supply over 
demand for money results in reserves outflow, i.e., Ms > Md > BOP < 
0, whereas, an excess money demand leads to reserves inflow, i.e. Md > 
Ms > BOP > 0 [McNown and Wallace (1977)]. The model given by 
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equation (3. 23), is known as the reserve flow equation which is the 
cornerstone in the empirical testing of the MABOP. 
The Empirical Estimation Methods 
The MABOP analysis is used for a large body of empirical works 
collected in two important books: [Frenkel and Johnson (1976) part II 
and Putnam and Wilford (1979) part I]. The actual estimation of the BOP 
model equations (3.22) and (3.23) may be carried out by two basic 
estimation methods, which we denote as direct and indirect estimation 
methods, as presented below: 
The Direct Estimation Method 
In this method we regress the dependent variable (R/R+DC)gR on all 
the independent variables in equation (3.23), after adding an error 
term. Using this single equation model to test the BOP as monetary 
adjustment we obtain: 
(3.24) 
The parameters in equation (3.24) are expected to carry the signs and 
values: a, = 1 , a2 > 0, a3 < 0 and a4 = as -1. The disturbance or 
2 
error term e - N(O,a ), and H R + DC. The key assumption of the 
monetary approach is the negative one-to-one relation between the growth 
in net foreign assets, gR (BOP) and the growth in net domestic credits, 
goc· Both the rates of growth in the money multiplier, gm, and net 
domestic credits, goc• are treated as exogenous policy variables. 
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The Indirect Estimation Method 
This met hod is carried out in two phases: ( i) the real demand for 
money function is independently specified and estimated, i.e. (Md/P) = 
md = f(y,i) + V. ~d The estimated values of real demand for money, (M /P), 
are transformed into growth terms, gAd. Then the generated series of 
m 
predicted real demand for money, in terms of growth rates, is 
substituted for the g d in equation (3.22). (ii) In phase two, we 
m 
regress the dependent variable, of equation (3. 22) on the independent 
variables after accounting for phase one. Using this single equation 
model to test the BOP as a monetary adjustment by the indirect method is 
presented as follows: 
(3. 25) 
The expected signs and values of the parameters in equation (3.25) 
2 
are: s1 > 0, s2 = s3 = -1 and the error term~- N(O,o ). The crucial 
argument of the monetary approach is presented by the negative one-to-
one relation between the growth in net foreign reserves (BOP) and the 
growth in net domestic credits. Finally, it should be indicated that 
the use of the alternative approach to defining net domestic credit, 
i.e. b.DC = (G - T - B), will have no effect on the type of estimation 
method chosen. Moreover, the break down of the money multiplier into 
its different influences, i.e. m = (1 .,. c)/ (r~ + re + c), will not 
affect the estimation method chosen to conduct the empirical testing of 
the reserve flow equations (3.24) or (3.25).C 28 ) 
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Policy Implications and General Evaluations 
The Policy Implications of the MABOP 
The monetary approach views any external imbalance as an automatic, 
self-correcting process. Therefore, any policy action to correct the 
BOP disequilibrium position is considered unnecessary and mainly 
ineffective except in the short run. Only changes in the rate of growth 
of domestic credits are the possible effective remedy in the long run 
[Kreinin (1979)]. The effectiveness of BOP policies must be evaluated 
in the context of their impact on the monetary equilibrium. Therefore, 
policy measures such as changes in the exchange rate, tarrifs, quotas, 
and direct exchange rate controls, are all seen as transitory measures 
which work their influences strictly via their impact on the domestic 
price level. A change in the price level causes an imbalance in the 
domestic money market, hence, producing a temporary stock imbalance 
between supply and demand for money. The resulting monetary disequili-
brium is reflected in foreign reserve flows or BOP surpluses or deficits 
which continue until the monetary equilibrium is restored. The major 
policy implications are: (1) Devaluation: Changes in the exchange rate 
or devaluation raises the domestic price level and produces an excess 
demand for money. The monetary approach, by introducing the money 
account, permits the monetary imbalance resulting from devaluation to be 
reflected in the overall BOP. This view differs from the traditional 
approaches which limited the effects of devaluation to the BOT [M. 
Whitman (1975)]. The monetary approach views the effects of devaluation 
as being transitory, unless devaluation is continuously repeated. 
The QQ curve in Figure 3(b) is reproduced in Figure 4 which can be 
78 
utilized to demonstrate the effects of devaluation on the BOP according 
to the monetary approach analysis. A devaluation raises the domestic 
price level, hence, reduces the real money ·balances and creates an 
excess demand for money. If the new demand for money is not satisfied 
from domestic sources, an inflow of foreign reserves may occur and 
produce a BOP surplus (on the BOT and/or the capital account). The 
increase in the demand for money shifts the QQ curve upward to Q1Q1 as 
shown in Figure 4. However, this BOP surplus will not last. The inflow 
of reserves increases the monetary base, hence, the money supply, and 
drives the economy down along the Q1Q1 curve as indicated by the pointed 
arrows. The inflow of reserves will cease, hence, the BOP vanishes as 
the stock of foreign reserves reaches the new level OR1 . At that point 
equilibrium in the money market is restored and the BOP surplus is 
completely eliminated [Kreinin (1979) and Kenen (1985)]. The above 
exposition explains why the monetary approach considers devaluation to 
have only transitory effects; a single change in the exchange rate is 
not capable of bringing about a lasting change in the BOP. In fact, 
creating a continuous favorable BOP position requires either repeated 
devaluation or keeping the restraint on the growth of the domestic 
component of the base money [Johnson (1972)]. 
(2) Tariffs: A tax on imports in the form of a tariff causes the 
domestic price of the imported commodity to rise, therefore, the effects 
of an import tariff are similar to that of devaluation. Both policy 
measures tend to create an excess demand for money balances resulting 
from domestic price increases. And unless the rise in money demand is 
met by domestic sources, it will lead to reserves inflow. Thus, an 
excess demand causes a transitory BOP surplus which lasts until 
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equilibrium in the domestic money market is restored through the BOP 
adjustment process [Kreinin (1975)]. 
(3) Quotas and Direct Exchange Control: Both measures do interfere 
with trade and reduce the volume of exports, hence leading to a 
temporary improvement in the external balance. Their most obvious 
effects tend to raise the domestic price level and increase demand for 
money. The created excess demand for money will either be met by 
expanding domestic money or by foreign money through a transitory 
favorable BOP position which disappears as soon as the monetary 
equilibrium is restored. 
So, the monetary approach considers all policy measures concerning 
the BOP as being of monetary nature and must be transitory. The effects 
of these measures are shown through raising the domestic price level and 
work via changes in the demand for money balances. Therefore, these 
policies have limited effects, and last only until the monetary 
disturbance is adjusted through international reserves inflow. In other 
words, the effects of devaluation, tariffs, import quotas, exchange 
controls and other interferences with trade and payments, practiced for 
BOP reasons should be of transitory nature and last only until the stock 
equilibrium in money market is restored. However, all BOP disequilibria 
may be treated by using domestic monetary policies( 29 ) [Johnson (1972, 
1977c) and Kreinin (1979)]. 
A General Evaluation 
The monetary approach, as the traditional approaches to the BOP 
analysis, has been exposed to attacks and criticism. The MABOP' s 
integration of the current and capital accounts is maintained by 
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invoking a rather strong assumption, namely, the existence of a stable 
demand for money function, which even though is not entirely 
unrealistic, is a very strong assumption. 
W. Futur (1979) delivers a major criticism to the approach, 
claiming that not every foreign reserves loss or outflow is an evidence 
that the money stock or the domestic credit base is too large. 
Therefore, restraining the expansion of the domestic money supply may 
not necessarily reverse the reserve loss and improve the BOP position of 
a reserve losing country. For example, in the case where investment is 
the carrier of technical progress, then if demand for money is 
restricted and so is investment, by restraining the expansion of the 
money supply, it may turn out to be a counter-prod\lctive measure. 
Moreover, the monetary approach does not treat adequately the behavior 
of wages and labor mobility and their role in the formulation of the 
country's economic policies. An attack regarding the crucial assumption 
of the one-to-one negative relation between the rate of expansion of the 
domestic money supply and the rate of change of foreign reserves is 
presented by Branson (1975). He explains that since the stock of money 
is endogenous, the implication of an exact offset (the coefficient on 
gDC = -1) between changes in foreign reserves and changes in domestic 
credit is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. To that he adds 
that some of the basic assumptions of the monetary approach are not 
realistic even in the case of small open economies, since some empirical 
evidence shows that interest rates and prices do vary from their world 
counterparts, hence violating the assumption of the integrated world 
market hypothesis. 
Another major criticism came from D. A. Currie (1976) who attacked 
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the monetary approach's overemphasis, particularly in the long run, on 
the role of monetary factors in the BOP adjustment at the expense of the 
non-monetary factors as tariffs, devaluation and fiscal policies, of 
which the traditional approaches have assigned the leading role. In 
fact, a more sound critique falls on the approach's focus on money while 
almost ignoring or underestimating the importance of the real factors in 
the BOP adjustment mechanism. So D. A. Currie thinks, centralization on 
money may come as a contrast to the traditional analysis which 
emphasized the role of real variables while ignoring the monetary 
forces. However, despite the importance of the monetary factors, he 
thinks the monetary approach seems to go too far on focusing on money to 
the extent of underestimating the role of the real factors such as 
income, interest rates and prices, especially in the time period 
relevant to economic policies. The definition of the overall BOP as 
given by the money account which integrates the current and capital 
account came under attack, so is the assumption that changes in reserves 
entail a financing process that clears excess flow supplies and demands 
in the current and capital account in the BOP. The critique considers 
the monetarist's definition stands short of providing the useful and 
needed information concerning the "above the line" accounts: ( i) the 
trade account; (i i) the service account; (iii) the short-term capital 
account; (iv) the long-term capital account; and (v) the private public 
transfers account. According to the critics the monetary approach's 
emphasis on the overall or net sum of all accounts as given by the money 
account failed to give any insight to the composition of these sub-
accounts, therefore, such shortcomings may limit the prospect of the 
monetary approach as a general theory of the BOP. And by ignoring the 
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decomposition of all balances, the monetary approach may overlook 
matters which may turn out to be of great significance to the economy 
under consideration. As M. Kreinin (1979, p. 149) put this argument: 
It matters for the generation of domestic output and 
employment whether the source of the disturbance is in the 
capital account or in the goods and services account. Also, 
if a deficit on goods and services is continuously financed 
by private short-term capital, it would cause no imbalance 
on official reserve transactions; yet the country's foreign 
indebtedness would rise over time, and that may have serious 
economic implications. 
A final point of evaluation concerns the monetary approach's 
specifications and limits of the adjustment process's time span. The 
approach suggests between one to ten years for the BOP adjustment to 
work out, but it focuses only on the long run final equilibrium position 
without describing either the dynamic path the economy follows to reach 
the equilibrium state or the exact time period required to reach that 
equilibrium [Kreinin (1979)]. 
ENDNOTES 
1The 1930's were dominated by highly variable exchange rates 
accompanied by severe world economic depression. In fact, the 
volatility of exchange rates and the competitive devaluation were 
responsible for many of the world economic troubles of that period. The 
1944 Bretton Woods Conference produced a world-wide regime of fixed 
exchange rates based on the U.S. dollar as a world money to which other 
currencies were pegged to. The Bretton Woods System, known as "the 
gold-exchange standard" did dominate the international monetary system 
until 1971. However, speculations in gold, world inflation, shortages 
in world liquidity and other factors accompaning the US persistent BOP 
deficits, all led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in August 
of 1971. That gave rise to the new floating, or more accurately the 
imperfect flexibility, in the exchange rate which dominated the 
international monetary system in the seventies and eighties. See J. E. 
Floyd, (1985). pp. 1-3 and Bell and Kettell, (1983), chapter two. 
2Although the monetary approach began to take shape in the early 
1970's, its roots go back to D. Hume's specie-flow mechanism, which 
linked the BOT to the domestic money supply. 
3The non-monetarist approaches to the BOP theory rest on the 
assumption that the monetary authorities in the country are able to 
absorb or sterilize the monetary consequences on the BOP. Therefore, 
these approaches assume a country is able to avoid the effect of foreign 
money (reserves) influence on its domestic money supply. 
4According to the monetary approach, money is one form of holding 
wealth, therefore, mone:r demand is treated as a demand for assets. 
Thus, society holds money balances because money is seen as an asset or 
a form of holding wealth. Therefore, the demand for money is considered 
a stock demand and not a flow demand. 
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5The demand for money function must be stable, which means the 
function can be identified and estimated, independently from the money 
supply. For example, a change in the domestic credits, (change in the 
domestic money supply) will not exert any change in the specification of 
the demand for money function. 
6This is in contrast to the elasticities and the absorption 
approaches which focused their analyses on the real sector, as presented 
by the current account, in a partial equilibrium framework. See Chapter 
III and Anne Krueger, (1969). For various concepts of the BOP 
analytical presentation, see P. Wilson (1986) Chapter eleven and P. 
Kenen (1985), Chapter eleven. 
7 The traditional approaches focus on the flows in the exchange 
market and what are behind them in the goods and services and assets 
markets. For example, the equilibrium mechanism within the current 
account depends on the absorption of the current flows of production by 
flows of consumption and investment spendings. Whereas, the surplus or 
deficit in trade and corrections of trade imbalances depend essentially 
on the relative prices between imports and domestic output. See 
Hodjera, (1978), p. 540, and Kenen, (1986), p. 397. 
8rt should be noted that even though equilibrium in the money 
market is the assumption, it is possible, at least in the short run for 
disequilibrium to exist. In fact, it is the difference between desired 
money balances and the actual money stock, or the excess demand for 
(supply of) money which explains the possibility of the BOP surpluses or 
deficits, i.e. BOP = ~Md- ~DC, where DC is domestically supplied 
money. See Batiz and Batiz (1985), pp. 431-432. 
9utilizing the summary balance sheet of the central bank, we can 
arrive at the base money, M = DC + R, where M, the money stock, is 
comprised of two sources: the stock of.domestic credit, (DC), and the 
stock of foreign reserves, ( R). In flow terms ~M = MDC) + ~R and 
defines the BOP as the change in reserves, (l.IR). Therefore, the BOP 
= l.IR = ~d - l.IDC, where Md is the demand for money and l.l stands for the 
rate of change. Accordingly, the BOP is explained by the addi tlon to 
(or subtraction from) the money balances that society desires to hold 
and are not provided by the monetary authorities in a form of change in 
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domestically supplied money. See W. T. Wilford, (1978), p. 99 and Batiz 
and Batiz, (1985) p. 432. 
10According to the monetarists, in a closed economy the emphasis is 
on the effects of changes in the money supply on the economic 
activities. Therefore, the nominal money stock or its monetary base is 
treated as a policy instrument. Thus, the focus is on the effects of 
changes in the nominal supply of money on domestic prices, wages 
interest rates and output. Since output is assumed fixed at the full 
employment level, then only prices including wages and interest rates 
are allowed to vary [Aghevli and Khan, (1977), p. 277]. 
11 Let EG, EB and EM denote excess demands in the goods, securities 
and money markets respectively. According to Walras 1 law all excess 
demands in the economy must sum up to zero, in essence that an excess 
demand in one market must show as an excess supply in one or the other 
market, so that: 
EG + EB + EM 0 
And equilibrium in any market is defined to be where there is no excess 
demand. However, in a three-market economy, when two markets are in 
equilibrium, the third market must also be in equilibrium; e.g. if EG = 
0, and EB 0, then it follows from Walras' law that EM must be zero. 
See Shone (1984), pp. 110-111. 
12when this three-sector economy has excess demands in its real and 
securities markets, then according to Walras 1 s law, this economy must 
have an excess supply (negative excess demand) in its money market. 
This is true, since according to Walras 1 law, the economy cannot have 
positive excess demands in all its markets [See Kenen, (1986), p. 
400]. Therefore, when the real and bonds markets achieve equilibrium, 
equilibrium in the money market is assumed as well. 
13The graphical analysis draws to a large extent on the analysis 
presented in Kenen (1968) chapter twelve. See also Batiz and Batiz, 
(1985), pp. 448-449. Moreover, for simplicity the demand and supply of 
base money is used in the analysis given by this exposition. 
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14For a small open economy, prices including the interest rates are 
assumed to move in the same direction with their world counterparts in 
accordance with the assumption of the integrated world market 
hypothesis. See Frenkel and Johnson, (1976), p. 26. 
15An excess demand for money Md > Ms implies saving by society 
which is done through reducing expenditure (absorption), which will lead 
to a surplus on the trade balance. Assuming no changes in the capital 
account, then the final outcome is a BOP surplus or a net inflow of 
foreign reserves. The inflow of reserves raises the money stock and 
gradually eliminates the excess demand for money. On the other hand, 
with an excess supply of money Ms > Md, society will dissave by 
increasing expenditure and move the trade balance into deficit. Again, 
assuming the current account to be in balance, the final result is a BOP 
deficit. Thus, the outflow of reserves reduces the quantity of money 
leading over time to eliminate the excess supply of money. When 
equilibrium in the money market is restored, it implies a BOP 
equilibrium, and there will be neither saving nor dissaving i.e. s 
= A(Md - Ms) = 0, where s is saving and A is the speed of adjustment or 
the rate at which society saves to close the gap or the difference 
between the desired money holdings and actual stock of money. See Kenen 
(1986), p. 408 and Wanniski, (1975), p. 35. 
16 Equilibrium could be a short- or long-run one, therefore, a 
situation where no excess flow demand exists in an economy indicates a 
short-run equilibrium. While a long-run equilibrium indicates a 
sl tuatlon where excess stock demands are absent. However, under the 
short-run equilibrium, the society still can, if it so desires, make 
adjustment and change its money holdings (or in general its financial 
assets) to the desired rate via adjusting the society's spending 
behavior on goods and services. When a stock disequilibrium occurs, a 
process of adjustment will develop in the flow demand for and flow 
supply of money through changes in expenditures on goods and services by 
t.he society. SeeM. Guitan, (1973), p. 785. 
17However, this does not mean that all causes of BOP disequilibrium 
are purely monetary in nature, since the shocks of non-monetary nature, 
such as the disturbances caused by the imposition of import tariff can 
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result in BOP imbalances. Nevertheless, in so doing, the disturbance 
must cause a disparity in the money market [A. Robin, (1979) p. 1234]. 
18under the flexible exchange rates regime the BOP = 0. Hence, any 
excess demand for money will cause deterioration in the exchange rate, 
whereas, any excess supply of money leads to appreciate the exchange 
rate. Thus, changes in the exchange rate restore the equilibrium in the 
money market. For more comprehensive treatment to the monetary approach 
to exchange rates determination, see the work edited by Frenkel and 
Johnson (1976) and work edited by B. Putnam and D. S. Wilford (1978). 
19The market is assumed to clear such that ex-post the actual stock 
of nominal money equals the demand for nominal money balances. However, 
ex-ante the stock of money can differ from its demand, which indicates 
that the adjustment process through the flow variables will set in 
motion and works automatically to correct any disturbance, so that the 
market ultimately clears. 
20The type of interest rate used to measure the opportunity cost of 
holding money balances variable differs according to the demand for 
money theory used. The transaction theories view money as inventory 
held for transaction purposes, therefore, they use the yields on short-
term market securities, i.e. Treasury Bills, or commercial papers. The 
portfolio assets theories which view money as an asset, that is an 
alternative way to hold wealth, use the yields on long-run financial 
assets or even equities on real assets as the proper measure to reflect 
the opportunity cost to hold inactive money balances. See Judd and 
Scadding, (1982), pp. 994-95. 
21 The concept of reserve money has a long history in monetary 
analysis. Irving Fisher (1896) called it simply "money"; James Tobin 
(1960) called it the "demand debt of the government"; Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwartz (1963) called it "high-powered money"; Karl Brunner 
and Allen Meltzer (1968) called it the "monetary base"; and the IMF 
statistics uses the term "reserve money". In this work the last three 
terms will be used interchangeably. 
22The AOL is comprised of Treasury and public deposits at the 
Central bank plus other liabilities which include the capital of the 
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bank. The AOA is comprised of all government and private sector bonds, 
loans and assets of the central bank other than the international 
reserves, R. The i tern R, includes the monetary gold and foreign 
exchange holdings of the central bank. The monetary base, H, is made up 
of the assets of the financial sector which are supplied by the central 
bank and the treasury. 
Wilford (1978), p. 99. 
See D. S. Wilford (1977), p. 73-78 and W. T. 
23under a fixed exchange rate system, the monetary authorities 
stand ready to sell and buy domestic-based money for foreign exchange. 
However, in the long-run the monetary authorities are assumed unable to 
neutralize the effect of international reserve flows by making reverse 
movements in their holdings of domestic assets. This fact indicates 
that the overall BOP imbalances, surplus or deficit, cannot be totally 
sterilized, and they will have their influence on the domestic money 
supply. See Herring and Marston, (1977), p. 333. 
24since ~\DC =dDC/dt = G - T - B, then to obtain the level of 
domestic credit, D, one needs to integrateD with respect to time over 
the interval t = 0 and t N: 
DC 
25 rn empirical researches the money multiplier may be treated in 
one of two ways: 
a) It may be considered as a constant parameter, which relates the 
money supply to the monetary base; i.e. m = M/H = M/(R+H). See McNown 
and Wallace (1977). But, this simple treatment of this important 
variable limits the policy options of monetary control available to the 
monetary authorities. 
b) Under the fractional reserve system, banks are required by law to 
hold reserves: (i) required reserve ratio which is decided by 
legislation and enforced by the central bank is called legal 
9., 
and ( i i) which depends the portfolio reserves, r ; an excess reserves 
selection of the banking sector is called the excess reserve ratio, 
re. The public influence, which reflects individuals' desire to 
allocate the money balances between cash and bank deposits is measured 
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by the currency/reserve ratio, (c). The determinants of the money 
multiplier are all the above three influences. The total influence of 
the money multiplier, m, when decomposed into its separate influences is 
given as follows: 
money multiplier m 1 + c i e 
r + r + c 
where c is a variable under the influence of the general public, re is 
determined by the banking sector, d i . an r 1s a monetary policy 
variable. See D. S. Wilford, ( 1977), pp. 20-21, Khatkhate, ( 1974), pp. 
742-746 and R. Shone (1984), p. 97. 
26 rn any economic system, the long run state is characterized by 
full stock equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which the actual or existing 
asset stocks adjust equal the desired asset stocks. See Humphrey and 
Keleher, (1983), p. 225. 
27The money multiplier is treated as an exogenous independent 
variable even though it is not independently estimated. However, in the 
model individuals and financial institutions do not necessarily behave 
passively by taking all the explanatory variables as given, since they 
are capable of influencing the rate of change of the money multiplier. 
See Aghevli and Khan, (1976), p. 280, and endnote No. 26 in this 
chapter. 
28 The money multiplier in note No. 25 can be written as: m = (1 + 
i e 
c)/(r + c), where r = r + r • Then taking growth rates of the money 
multiplier we obtain an expression which presents the break down of the 
growth rates of this variable as follows: 
I 
And using the alternative definition of domestic credit as presented by 
equation (3.15), where: D.DC = (G - T - B), and taking the rates of 
change we obtain an expression which represents the expanded 
relationship of the rate of change of the domestic credit variable as 
follows: 
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CR)Cc-r-s) II 
Substituting expressions I and II above, for gm and (DC/H)gDC in the 
reserve flow model, we arrive at the estimation form of the BOP 
equation. For example, using the indirect method given by model 
equation (3.25), the alternative BOP estimation equation is presented as 
follows: 
(3. 25. 1 ) 
The expected signs of the coefficients are: >. 1 > 0, >. 2 < 0, >. 3 > 
0, >. 4 < 0, >. 5 > O, >. 6 > 0. However, nothing is priory known about the 
values of these coefficients. See D. s. Wilford, (1977), pp. 50-56. 
29This excludes the disaster situations, like the 1930's world 
depression, where the volatile movements were very severe and all world 
currencies were overvalued [H. Johnson, (1977C), p. 227]. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE MABOP 
FOR LIBYA, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA 
Introduction 
The monetary approach, presented in the previous chapter, focuses 
on the overall BOP by centering its analysis on the monetary sector of 
the economy. The approach defines the BOP as the net flows (in or out) 
of international reserves which reflect a disequilibrium in the money 
market [Genberg (1974)]. Thus, the monetary approach views the changes 
in international reserves as representing an adjustment process which 
will be triggered to work automatically to correct the imbalance in the 
domestic money market( 1) [Frenkel and Johnson (1976)]. To be able to 
restore equilibrium the monetary authorities manipulate the domestic 
component of the monetary base in an effort to eliminate the imbalance 
in the BOP, i.e. the change in net foreign assets. For example, a 
sufficient increase in domestic credits to meet an increase in demand 
for money may lead to elimination of a surplus in the BOP and vice 
versa. 
In developing economies, the domestic productive base is 
insufficient to produce enough domestic production to satisfy the 
increased demand which results for an expansionary monetary policy, i.e. 
increasing domestic credits. Their economic plans are designed to 
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stimulate the employment of the idle resources, increase capital 
accumulation, and expand the domestic production base to satisfy 
domestic aggregate demand. However, in the early stages of development, 
domestic production always falls short of satisfying the domestic 
demand. Therefore, when the monetary authorities follow expansionary 
credit policies, such policies in many cases may lead to an increase the 
domestic price level, i.e. higher inflation, unless the excess credits 
are directed toward increasing the demand for foreign goods [Shin 
(1917)]. 
As the process of development continues, imports of capital goods 
in particular will grow and may use all foreign assets at the disposal 
of the economy. As economic development proceeds, the inflow of capital 
tends to increase income which induces a higher demand for money via the 
transaction motives. Unless the monetary authorities practice a 
flexible credit policy, so that the increased demand for money will be 
satisfied through domestic sources, the excess demand for money would be 
met by external sources. So if the monetary authorities practice a 
credit policy which is independent' of the changes in the demand for 
money, in the absence of well developed financial markets, the excess 
demand for money will be met by adjustment in the trade account in a 
manner that exports will grow faster than imports in order to reduce 
deficits or create surpluses in the overall BOP. In fact, the argument 
behind treating the foreign assets as a source which exerts its 
influence on the base money and the money supply follows from the 
following: A deficit in the current account which is not covered by 
inflow of long-term capital represents an excess supply of money due to 
an expansionary domestic credit policies. On the other hand, a BOP 
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surplus reflects an excess demand for money which is not met by domestic 
sources. 
In the case of our countries, Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the 
expansion of exports - more than 99 percent oil exports - led to huge 
accumulation of foreign asset holdings of the monetary authorities. 
Hence, given the limited role of the capital accounts of these 
economies, and the rudimentary stage of their financial markets, such 
structure is reflected in overall BOP surpluses which characterized most 
of the entire period of study ( 1970-1982). This chapter will use a 
simple monetary model like the one which has been presented in the 
Chapter III and data from Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to test the 
MABOP theory. The empirical results will be used to predict. the 
relationship between the net flow of foreign reserves and the domestic 
monetary variable, DC, in these oil-exporting small open economies. The 
empirical analysis will be done in two major steps. The first step 
involves the estimation of the reserve flow equation under the 
assumption of exogenei ty of the domestic credits variable. In the 
second step, the exogenei ty assumption is removed and the monetary 
variable is considered endogenous to the model. This estimation 
requires the specification of a reaction function that reflects the 
behavior of the monetary authorities. The later estimation is to be 
presented by a two-equation model consisting of the BOP and the reaction 
function. Then the model is simultaneously estimated using the two 
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique. 
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The Empirical Testing of the BOP Single 
Equation Model 
The general view concerning the empirical estimation of the 
monetary approach treats the domestic credit creation of the central 
bank as an exogenous policy variable. The monetary authorities 
manipulate the domestic monetary variable in an effort to influence 
society's portfolio balance between holding foreign and domestic 
assets. The reaction of society to the monetary authorities policy 
decision tends to produce a change in the BOP. The estimation form of 
the basic reserve flow equations (3.24) and (3.25) of Chapter III are 
reproduced and given below: 
R (H)gR a1gp + a2gy + a3gi + a4gm + DC (l5 ( R) gDC . ( 4. 1 ) 
R a, c g ... d + g ) DC (4.2) (H)gR + 8 g + 83 (H) gDC p 2 m 
m 
These are the two BOP equations to be tested, and each equation 
summarizes the general assumptions of the MABOP theory. Equation (4.1) 
tests the model directly, while equation (4.2) utilizes a measure of an 
excess demand for money to test the model indirectly. At this stage, 
some essential points need to be emphasized, which are as follows: 
a) The dependent variable in both equations is the BOP which includes, 
by definition, the "below the line" changes in net foreign assets of the 
banking system, NFA, weighted by the share of the foreign component to 
the base money, R/H. It assumes that the direction of causation runs 
from domestic credits, gDC• to the BOP, gR, and not the reverse. 
b) The BOP as presented in the above equations is derived from the 
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definition of the money supply, which equals the product of the money 
multiplier and the monetary base. However, the BOP as an adjustment 
function is derived from the flow equilibrium condition in the money 
market. 
c) When the relationship is given by equation ( 4. 2), the real demand 
for money is assumed to be independently specified and estimated, i.e. 
md = f(y,c) + e. This relies on the monetariests' key assumption of the 
existence of a well-behaved, stable demand for money function which is 
estimated independently of the money supply process. This implies that 
changes in domestic credits will not affect the specification of the 
demand function. The demand for money exerts its influence on the BOP 
via its own determinants, the real· income and the opportunity cost 
variables. Therefore, a correct specification of the demand for money 
function is considered of crucial importance as far as the empirical 
estimation of the BOP is concerned. 
d) The money multiplier is treated as independent variable in the BOP 
equation, although it is not independently estimated. 
e) The central policy variable is the rate of change in the domestic 
credits variable. The negative relationship between the BOP (growth in 
net foreign assets) and the domestic credits component of the monetary 
base may be totally or partially explained by sterilization policies 
which the central bank practices. Hence, the behavior of the monetary 
authorities will be explained in the second step estimation via its 
reaction function. 
f) The two equations (4.1) and (4.2) are derived under the long-run 
assumption where the economy is at full employment and prices and 
exchange rate are assumed fixed. The PPP is assumed to hold, hence, the 
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domestic price level is proportional to the world price level (P 
= E•P ) . In terms of growth rates gp g + gp 
' 
and under fixed 
w E w 
rates g 0, so g = gp . 
E 
p 
w 
With such necessary key points clarified, we can start the 
empirical t es ti ng of the standard monetary approach model via equations 
(4.1) and (4.2). The estimation of the model as presented by the first 
equation will be referred to as the "Direct Estimation" of the BOP 
equation. An alternative test of the theory is obtained by regressing 
the BOP on a measure of the excess demand for money as presented by 
equation (4.2). This second set of testing will be referred to as the 
"Indirect Estimation" of the BOP equation. 
The Direct Estimation of the BOP 
Here, we are going to discuss some of the empirical findings 
regarding the relative impact of domestic supply of and demand for money 
variables on the BOP, which is done by estimating the simple monetary 
model of equation (4.1). The test uses quarterly data from Libya: 
1970-QII-1979-QIV, Kuwait: 1973-QI-1982-QIV, and Saudi Arabia: 1970-
QII-1982-QIV. The model explains the BOP adjustments under the 
essential assumption of the exogeneity of the central bank's domestic 
credit variable, or in brief, the exogeneity of the monetary variable. 
The model follows the small open economy hypothesis, where the exchange 
rate is assumed fixed, at least during the relevant period of study. 
All variables are considered exogenously determined either by the trend 
of the corresponding variable, by the ROW, or by the monetary 
authorities. The domestic credit variable is a policy instrument which 
is used by the monetary authorities to influence the portfolio balances 
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of the general public between holding foreign assets and domestic 
assets. The public's reaction to the monetary authorities' policy 
decisions will lead to a change in net foreign assets (BOP by 
definition). Adding an error term to the BOP equation (4.1), we obtain 
the equation to be estimated as follows: 
( 4. 3) 
All variables in equation (4.3) are as defined above, except ~which is 
an error term, and the weights (R/H) and (DC/H) are replaced by the 
terms k and (1 - k), respectively, for convenience. This BOP equation 
is also known as the "basic reserve flow equation". 
The monetary model leads us to expect the price coefficient, a 1, to 
be +1.0(3); however, at least carrying a positive sign is considered of 
prime importance. The relation indicates that an increase in the price 
variable tends to reduce the real value of cash balance holdings by the 
public. Similarly an increase in income tends to increase the demand 
for money. Thus, both income and price increases tend to induce a 
foreign reserves inflow. 
The opportunity cost of holding idle money balances, as 
approximated by the expected inflation, is inversely related to the 
demand for money. Hence, the coefficient of expected inflation is 
expected to carry a negative sign. The crucial assumption of the 
monetary approach is the negative relation between the reserve flows and 
the domestic money supply or the monetary variable. The net domestic 
credits and the money multiplier are treated as exogenous variables, and 
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each coefficient is expected to be equal -1. 0. But of more importance 
is the expected negative signs of a4 and a5 . Each is quantitatively 
equal to unity and qualitatively is negative [Kreinin and Officer 
(1978)]. 
The empirical estimations have been done using quarterly data but 
with different time periods due to the availability of the data. The 
results of the estimation are presented in Table III. In order to 
determine the statistical significance for each individual coefficient a 
one-tail t-test is performed on each coefficient estimate. A main 
concern is placed on the sign of the coefficient. The size of the 
coefficient, though essential, is considered of secondary importance 
compared to its qualitative value. 
As shown in Table III, the regression results obtained for the case 
countries are good in general. The high coefficients of deter-
mination, R2 and the significant F-statistics indicate the goodness of 
s' 
fit in these regressions. But not all independent variables are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. In 
all cases, the estimates of income elasticities are quite low and not 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent significance level. 
Almost all coefficients of the expected inflation carry the predicted 
negative signs, but they are not statistically significant. The 
exception is the Libyan case, where this coefficient is significant at 
the 5 percent level in the regression using M1, but has a low 
significance level of 10 percent in the regression using M2. 
The estimates of the coefficients of the money multiplier, in all 
cases, carry their expected signs and are all significant at the 5 
percent level. The only exception is the Libyan regression, which uses 
TABLE I II 
ESTIMATES OF THE BOP EQUATION (4.3) USING DIRECT ESTIMATION AND OLS 
variables 
-2 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 R ow rho F RMSE 
money 
Libya, 1970QIII - 1979QIV: 
M1 0.887 0.374 -0.016 -1.161 -0.673 0.61 1 .899 -- 1 5 0.1 62 
(2.087) (1.172) (1.734) ( 1 .557) (6.171) 
M2 0.960 0.208 -0.014 -0.921 -0.717 0.63 1. 889 -- 16 0. 159 
( 2. 28 3) (0.681) ( 1 . 629) (1.938) (7.078) 
Kuwait, 1973QI - 1982QIV: 
M1 0.912 -0.212 -0.012 -0.824 -1 .023 0.91 2.000 -- 97 0.103 
(1.867) ( 1. 398) (0.508) (9.668) ( 21 • 270) 
M2 0.769 -o. 969 -0.004 -0.939 -1 .060 o. 96 1. 980 -- 240 o. 067 
(2.417) (0.695) (0.267) (16.334) (33.432) 
Saudi Arabia, 197QII- 1982Q4: 
M1 0.909 0.088 -0.0008 -0.844 -0.9 76 0.99 1. 568 0.216 -- 0.009 
(2.633) (1.260) (0.604) (3.631) (76.900) 
M2 0. 668 0.082 -0.0002 -0.992 -0.981 0.99 1. 177 0. 412 -- o. 005 
( 2. 6 37) (1.591) (0.202) (7.255) (88.082) 
~ 
0 
0 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Nvtes: 
(1) The dependent variable is the rate of change of net foreign reserves holdings of the central bank,kgR, 
weighted by the share of the foreign component in base money kgR where k = (R/H). 
(2) a 1 is the coefficient of the rate of change of the general price level, gp. P is measured by the 
consumer price index (CPI), 1975 = 100 for each country. However, in Libya CPI is replaced by the GDP 
price deflator, 1975 = 100. 
(3) a2 is the coefficient of the rate of change of real income, gy. y is real GDP in 1975 prices. 
(4) a 3 is the rate of change of the expected inflation, gne· 
(5) a 4 is the coefficient of the rate of change of the money multiplier, gm, where m = M3/H. 
(6) a5 is the coefficient of the rate of change of net domestic credits of the central bank in each 
country, goc• weighted by the share of this domestic component of the base money, (1 - k) = (DC/H). 
(7) M1 and M2 are the narrow and wide definitions of money used in the regression, respectively. 
(8) Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
(9) R2 is the R2 adjusted for the degrees of freedom: 
where N 
K 
-2 [ 2 ] R = 1 - (1 - R )(N- 1)/(N- K) 
the number of observations, and 
the number of explanatory variables. 
(10) rho is the estimate of the coefficient of the first order auto correlation. In this table both 
regressions in the Saudi case were corrected for serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
technique. 
(11) RMS~ is the root mean squares errors. 0 
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the M1 definition of money, where the estimate of the coefficient of the 
M1 multiplier has the right sign but, it turns out to be statistically 
insignificant. 
All estimates of the coefficients of the domestic money supply 
variable, that is the domestic credits creation variable carry the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. However, for some regressions, even though the estimates of the 
domestic monetary variable carry the expected sign and are significant 
at the 5 percent level, they fail to support the monetary approach 
assertion that the net domestic credits coefficient is equal to -1. 0. 
Only the Kuwaiti results confirm that assumption.C 4) 
For the Libyan regressions using both M1 and M2 and the Saudi 
regressions using M1, the net domestic credits carried the right sign 
and are significant at the 5 percent, even at 1 percent level. However, 
the calculated t-ratios for the Libyan and Saudi regressions using both 
definitions of money reported estimates of the coefficient of net 
domestic credits variable which are statistically different from -1.0. 
Hence, these results failed to confirm the main assumption of the 
MABOP. On the other hand, the two regressions for Kuwait using ~1 and 
M2 reported that the estimated coefficients for the net domestic credits 
variable not only are carrying the expected signs, but also are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These findings do 
conform the assertion of the monetary approach that a5 = -1.0. 
The qualitative signs are of great importance, and all estimated 
coefficients carry their predicted signs,(5) with the exception of the 
coefficients of income in Kuwait in both regressions. However, not much 
weight should be attached to the real income result since the 
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quantitative magnitude is very low and statistically insignificant in 
both regressions. In the other two cases the estimated coefficients of 
the real income variable do carry the expected positive sign, but are 
statistically insignificant also. The obtained result is an indication 
of the low role both real income and expected inflation play in the 
overall determination of the model. In fact, given the political, 
social and economic structural setting in these Muslim, oil-rich 
developing countries, there is great doubt as to the significance of the 
role that the interest rate or its proxy, the expected rate of 
inflation, can play. As for the income variable, in such economies the 
degree of monetization is still relatively low; hence, a relatively low 
income elasticity with respect to the reserve flow (BOP) is expected, 
and the results we obtained from our empirical results may be considered 
as clear evidence. 
Since the model is estimated using time series data, it is of 
particular importance to check for the presence of the first-order 
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistics (except in Saudi Arabia) 
indicate the absence of serial correlation among the residuals. 
However, when the preliminary estimates reveal evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation, as in Saudi Arabia, the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt 
Procedure is applied to correct for that problem. The overall fit of 
the BOP equation is good with the independent variables jointly 
explaining a large proportion (as high as 99 percent in Arabia and as 
low as 61 percent in Libya) of the variation in the dependent 
variable. All regressions have highly significant F statistics and 
fairly low standard errors. Moreover, the equations should perform a 
good historical simulation as indicated by the fairly low values of the 
1 04 
root-mean-squares-error, for all regressions. However, only the Kuwaiti 
results for both regressions support the MABO?'s key contention 
ofa5 =-1.0. 
The Indirect Estimation of the BOP 
The indirect estimation of the BOP is carried out in two steps. 
The first deals with the specification of the real demand for money 
function and the estimation of that function for each country. This 
step enables one to acquire a series on the predicted real demand for 
money, (Md/P). For the second step, we transform the predicted demand 
for money series into rates of growth and substitute them into the 
reserve flow equation (BOP) as given by equation (4.2). After adding an 
error term the BOP (reserve flow) equation is estimated by the indirect 
estimation method as follows: 
( 4. 4) 
-1 . 0 • 
~d 
All variables are as defined previously, and the subscript m stands for 
the estimated real demand for money. The estimation process of equation 
(4.4) involves two additional major steps. 
(1) The Estimation of the Demand for Money: As indicated above, 
the performance of this step will allow us to generate a series of 
values predicting the real demand for money. The existence of a well-
identified demand for money function is an important aspect of the 
analysis of the MABOP adjustment. Following Chow (1966), a distinction 
1 05 
is made between long run and short run demand for money functions. This 
analysis is done by introducing a mechanism that allows the adjustment 
of the actual stock of real cash balances to its desired level. The 
long run demand for money function is specified as follows: 
(4.5) 
where Yt is a real income, r is an opportunity cost of holding idle 
money balances, K is a constant term, and M~ is the aggregate desired 
demand for nominal money, and t is time. For the actual estimation, a 
semi-logarithmic form of equation (4.5) is used to obtain the long run 
demand for real money is as follows: 
(4.6) 
To arrive at the short run demand function, it is assumed that society 
adjusts its desired money holdings to their actual level according to a 
partial adjustment procedure. This means that in the short run in which 
estimation is based (year or quarter) society is assumed to always 
adjust the actual money stock to its desired level as a fraction (\) of 
the gap between the desired level in the current period (year or 
quarter) and the actual level in the previous period.< 6) The 
substitution of the adjustment process into the long run equation (4.6) 
will yield the short run demand equation to be used in empirical 
estimation of the real demand for money as given below: 
d ln(M/P\ 
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(4.7) 
The term ~ is an error term, assumed normally distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance. The values of >..e 1 and >..e 2 are the short run 
coefficients of income and interest rat e. Since both enter in loga-
rithmic form, they are the short run income and interest elasticities of 
demand for money [Wong (1977) and A. Darrat (1984)]. But, given the 
institutional and social structure of our sample countries, we are 
unable to use interest rates as a measure of the opportunity cost for 
holding idle money balances. 
In developing economies durable goods are one form of holding 
wealth besides the existing array of financial assets which are 
available to the individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate to add the 
implicit return on goods, that is the rate of inflation, in addition to 
the market rate of interest as separate influence. Thus the two 
variables represent the opportunity cost arguments in the demand for 
money function. In Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia interest rate 
payments are condemned by religious codes and the general public 
believes interest payment is a type of usury. Moreover, the 
governments' policies fix the official market interest rates at very low 
rates. Hence, the market interest rates in these economies do not 
reflect the conditions that exist in their money markets.<7) The socio-
economic structure in these economies is considered a major constraint 
that limits the choice of wealth holding available to individual 
investors. Durable goods emerge as the major alternative to money 
holding, and their expected rate of return should be included as a 
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separate influence in the money demand function. 
Following, Laidler (1977) and Dornbusch and Fisher (1981), the 
demand for money function should include the expected rate of inflation 
as a separate influence in that function. C8) However, since the 
interest rates are fixed by institutional decision in the case of Libya 
and Kuwait and banned in Saudi Arabia, the implicit return on goods, as 
approximated by the expected rate of inflation, is left as the only 
measure for the opportunity cost of holding inactive money balances. 
Therefore, in our empirical estimation of the demand for money function, 
the expected rate of inflation will be the only proxy for the 
opportunity cost variable. Hence, equation (4.7) will be rewritten as 
follows: ( 9) 
d ln(M/P)t 
(1 - \) • 
(4.8) 
Equation (4.8) is the short run demand for money equation which is 
used here for the empirical estimation. The estimates of equation (4.8) 
for the three countries are given in Table IV. The coefficients of 
determination, R2 , are quite high and F statistics are statistically 
significant in all cases. Most of the estimates of the coefficients 
have the correct signs, and are significant at the 5 percent level. The 
exception is the opportunity cost variable where the coefficient of 
expected inflation is insignificant in all cases and has the wrong sign 
for the Saudi cases. ( 10) The income elasticities in all countries are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and have larger 
magnitude with M1 in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whereas in Libya, the wide 
TABLE IV 
THE ESTIMATED DEMAND FOR REAL MONEY, USING EQUATION (4.8) BY OLS 
money 
-2 definition co c1 c2 c3 R h 
Libla, 1970QII - 1979QIV: 
M1 -0. 394 0. 385 -o. 299 0.720 0.98 1 . 117 
(-1.70) (2.91) (-1 .35) (7.05) 
M2 -. 443 0.537 -.168 0.612 0.99 0.225 
(-2.15) (3.42) (-0.93) (5.37) 
Kuwait, 1972QIV - 1982QIV: 
M1 -0.774 o. 402 -0.335 0.747 0.95 2. 169 
(-1.66) (2.16) (0.20) (6.22) 
M2 -0.572 o. 302 -0.017 0.840 0.98 1. 7 46 
(-2.79) (3 .04) (0.02) (12.98) 
Saudi Arabia, 1970QII - 1982QIV: 
M1 -1 . 45 0.24 0. 19 0.89 0.99 1 . 041 
(-3.05) (3.41) (1.12) (29.70) 
M2 -1.33 0.22 0.13 0.90 0.99 0.582 
(3.55) (3.91) (1.03) (36.83) 
rho 
-0.134 
-0.040 
0.322 
0.246 
0. 139 
0.077 
RMSE 
0.068 
0.055 
0. 11 0 
0.057 
0. 055 
0.043 
0 
(]:) 
Notes: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
The dependent variables are the natural logarithms of M1 and M2 which are the narrow and wide 
definition of real money balances respectively. 
M1 and M2 stands for regressions using the narrow and wide definition of money respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
R2 is the adjusted R2 . 
h is the Durbin statistic for a regression which includes a lagged endogenouse variable. 
i.e. log mt_ 1 : 
h = [1 - (1/5)DW][N/(1 - var(b)r112 
where var(b) is the estimate of the variance of the lagged endogenous variable, N is the number of 
observations and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
(6) rho is the estimate of the coefficient of the first order serial correlation, as obtained from the 
Cochran-Orcutt iteration technique. 
(7) Since equation (4.8) is a short run equation for the real demand for money, the long run estimates of 
the coefficients of real income and expected inflation are calculated as follows: 
(a) The long run income elasticities, o = (~8 1 /~). Using the Libyan estimates o are 1.375 and 1.384 
for M1 and M2 respectively. 
(b) The long run estimates of coefficient of ne, ~ 
-1.068 and -0.433 for M1 and M2 respectively. 
(~8 2 /\). For Libya the estimates of ~are 
0 
'-0 
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definition of money shows a larger income elasticity as compared with 
M1. This indicates that in Libya a given percentage increase in real 
income causes individuals to increase their time and saving 
deposits.Cll) The short-run income elasticity of real demand for money 
is given by the estimates of the coefficient of real income since the 
variable was entered logarithmically. For example, the income 
elasticities using M1 are 0.385, 0.402 and 0,24 for Libya, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia respectively. 
Finally, based on the above findings one may conclude that the 
first step has been fulfilled. A demand for money function was 
specified, then estimated for each case country, and a predicted series 
of real demand for money is obtained.C 12 ) Now, we turn to the second 
step and continue our estimation of equation (4.2). 
( 2) The Indirect Estimation of the BOP: In the first step, a 
series of the desired real money demand is generated from the values of 
the regressions in each country. The new variable we obtain is the 
predicted real money demand, (~/P)d. After taking the rates of change 
of this new series to acquire a series of gAd' we proceed to estimate 
m 
the BOP equation. In this research two versions of the BOP equations 
will be estimated by indirect estimation depending on the independent 
variables to be included in each equation: 
( i) Version one of the reserve flow equation wi 11 be referred to as 
MARKI. It presents the rate of change of net foreign reserves as the 
dependent variable. The relevant explanatory variables in this BOP 
equation are given by the rate of change of the desired demand for 
nominal money (g ... d + gp) and the domestic money supply variables which 
m 
are given by the rate of change of the money multiplier (gm) and the 
1 1 1 
rate of change in the net domestic credit (g0c). The MARKI BOP equation 
is as follows: 
~1Cg~d + gp) + ~2gm + ~3(1 - k)gDC + v , 
m 
~1 > 0. -1 • 
(4.9) 
(ii) Version two of the reserve flow equation will be referred to as 
MARKII. Here all the relevant independent variables in the BOP equation 
are lumped together into a single independent variable. The combined 
independent variable is generated by taking the difference between the 
rate of change of the part of the money supply under the monetary 
authorities' control, [gm + (1 - k)g0cJ, and the rate of change of the 
desired demand for nominal money, (gAd+ gp). Since, the rate of change 
m 
of two different levels of stock variables is used to denote a flow 
variable, we may refer to this new variable [(1 - k)gDC + gm - g~d - gp] 
m 
as the predicted ex ante excess flow supply of money ( EAEFSM). The 
MARKII BOP equation which we are going to estimate using the indirect 
estimation method (IEM) is given as follows: 
<fJEAEFSM + ].1, where <fJ -1. (4.10) 
The statistical findings from the estimation of equation (4.9) are 
reported in Table V. The regressions using both definitions of money 
performed well in general. The coefficients of determination are all 
high, and the F statistics are all significant. All coefficients have 
the expected signs. The estimates of the coefficient of the nominal 
demand for money variable are positive as predicted by the theory.Cl3) 
TABLE V 
ESTIMATION OF THE BOP EQUATION (4.9) INDIRECT SINGLE EQUATION, MARK I BY OLS 
money 
-2 definition B1 B2 B3 R ow F SER 
Libya: 1970QIII - 1979QIV: 
M1 0. 436 -0.879 -0.794 0.59 1. 832 28 0.027 
(2.299) (-1.217) (-7.434) 
M2 0.259 -0.858 -0.791 0.57 1 .807 26 0.028 
( 1 • 098) (-1.731) (-7.567) 
Kuwait: 1973QII - 1982QIV: 
M1 0.286 -0.878 -1.028 0.91 2.214 205 0.010 
(2.339) (10.247) (22.273) 
M2 0.333 -0.940 -1 . 054 o. 96 2. 1 61 5 41 0. 004 
(3.102) (17.580) ( 35. 1 30) 
Saudi At'abia: 1970QIII - 1982QIV: 
M1 0.873 -0.922 -0.969 0.99 2. 089 4986 o. 007 
(6.417) (-4.543) (-103.527) 
M2 0.862 -0.970 -0.971 0.99 1.985 6654 0. 005 
(6.686 (-6.680) ( -111 . 86 3) 
[\) 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable (R/H)gR is the rate of change of net foreign reserves held by the central bank 
in Libya and Kuwait and SAMA in Saudi Arabia. It is weighted by the share of the foreign component in 
base money. 
(2) The independent variable (g~d + gp) is the rate of change of the nominal money demand, 
m 
the rate of change of the desired demand for real balances obtained from the predicted 
estimated demand for money reported in Table IV. And all other variables are as given 
where g~d is 
m 
values of the 
in Table V. 
(3) Ml and M2 refer to the regression equations using the narrow and broad definitions of money 
respectively. 
(4) All other notations and symbols are as given in the previous tables. 
(5) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
w 
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The estimates of the coefficient of the money supply variable -- the net 
domestic credit -- are statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
and all are very close to -1.0 in magnitude. For the cases of Libya and 
Kuwait the coefficients are not significantly different from -1 .0, for 
both definitions of money. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
despite having the value of the coefficient very close to -1.0, the 
estimates obtained failed to support the contention of the monetary 
approach.( 14 ) The results in the Libya case, in fact, are due to the 
large standard errors of this variable. Generally, we can conclude that 
the estimation of equation (4.9), with the exception of the poor results 
from the regressions ln the Libyan case, provides good results and 
supports the monetary approach to the BOP, especially in Kuwait. 
The statistical findings from the estimation of equation (4.10) are 
reported in Table VI. The results from the MARKII equation are good in 
general, since coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
empirical findings concerning the sign for the ex-ante excess flow 
supply of money (EAEFSM) is negative as predicted, regardless of the 
definition of money used. However, only in the case of Kuwait is the 
coefficient's magnitude statistically not different from -1.0. The 
results in the case of Libya and Saudi Arabia are different from -1.0. 
Once again the data from both countries have failed to lend support to 
the basic argument of the monetary approach, despite the values of the 
coefficients being very close to -1.o.< 15) 
Finally, we conclude from the empirical findings from the single 
equation estimations the results obtained are not very satisfactory. 
Despite the high R2 and significant F-statistlcs reported, some of the 
regressions do suffer from the problem of serial correlation, as in the 
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TABLE VI 
ESTIMATION OF THE BOP EQUATION (4.10) 
INDIRECT SINGLE EQUATION, 
MARK II ( OLS) 
variables 
-2 R ow rho SER 
money 
Libya: 1970QIII - 1979QIV: 
M1 -0.740 0.62 1 . 5 30 0.227 0.028 
(-7.822) 
M2 -0.724 0.59 1 . 4 78 0.247 0. 0 31 
(-7.303) 
Kuwait: 1973QII- 1982QIV: 
M1 -0.926 0.95 2. 181 256 0.018 
(16.955) 
M2 -0.966 0.93 2.142 676 0. 008 
(26.286) 
Saudi Arabia: 1970QIII - 1982QIV: 
M1 -0.966 0.99 2. 211 -0. 11 4 0.007 
(126.695) 
M2 -0.966 0.99 2.144 -0.975 0.005 
(146.162) 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is (R/H)gR as defined in Tables III and V. 
(2) The independent variable EAESFSM is ~hat we termed as ax-ante 
excess flow supply of money. It equals to the difference between 
[(DC/R)g0c + gm] which is the rate of change of the nominal money 
demand a3 defined in the text. 
(3) All other notations and symbols are as defined previously. 
(4) The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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Saudi regression using M2 in Table III which has been corrected using 
the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. Moreover, the estimates of the 
coefficients of some variables are either statistically insignificant 
(as real income in reserve flow equal reported in Table III, and the 
expected inflation in the demand for money given in Table IV) or the 
estimated coefficients carried wrong signs (as in the case of real 
income in Kuwait, Table III, and the expected inflation in the Saudi 
demand for money, Table IV). 
The results indicate the existence of disparity in the performance 
of t~is single equation model among our sample countries which may be 
attributed to the differences in their economic characteristics despite 
their similarity as developing small oil economies. In fact, our 
findings may lead us to state that using the data from these three oil-
exporting small developing economies at best provides only weak support 
to the claim of the MABOP. ( 16 ) In our study all results point to the 
contention that an expansionary monetary policy (increasing the domestic 
money supply) tends to produce an unfavorable BOP position in that 
country. Evidence is backed by all the results obtained from the three 
countries. However, most results do not lend complete support to the 
one-to-one relation between the BOP (the change in net foreign assets) 
and change in the domestic money supply, despite the fact that the 
coefficients of the net domestic credits (and the money multiplier) are 
very close to -1.0 in almost all the regression sets. This final 
conclusion may call for a further investigation of the relation between 
the domestic money supply and the BOP, which is the subject of the next 
section of this chapter. 
Domestic Money Supply and the BOP -
A Simultaneous Equation Model 
117 
In an open economy, the money supply at a given time is the product 
of that economy's money multiplier and its base money, i.e., M = m(R + 
DC). Given this definition, the money supply can be expanded by 
increasing the money multiplier and/or the domestic credit and/or the 
foreign assets component of the base, or all the above. In fact, the 
role played by the international reserve flows in the determination of 
the domestic money supply is what distinguishes the monetary sector in 
an open economy from that of a closed one. In an open economy the 
monetary authority needs to incorporate its foreign asset holdings in 
its monetary framework with those involving domestic assets in order for 
that country to be able to use monetary policy to achieve the public 
economic goals [Phaup-Kusinintz (1975)]. However, in a small open 
economy under fixed exchange rates, the monetary authority's control 
over its monetary base is limited to the base's domestic source, that is 
domestic credits. But changes in net domestic credits can be offset by 
changes in the net foreign assets which result from the process of 
reaction of the private sector. Thus, the actions of individuals impose 
limits on the ability of the monetary authority's control over the total 
money supply.C 17) 
As indicated above, the main argument of the standard monetary 
approach is its assumption of a complete offsetting relation between the 
domestic and foreign components of the base money. This means the 
coefficient of the rate of change in net domestic credits in the reserve 
flow equation is expected to be -1.0. This explains the treatment of 
the net domestic credits, in the previous empirical testing, as an 
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exogenously determined variable. Thus, according to the standard 
monetary approach, a monetary policy via changes in domestic credits is 
deemed useless in controlling the total money supply. Any efforts by 
the monetary authorities to change the money stock will trigger a 
reaction by the public to offset that policy as long as the actual money 
stock differs from what the society desires to hold. The standard 
monetary approach, as explained above, considers the domestic credits to 
be an instrument of monetary policy. Therefore, the policy target, 
according to the monetary approach, is not the control of the base 
money, or the money supply, but the control over the base's composition 
between domestic and foreign assets [Wilford and Wilford (1978)]. 
However, in the small open economy case, to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate the monetary authorities are required to intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets by selling and buying foreign exchange. Such 
actions, no doubt, exert their effect on the foreign component of the 
monetary base and, hence, the money supply via the money multiplier. The 
above analysis shows how the two components of base money relate to one 
another. Therefore, it is in the assumption of such interdependence 
that the impact of money supply factors on the reserve flow (BOP) 
equation should be studied. 
The Domestic Credits and the BOP 
The estimates of the reserve flow (BOP) equations demonstrated the 
negative correlation between the rate of change of the net domestic 
credits and the rate of change of the net foreign assets. However', in 
Saudi Arabia and Libya the assumed correlation is low and not as 
postulated by the standard monetary approach to the BOP, i.e. the values 
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of the coefficient of the domestic credit variable in Libya and Saudi 
Arabia failed to support the basic assumption of the monetary approach 
since the estimates of the coefficient of gDC were statistically 
different from -1.0. The question then, is: does this result from a 
discretionary policy or does it indicate the presence of a sterilization 
poll cy?( 18 ) The answer to such questions relates to the problem of 
simultaneous bias in single equation estimation [A. Koutsoyiannis 
( 1977) J • 
It is possible that we cannot treat domestic credits as an 
exogenous policy variable independent of the net foreign reserves 
variable as assumed by equations (4.1) and (4.2). This means, that it 
is necessary to consider the possibility of the reverse causation; i.e., 
the feedback effect of the changes in foreign reserves on domestic 
credits. In that case, the domestic credit would be treated as an 
endogenous variable to be determined by the model. To take up such a 
task, several techniques are available which may be used to check the 
direction of causality and to account for the feedback effect [Sims 
(1972), Granger (1978) and Blejer (1979)]. 
There are several techniques used in testing for causality. Some 
techniques, as the one used by Sims (1972) and Granger (1978) are not 
suitable for short time series as our data. However, there are 
techniques that suit the short time series but require the availability 
of monthly data. Thus, in all cases our data are not sufficient to meet 
these requirements. The technique which is more suitable to our case 
does not involve a test for the direction of causality, despite the 
possible existence of reverse causation or a feedback effect from the 
dependent variable to the independent ones. Instead, a simultaneous 
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equation system can be used to introduce a reaction function that 
expresses the behavior of the monetary authority. In the following 
analysis the endogeniety of the domestic credits variable is considered. 
The task has been done by the introduction of a simple simultaneous 
equation model to analyze the BOP adjustment process in which the 
domestic credit variable is treated as an endogenous variable. 
The Reaction Function of the Monetary Authorities 
In a small open economy under a fixed exchange regime, a reaction 
function in the context of a monetary policy needs to show the measures 
that the monetary authorities can take in any effort to exert some 
control over the domestic money supply. In essence, the reaction 
function demonstrates the use of foreign reserves to influence the 
monetary base. This study attempts to investigate the degree to which 
payment imbalances influence the ability of the monetary authorities to 
control the money supply. The capability of the monetary authorities to 
sterilize the impact of the foreign reserves flows (in or out) on the 
monetary base and the total money supply will be expressed. 
As explained above, the monetary base reflects the changes on the 
assets side of the balance sheet of the central bank. The monetary base 
is determined by demand and supply forces as presented by the demand 
pressures for the base and the behavior of the central bank to 
accommodate those pressures and supply the desired high-powered money. 
S. M. Lee ( 1985) stated that the accommodation pressures mostly come 
from the government (fiscal) and foreign sectors. Meanwhile, the supply 
of the high-powered money depends on the reaction of the monetary 
authorities to meet such pressures. The behavior of the monetary 
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authorities can be captured by a reaction function that contains those 
variables which influence the course of monetary policy. Therefore, the 
specification of the reaction function of the monetary authorities 
includes objective variables which reflects the state of the economy as 
presented by macroeconomic stabilization policies and the sources of 
pressure for monetary accommodations. In empirical studies a great 
emphasis is put on the correct specification of the reaction function 
which accurately describes the behavior of the monetary authorities.< 19) 
In the case of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the monetary authorities in the conduct of their credit 
policies are concerned with the following objectives: (a) These 
monetary authorities control the money supplies to pursue price 
stability and other domestic goals. And to be able to control the base 
money they must offset movements in its uncontrolled component through 
changes in the controlled one. This implies that each monetary 
authority neutralizes the impact of foreign reserves on the monetary 
base, hence, sterilization is assumed to be practiced. (b) These 
monetary authorities do emphasize the goals of economic development of 
achieving more production and high economic growth with price stability 
when their credit policies are formulated. Thus, each monetary 
authority takes into account the government's overall budget when 
accommodating the demand pressures and supply the desired credit. 
All the above factors are considered when one constructs a reaction 
function to explain the behavior of the monetary authorities. Following 
Ujiie (1975), Genberg (1976), Tullio (1976) and Lee (1985), the basic 
reaction function used in this study specifies the rate of change in net 
domestic credit creation of the central bank (the rate of growth of the 
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domestic component of the base money)( 20) as a function of the rates of 
change of the BOP, real income, government budget and the domestic price 
level. Each independent variable selected is frequently offered as a 
major cause of change in domestic credit and is assumed to exert a 
strong explanatory power on the dependent variable. In other words, 
these variables are claimed to be possible determinants of each central 
bank's behavior. <21 ) The functional form chosen to represent the 
reaction function of the monetary authorities of these oil-based small 
open economies is as follows: 
(4.11) 
Equation (4.11) expresses the growth rate. of net domestic credits 
creation of the central bank ( g0c) as a function of the growth rates of 
net foreign reserves holdings of the central bank (gR), real income 
(gy), inflation (gn) and government budget deficit or some other measure 
of fiscal policy (g80 ). All variables are measured in growth rates. 
The monetary authorities are assumed to tighten domestic credit in 
response to a higher inflation. Therefore the sign of the coefficient 
of inflation is expected to be negative [J. Tullio (1978) and R. K. 
Abrams (1979)]. The expected sign of the coefficient of growth in real 
income is positive on the grounds that the monetary authorities provide 
more domestic credits to satisfy the public's higher transaction demand 
for money which results from an increase in real income [Lee ( 1985)]. 
In LDCs the ability of the government to finance its budget by borrowing 
from the public is absent since financial markets are in relatively 
early stages of development, therefore, borrowing from the central bank 
and money creation are heavily practiced. Moreover, the central banks' 
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monetary decision is not separated from the Treasury's decision 
concerning the general financial stabilization program. In other words 
the monetary authorities are dominated by the Treasury. Thus, the 
change in the government budget variable is included to capture the 
reaction of the central bank to the accommodation pressures from the 
fiscal sector. The fiscal measure proposed is either Sarro's 
expenditure variable, (Sarro 1977), measured by government expenditures 
relative to normal, or the government budget deficit if available. This 
variable is used to capture the relation between budget changes and the 
base money. The fiscal variable is generally expected to carry a 
positive sign, reflecting the impact of the expansionary fiscal policy 
on the base money or the money supply. This variable will be used 
whenever the data on budget deficits are either not available or if 
found that the series is incomplete. Since the change in net domestic 
credit is used to offset the development in the BOP, it is postulated to 
offset the change in the accumulation of foreign reserves. Thus, the 
coefficient of the rate of change in net foreign assets is expected to 
carry a negative sign. The general form of the reaction function to be 
estimated is: 
(1 - k)gDC = 80 + 61g~ + 82gy + 63 gBD + 84kgR + € • (4.12) 
In equation (4.12) the dependent variable is the rate of change in net 
domestic credit creation of the central bank (the credit policy 
variable) weighted by the domestic component's share in base money as 
has been done in the BOP equation. The rate of change of the net 
foreign reserve variable (BOP) is also weighted by its share in the base 
[k = (R/H)]; € is a stochastic error term, and other variables are as 
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defined above. 
The Empirical Estimation of the System 
The behavior of the monetary authorities in formulating their 
credit policy is described by the reaction function as specified 
above. The BOP equations are given by equation (4.3) or (4.4). Now, 
the equation which presents the monetary authorities' reaction function 
is combined with either of the BOP equations, and, both equations are 
treated as a system.< 22 ) The system is used in the simultaneous 
estimation of the credit policy variable, gDC, and the balance of 
payments, gR. The system of equations is given as follows: 
(4.13) 
( 1 - k) gDC (4.14) 
However, if the BOP is indirectly estimated, then equation (4.13) will 
be replaced by the following equation: 
k•gR = 81(ghd + gp) + S2gm + 83(1- k)gDC + V. (4.15) 
m 
The simultaneous equations system as expressed in equations ( 4.13) or 
(4.15) combined with (4.14) has two endogenous variables, the BOP and 
the domestic credit. The credit variable is now determined by the whole 
system, where, the determinants of the domestic money variable are the 
right hand terms of its equation plus all the variables in the BOP 
equation. In fact, the slmul taneous estimation of this system will 
serve: (i) to investigate the possibility of sterilization policy 
practiced by the central bank; and (ii) to account for the feedback 
effect between the net domestic credit and the BOP, since the central 
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bank includes changes in foreign reserves in formulating its credit 
policy. The empirical estimation of this system covers the same time 
period used in the estimation of the BOP single equations (4. 3) and 
(4.4). 
The results obtained from the simultaneous estimations of the 
system, using 2SLS technique, are given in Tables VII-IX. The empirical 
findings from estimating the BOP equations (4.13) and (4.15) are 
reported in Tables VII and VIII respectively. The empirical findings 
from the estimation of the monetary authorities' reaction functions of 
equation (4.14) are reported in Table IX. 
The Simultaneous Estimation of the BOP 
The empirical results from the simultaneous estimation of the BOP 
equations show a slight improvement over the results obtained from the 
single equation estimates of Tables III and V. The simultaneous 
estimates, using the direct estimation of the BOP are given in Table VI, 
while Table VIII reports the simultaneous results from the indirect 
estimation. 
The major improvement is shown in the estimate of the offset 
The offset coefficient estimates carry their 
expected negative sign and are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level in all cases using both money definitions. ( 23) Such 
findings may suggest that the monetary authorities in these countries 
are concerned with the stability of the base money (and the total money 
supply) and not merely with its distribution between domestic and 
foreign sources. The results reported in both tables indicate that 
better estimates of the BOP equations are obtained in Libya and in Saudi 
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Arabia as compared with results from the OLS estimation. The 
simultaneous estimates of the coefficient of the rate of change in 
domestic credit are not only statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level but, all money coefficients are not different from -1.0. <24 ) 
Therefore, based on these empirical findings, it is suggested that in 
the case of Libya and Saudi Arabia the domestic credits variable should 
be treated endogenously for the estimation of the BOP. But, our 
empirical findings in case of Kuwait as shown in Tables III, V and VI 
support the exogeneity assumption of the domestic credit variable as 
postulated by the MABOP. 
As indicated by the direct estimation of the BOP reported in Table 
VII the estimates of the coefficient of the real income variable carry 
the postulated positive sign in agreement with the monetarists' 
assumption that an increase in real income improves the BOP temporarily 
and raises the level of foreign reserves, a result which is supported by 
the results the simultaneous as well as the single equation estimation 
of the BOP. The estimates of the coefficient of the expected inflation 
variable carry the expected negative sign in all regressions. However, 
neither coefficients of the rate of changes in real income nor the 
expected inflation are significant at the 5 percent level, which are the 
same results obtained by the single equation model. The exception to 
these findings is the estimate of the are real income variable in Saudi 
Arabia, with the regression using M2, where its estimate has shown a low 
10 percent level of significance. The estimates of the coefficient of 
·..;he price variable have the expected positive sign for both countries 
whatever the money definition used. However, in the Libyan case the 
price coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level for the 
TABLE VII 
ESTIMATES OF THE BOP EQUATION (4.13) USING DIRECT ESTIMATION AND 2SLS 
money 
-2 
used a, (12 (13 (14 (15 R ow rho SER 
Libya, 1970QIII - 1979QIV: 
M1 0.682 0.257 -0.010 -0.807 -1 • 084 -.52 2.089 -0.433 0.178 
( 1 • 7 80) (0.740) (1.148) ( 1 • 069) (6.435) 
M2 0.764 0.168 -0.0095 -.852 -1.115 0.53 2.065 -0.419 0. 176 
( 1 . 966) (0.497) (1.113) (1.734) (6.992) 
Saudi Arabia: 1970QIII - 1982QV: 
M1 0.320 0. 101 -0.001 -0.943 -1 .006 0.99 1 . 983 0.466 0.096 
(0.962) (1.478) (0.356) (4.286) (55.776) 
M2 0. 417 0.088 -0.00004 -1 . 032 -0.9995 0.99 2.038 0.606 0.071 
(1.778) (1.814) (0.0042) (8.158) (62.636) 
Notes: (1) All notations and variables are as explained in the notes of Table III. 
(2) All regressions are corrected for serial correlation using Maximum Likelihood Iterative 
Technique, which is a two-stage iterative method, and the rho reported is the final value for 
rho. 
(3) The estimation procedure was done by the TSP version 4.00, (1983). 
(4) Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
~ 
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regression using M2, and is significant only at the 10 percent for the 
regression using M1. In the Saudi case, the estimated coefficient for 
the price variable carries the predicted sign, but is not significantly 
different from zero in the regression using M1 and is significant only 
at the 10 percent when M2 is used. 
obtained by the single equation. 
Such finding differs from those 
The simultaneous estimations of the BOP using the indirect method 
of equation ( 4.15) are reported in Table VIII. The key monetarist 
assumption concerning the offset coefficient, ogR!ogDC = -1 .0, is 
confirmed by all the regressions and under both money definitions. The 
simultaneous estimates of the coefficient of the domestic credit 
variable have the right sign. They are also significant at the 5 
percent level and equal -1.0 for all regressions and money 
definitions. Therefore, in contrast to the single equation estimation, 
the simultaneous estimates do support the MABOP's assertion of one-to-
one negative relationship between the rate of change in net domestic 
assets, g0c, and the BOP. The estimates of the coefficient of the 
demand for money variable carry the expected positive sign except in the 
Saudi regression using M2. Moreover, all estimates of the money demand 
variable are insignificantly different from zero, except for the Libyan 
regression using M1. All regressions, with the exception of regression 
using M1 in Libya, suffered from the problem of serial correlation which 
was corrected using the maximum likelihood iterative technique.( 25) The 
money multiplier variable's estimated coefficient carries the correct 
sign, but it is statistically significant only in the Saudi regressions. 
In conclusion, the simultaneous estimations of the BOP, whatever 
the money definition used, have shown a slight improvement over the 
TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATES OF THE BOP EQUATION (4.15) BY INDIRECT ESTIMATION AND 2SLS 
money 
-2 
used B1 B2 B3 R DW F SER 
Libya: 1970QIII - 1979QV: 
M1 0. 499 -0.323 -1 .096 0.50 2.17 -- 0.182 
(2.272) (0.331) (3.366) 
M2 0.203 -0.674 -1.202 0.44 2.03 -0. 431 0. 193 
(0.938) (1.254) (7.143) 
Saudi Arabia: 1970QIII - 1982QIV: 
M1 0. 303 -1.116 -1.029 0.99 1. 575 0. 411 0. 1 032 
(1.437) (4.868) (46.156) 
M2 -0.018 -1.220 -1 .058 0.99 1 • 180 0.602 0. 1 01 
(0.076) (6.456) ( 31 • 009) 
Notes: (1) All notations and variables are as explained in the notes of Table V. 
(2) Regression using M2 in Libya and both regression of Saudi Arabia are corrected for serial 
correlation, using the Maximum Likelihood Iterative Technique, which is a two-stage method. 
The rho reported is the final value of rho. 
(3) The estimation procedure was done by the TSP version 4.00, (1983). 
(4) Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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single equation models in both Libya and Saudi Arabia as far as the 
domestic credit is concerned. Therefore, one may say that the 
simultaneous estimation, which accounts for the problem of 
interdependence between the domestic and foreign money sources of the 
base money, performs slightly better than the single equation model, 
especially when the offset problem is concerned [see Tables (III and 
VI), and (V and VIII)]. 
The Simultaneous Estimation of the Monetary 
Authorities' Reaction Function 
Concerning the simultaneous estimation of the monetary authorities' 
reaction function, the results obtained for the three countries are 
reported in Table IX. The coefficient of the rate of change in net 
foreign reserves, gR, indicates the extent of the monetary authorities' 
effort to sterilize the changes in net foreign reserves from affecting 
the monetary base. Judging from the empirical estimates of the 
coefficient of sterilization, agDC/agR, sterilization policies have been 
in practice in these countries, at least during the period covered by 
this research. In all cases the estimates of the coefficient of 
sterilization carry the correct negative sign and are significant at the 
5 percent level. Moreover, the estimates of the coefficient are 
approximately equal to -1.0. Only the Saudi sterilization coefficient 
is statistically equal to -1. 0. These findings indicate that the 
monetary authorities of these oil exporting small economies appear to 
sterilize completely, or near completely, any change in the base money 
caused by the foreign reserves inflow. Therefore, given that exchange 
rates were always pegged during the period of study, the monetary 
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authorities of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would have almost complete 
control over their money supplies.C 26 ) Such findings, in fact, reflect 
the financial position of these countries. They are rich oil exporters 
and none of them suffered from foreign reserve shortages, at least 
during the time span of this study. The oil "boom" accompanying the 
oilprice hikes of 1970's and the 1980's had affected their financial 
performance to a large extent. Such huge earnings of foreign exchange 
help guarantee a steady inflow of foreign reserves which made their 
sterilization policies possible. Therefore, as the 1 evel of foreign 
reserves increased, the monetary authority in each country was able to 
step in to freeze its effect on the base money and hence the nominal 
money supply. For example, if the Libyan monetary authorities predicted 
that the rate of change in foreign reserves will increase by 10 percent, 
they would reduce the rate of growth of domestic credits by 8.2 percent 
(see Table IX) . So, one may say sterilization policies in Libya have 
succeeded in preventing foreign reserves accumulation from fully 
increasing the country's base money. Thus, the monetary authority was 
able to exert control over the total money supply. 
Among the other exogenous explanatory variables used in the 
specification of the reaction function, the rate of inflation appears to 
have a significant influence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However, the 
coefficient of the rate of inflation carries the wrong sign except in 
the Libyan case. Using a one tail t-test, the estimates of the 
coefficient of inflation are significant at the 5 percent level, which 
implies that maintaining price stablli ty has been among the policy 
objectives in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In fact, judging from the 
coefficient of the inflation predictor in the country equation, Saudi 
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Arabia' Monetary Agency, SAMA, has paid considerable attention to the 
problem of inflation. <27) 
The income variable has the right sign in ~ibya and Saudi Arabia, 
however, the estimated coefficients are insignificantly different from 
zero. In Kuwait the coefficient of real income is significant at the 
5 percent level but carries the wrong sign. Thus, the contention that a 
change in domestic credits depends on real income is supported only by 
the Kuwaiti findings. The government budget deficit variable in Libya 
and Kuwait exerts no significant effect on the rate of change in 
domestic credits, despite having the correct sign. Only the fiscal 
variable in the Saudi Arabia case appears to be a significant 
variable. It carries the correct sign and is significant at the 5 
percent level. The latter result shows the importance of the fiscal 
pressure when determining monetary policy in Saudi Arabia. 
According to the results obtained, the central banks of these 
economies have effective control over the base money. Therefore, they 
responded strongly to neutralize the impact of foreign reserves flow (in 
or out) on their nominal money supplies, even though foreign reserves, 
over the covered period, have fluctuated and grown rapidly. The results 
indicate that the central banks in these economies supplied money 
according to the needs of their economic activities and managed their 
credit policies in a way to furnish the required credits for their 
economic development. However, since the t-statistics were 
insignificant except for the net foreign reserves variable, (especially 
in Libya and Kuwait), following Willms (1971), we estimated the monetary 
function using only net foreign assets as an explanatory variable. ( 28 ) 
The results obtained from the estimation support the findings above, 
eo 
0.018 
(0.500) 
0,0112 
(1.459) 
0.036 
(1.323) 
e, 
-0.8'75 
(6.573) 
-1.061l 
(42.1151) 
-0.933 
(7.940) 
TABLE IX 
ESTIMATION OF THE REACTION FUNCTION EQUATION (4.14) BY 2SLS 
e2 
0.203 
(0.389) 
0.123 
( 1. 37'{) 
-1.279 
(2.257) 
83 
-O.OOll 
(0.519) 
84 85 
.!:!_~ya: __ 1970q}II- 1979QIV 
0. 116 
(0.209) 
-2 R 
0.59 
.§_aud i_ Arabi~_: _ _!2]0QI II - 1982QIV 
0.004 
(2.6711) 
0.022 
(2.712) 
0.223 
(1 .9 1:8} 
~~!!_~_!:._:_j 9'7].2_II - 19~2QIV 
-0.005 
(0.742) 
0.99 
o.n 
DW 
2.076 
2.012 
1. 956 
rho SER 
-0. 391 0.167 
0.300 0.098 
-0.498 0.1 60 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the rate of change of net domestic credits creation by the central 
bank in each country, weighted by the domestic component's share in base money, (1 - k)gDC 
where k ~ R/H. 
(2) The independent variables are the rate of change of net foreign assets, weighted by this 
foreign component's share in base money, kgp, the r·ate of change of expected real income,gy, 
the rate of change of inflation, gn• and the rate of change of budget deficits,gGBD• but since 
data on the budget deficits are not available for Saudi Arabia, gGEXP• Barro's fiscal variable 
was used instead. See the text for the definition of this variable. 
(3) e0 is the coefficient of the constant, gGEXP' 
l>J 
l>J 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
(4) Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(5) Since all regressions suffer the problem of serial correlation, all regressions were corrected 
for serial correlation using the Maximum Likelihood Iterative Technique, which is a two-stage 
interative method. And the rho reported is the final value of rho. 
(6) The estimation procedure used is the TSP version 4.00 (1983). 
(7) All other notations are as explained in the previous notes. 
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that active sterilization policies were practiced by the monetary 
authorities of the three countries. The sterilization coefficients 
obtained were 1 .039, 0.83 and 0.76 for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, 
respectively. Apparently, all countries do sterilize the impact of 
foreign reserve changes on the money supply since the estimates of the 
changes in net foreign assets are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The sterilization is complete in the case of Saudi 
Arabia but only partially complete in the Kuwaiti and Libyan cases. 
Finally, judging by the relatively high coefficients of deter-
. t• -R2 m1na 1on, : 0.99, 0.77, and 0.59 (and 0.98, 0.71 and 0.67 when 
changes in foreign reserves is the only explanatory variable) for Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, respectively, one may say that the variation 
in the domestic credit variable is fairly well explained by the overall 
specifications of the reaction function presented. However, these 
empirical findings should be interpreted with caution since the function 
we used is built on an ad hoc basis and has not been derived from a 
macromodel. Thus, it is possible that the specification of the reaction 
function this study used may not be exactly accurate, especially since 
most of the regressions suffered from the problem of serial 
correlation. 
ENDNOTES 
1For more details on the approach's theoretical development and its 
conceptual meaning consult Chapter III of this thesis. 
2This long run standard model assumes all goods are tradables. 
However, if non-traded goods are assumed, the rate of change of the 
domestic price level (the domestic rate of inflation) can diverge from 
the rate of change of prices abroad. But, in the real world, home 
inflation diverges from its world counterpart, and when the domestic 
rate of inflation is high, it tends to worsen the competitiveness of 
home goods and to reduce the real yield of home financial assets. Both 
factors will tend to worsen the BOP. See Tullio (1976) p. 44 and Batiz 
and Batiz (1985) pp. 466-467. 
3The coefficient for the rate of change of prices is expected to 
equal unity due to the homogeni ety assumption of the demand for money 
with respect to prices. 
4The test to show whether the estimates of a coefficient are 
statistically equal 1. 0 or not is done by calculating a t-ratio as 
~ 
follows: teAL = 11- S!IS~, where 8 is the estimate of the tested 
coefficient and SA is its s~andard error. If the calculated t-value 
shows that the di!ference is significant at the 5 percent level, then we 
conclude that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from 
-1.0; otherwise it is significantly equal to -1.0. For example, using 
the results from regressions with money (M1) given in Table IV: t (1 
- 1.023)/0.048 = 0.475, t = (1 - 0.976)/0.01 = 2.192, and t (1 
9.673)/0.109 = 3.000, for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya, respectively. 
Only in the Kuwaiti equation is the estimate of the coefficient of net 
change in domestic credit statistically equal to -1 .0. In the other two 
countries the estimates are significantly different from -1.0. The test 
difference from -1.0 in the Kuwaiti case does support the contention of 
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the MABOP. The same test needs to be done for regressions using the 
broad definition of money as well as for the estimates of the 
coefficients of the money multiplier. 
5For the MABOP to be supported by the empirical results, the rate 
of interest, which is approximated here by the expected rate of 
inflation, and the price level must serve as the determinants of the 
demand for money and behave as if the international goods and capital 
markets are highly integrated. See Johnson (1972, and 1976), Wilford-
Wilford (1977), and Putnam-Wilford (1978). This indicates that the 
price level should carry a positive sign and the opportunity cost 
variable should carry a negative sign, regardless of whether domestic or 
world variables are used in the BOP equation. When domestic price and 
interest rate variables carry different signs from their world 
counterparts, it is an indication that the world goods and capital 
markets are not well-integrated as the MABOP asserts. Meanwhile, 
carrying the right sign and significant coefficients is an indication of 
highly integrated world goods and capital markets. 
6rt is assumed that the actual stock of money adjusts to demand 
within a single period (year or a quarter). A straight-forward 
adjustment mechanism between the actual and desired money stock is as 
follows: 
d ~ln(M/P)t = A[ln(M/P)t - ln(M/P)t_ 1J, 0 < A < 1 
where A is the adjustment coefficient. This simply assumes that in the 
short period the public would always make some correction to money stock 
held in the previous quarter. This involves the assumption that the 
actual stock of money adjusts proportionally by a fraction (A) of the 
difference between the desired demand for real balances in the current 
period and the actual stock of money available in the previous period. 
See D. Morgan (1979) p. 83. 
7rn Saudia Arabia interest payments are prohibited by law. 
However, when the interest rates do exist as in the case of Libya and 
Kuwait the rates are pegged by the monetary authorities at low rates 
which prevents them from reflecting the conditions of their money 
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markets. For example, interest rates in Libya vary from as low as 2.5 
percent for interbank loans to as high as 7. 5 percent on commercial 
loans. Time and saving deposit rates range bet't~een 3. 25 percent as a 
minimum and 4 percent for a maximum. See CBOL Economic Bulletin, 
( 1983), Table 17. In our case countries, in fact, the market interest 
rates do not carry the job of the credit allocation function, because 
the allocation of credits is done by the government economic policies, 
based upon the goals of the economic plans. For more details see 
Chapter II. 
8Dornbusch and Fisher (1981, p. 244) suggested that: " .•• in 
markets where interest rates are controlled, and the rates do not rise 
to reflect expected inflation, individuals begin to think of the 
alternative of buying goods rather than holding money when expected rate 
of inflation rises. The expected inflation rate itself then becomes a 
separate influence on the demand for money." 
9with regard the specification of equation (4.8), the inflationary 
expectations variable enters linearly because the inflation rate would 
be undefined if this variable enters in logarithmic form. Therefore, 
equation (4.8) appears in semi-logarithmic formulation. See Aghveli and 
Khan (1978), p. 388. 
10 Polican and Choi (1978) have argued that higher prices could have 
a positive effect on a household's money demand. However, for Saudi 
Arabia, Fadil indicated that the ambiguity of the behavior of the 
inflation variable is to be expected in view of the high subsidy 
elements in the household expenditure. See Fadil (1985), p. 70. 
11 In the case of Saudi Arabia it is reasonable to have a high 
income elasticity of demand for money, since interest payments on all 
types of deposits including the time and Savings deposits are prohibited 
by law. Thus for a given percentage increase in income, individuals 
increase their cash and demand deposits since savings do not earn any 
income. 
12A series of seasonal dummies were used to account for seasonality 
in the demand for money, but they were dropped since the F statistics 
for such dummies were statistically insignificant in all cases. 
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13The price and income variables are both positively correlated 
with the BOP, while expected inflation is assumed to enter negatively in 
the BOP equation. Therefore, the total effect of the demand for money 
variable is expected to be positive. See Table V in the text. 
14 The calculated t-statistics for the difference of the estimates 
of the coefficients of the money supply variables from -1.0 are given as 
follows: 
gm (DC/H)gDC 
M1 M2 M1 M2 
For Libya -0.168 -0.286 -1 • 929 -1.991 
For Kuwait -1 • 28 2 -0.837 -0.568 -1.610 
For s. Arabia -0.020 -o. 201 -3.444 -3.333 
The t-values show that all estimates of the coefficient of changes in 
money multiplier are statistically equal to -1.0 in all countries. 
However, only the estimates of coefficient of change in domestic credits 
in Saudi Arabia failed to support the monetary assumption, since it is 
significantly different from -1.0 for M1 and M2. 
15The calculated t ratios for the difference are: 
The t-value: t 11.0- &!IS~ 
For Libya: t -0.260/0.095 -2.74 for M1 
t -0.280/0.110 -2.55 for M2 
For Kuwait: t -0.074/0.055 -1.345 for M1 
t -0.034/0.037 -0.919 for M2 
For S. Arabia: t -0.034/0.008 -4.250 for M1 
t -0.034/0.007 -4.857 for M2 
Only in Kuwait does the difference equal -1.0 in support of the MABOP. 
16 This outcome, in fact, contradicts the strong and adequate 
support which has been obtained from several empirical studies using 
data from the more developing economies. See the works of Zecher (1974) 
on Australia, Bean (1976) on Japan, and Putnam-Wilford (1978) on a group 
of European countries. All these studies documented strong support for 
the MABOP. 
17For example a contractionary monetary pvlicy via open market 
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operation will have a partial success if the economy is open to the 
ROW. The resulting excess demand for money due to the decrease in the 
money supply will find in the BOP a channel through which the additional 
money demand leaks into the economy. On the other hand, if too much 
money is pumped into the economy, the country's residents will dispose 
of the redundant money through the external sector by increasing their 
demand for foreign goods and assets, thereby generating an outflow of 
reserves which tends to damp the expansionary effect of that monetary 
policy. For more details on monetary policy in an open economy, see 
Komiya (1969), Johnson (1972) or any related source. 
18A sterilization is the monetary authority's action to interfere 
in the automatic adjustment in foreign reserves in response to changes 
in domestic credits. For example, the sterilization process's goal is 
to neutralize all or part of the changes in foreign reserves so that the 
monetary base will not fluctuate with exogenous variables. 
19 All studies of the central bank's reaction function used an 
explicit constrained optimization model where the reaction function 
usually takes the form of a linear function of target variables, 
measured as deviation from the optimal levels, as well as exogenous 
variables which are included in the constraint equation. For such 
formulation see J. Wood (1967) and P. D. Jonson (1974). Or they used an 
ad hoc approach where the reaction function is specified as a linear 
function of some variables which are likely determinants - either in 
view of the history of policy or implied by economic or the poll tical 
economic theory - of policy under the assumption that stabilization 
authorities were reacting endogenously to the course of the economy. 
See M. Keran and c. Babb (1969), M. Willms (1971), Miller and Askin 
(1978) and Willet and Laney (1978), among others. 
20 rn the literature on the reaction function no general agreement 
exists as to the target variables to be included to present the external 
transaction goal, nor on which variable to use as representative of the 
overall thrust of the monetary policy. The interest rate, the money 
supply, the total monetary base, the unborrowed reserves and the 
domestic component of base money, 
represent the dependent variable 
all have been used by writers to 
in the works on the reaction 
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function. See J. Tullio, (1976), p. 85, and S.M. Lee (1985) p. 177. 
21 No generally accepted, well specified, single model which 
describes the behavior of the monetary authorities exists. So one can 
use it to explain the impact of the BOP and other objective variables on 
money, and solve the problem of modeling the monetary authorities' 
behavior. 
22For more about this type of presentation of the system, see 
Genberg (1974 and 1976), Tullio (1976) and Shin (1977) among others. 
23The simultaneous estimates of the BOP equation are reported only 
for the Libyan and Saudi cases since the Kuwaiti data did confirm the 
MABOP contention concerning the exogeneity of the domestic credits 
variable in the single equation estimations reported in Tables III and V 
in the text. 
24This implies that when the rate of accumulation of foreign 
reserves increases, the monetary authorities step in to freeze part of 
the reserves accumulation. Such a policy action insures that the inflow 
of foreign reserves will not fully influence the base money. Thus, as a 
result the monetary authorities' control over the nominal money supply 
will be maintained. 
25The maximum likelihood iterative technique is a two-stage 
iterative method. A trial value of rho is computed and the data is 
transformed according to the equation: 
for t = 1 
Then the regression is run on the transformed data. A new value of rho 
is computed, and the process is repeated until rho does not change from 
one l teration to the next. See the reference manual for TSP version 
4.00, (1983), pp. 32-30, and also, Beach and Makinnon (1978), pp. 51-58. 
26when the monetary authorities' sole goal is to maintain control 
over the money supply for the pursuit of domestic goals, the impact of 
net foreign reserves on the base money must be sterilized completely )y 
an opposite movement in domestic credits. This implies a steri.lization 
coefficient of -1.0. But, if the monetary authorities' sole objective 
is to attain external balance by allowing the flow of foreign reserves 
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to alter the base money, hence the money supply, they may need to follow 
a passive policy of no sterilization which implies the sterilization 
coefficient to be zero. 
27 rn the long run, control over the money supply depends upon the 
country's level of foreign reserves. Thus, ample foreign reserves will 
allow the existence of a domestic rate of inflation in excess of the 
world's. And without enough foreign reserves a monetary expansion will 
require a devaluation. See Miller and Askin (1978), p. 233. 
28The monetary equation, using changes in net foreign assets as the 
only explanatory variable to explain the variations in net domestic 
credits, produced results in support of the assumption that active 
sterilization policies by all countries have been practiced over the 
period covered by this research. The estimations of the equation are 
given as follows: 
For Libya: ( 1 
- k)gDC = 0.020- 0.761(k)gR 
(0.019) (0.083) 
R2 0.67 DW = 2.103 rho = -0. 42 
For Kuwait: ( 1 
- k)gDC = 0.017 - 0.830(k)gR 
(0.033) (0.086) 
R2 0.71 DW = 2.321 rho = -0.244 
For S. Arabia: (1 - k)gDC = 0.088- 1.039(k)gR 
(0.031) (0.019) 
SER 
SER 
R2 = 0.98 DW = 1.934 rho= 0.25 SER 
where figures between parentheses are standard errors. 
0. 1 55 
0. 181 
0. 1 23 
CHAPTER V 
PRICES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Introduction 
The standard monetary approach model introduced in the previous 
chapters deals with long run equilibrium analysis, where relative 
prices, in the small open economy under a fixed exchange rate, are 
assumed exogenously determined. The model also assumes that world 
commodity and capital markets are highly integrated. Thus, the 
equilibrium version of the MABOP asserts that all goods are considered 
tradables, and no barriers to international trade are present. 
Accordingly, that version of the monetary approach looks to all price 
movements as being globally determined, rather than being caused by 
changes in a particular country's domestic price level. The approach 
relies on arbitrage activities to equalize prices (including interest 
rates) across countries whenever a deviation between a tradable good's 
home and world prices occurs. This implies that the price of a good 
expressed in some common currency is expected to be the same in all 
countries, or what is known as the "law of one price" or the "integrated 
world market hypothesis" [Wilson (1986) and Genberg (1976)]. 
However, in the real world the low degree of capital mobility, the 
barriers to trade and the existence of a large proportion of output 
which does not enter world trade, even in the case of small open 
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economies under fixed exchange rates, may result in different prices 
among countries, at least in the short run. This chapter tests the 
assumption of the integrated market hypothesis using price data from 
Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The standard monetary model will be 
modified to explain why prices across countries differ from their world 
counterparts. After testing the "integrated market hypothesis", the 
relationship between prices and the BOP will be investigated. The 
empirical testing will be carried out using a modified version of the 
basic monetary model, which introduces the non-tradables sector in the 
domestic economy into the analysis to allow for short run variations of 
price levels across countries. The modified model differs from the long 
run standard model in that it not only traces the adjustment of BOP to 
domestic money imbalances, but the short run price adjustments to such 
monetary disturbance are also considered. The model is introduced, then 
an empirical investigation of that model is presented. The chapter ends 
with some comments and general concluding remarks. 
The Integrated Market Hypothesis 
One major proposition made in the standard monetary long run 
analysis is that all prices in the small open economy are linked to 
their world counterparts. All prices movements are globally rather than 
domestically determined. The standard monetary approach assumes a 
direct relationship only between changes in the domestic money supply 
and the BOP, hence, it implies the following assumptions are valid: 
(i) All goods are treated as traded goods. (ii) There are no barriers 
to international trade, at least over the adjustment period. and (iii) 
Though price indices are affected by the non-conformity of the weighting 
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procedwes among countries, the model assumes that in constructing the 
aggregate price index, weighting patterns used are the same. However, 
even in the presence of some trade impediments, as long as they remain 
constant over time, the price of traded goods and the general price 
level would change, but at the same rate among countries. Therefore, 
the monetary approach asserts that rates of inflation in all countries 
will be the same. The "integrated market hypothesis" in its crude 
version, can be expressed by the absolute form of the purchasing power 
parity, PPP, which is given as follows:( 1 ) 
P = E•P h w ( 5 • 1 ) 
where P is the general price level with the subscripts h indicating the 
home country and w indicating the world, and the term E is the exchange 
rate. Equation (5.1) is also called the "law of one price" which 
indicates that goods are sold for the same price worldwide [Melvin 
(1986)]. But in reality, barriers to trade are present such as export 
and/or import taxes and subsidies do affect the relative prices. Thus, 
lt seems more reasonable, particularly in empirical testing, to express 
the PPP in its relative form: 
(5.2) 
where liP /P equals the rate of inflation and the other symbols are as 
defined above. Equation (5.2) states given the three previous 
conditions are held, inflation rate differences will be reflected in the 
value of the exchange rate. 
The integrated market hypothesis has been subjected to various 
empirical studies to test its validity. The model we are going to use 
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in this research to test the "integrated market hypothesis" follows H. 
Genberg' s model ( 1976), which he used to test the hypothesis with 
Swedish data.( 2)- According to Genberg, the artificial differences which 
result from the weighting patterns due to the construction methods of 
the price indices are captured by a random disturbance.(3) The equation 
to be used in testing the "integrated market hypothesis" is formulated 
as follows: 
( 5. 3) 
Equation (5. 3) expresses the home country's inflation rate, gp, as a 
function of world inflation rate, gp* and a stochastic disturbance term, 
e. This formulation leads us to expect the constant term to be statis-
tically equal to zero and the estimated coefficient of world inflation· 
is equal to plus unity. (80 = 0 and s1 = +1,0) 
However, the inclusion of all countries' prices in the construction 
of the world rate of inflation may not seem reasonable since our sample 
countries' trade with many countries, especially the developing 
countries, is negligible. Besides, there is no major or dominant trade 
partner for each of our countries. Thus, two proxies are constructed to 
represent the world rate of inflation for each country. The methods 
used in the construction of world inflation rate are as follows: 
1) The weighted world rate of inflation, WWINFL, is given by the 
weighted averages of the rates of inflation of the trading partne·rs of 
each country. The weighting scheme used in each case is the trade 
partner's share of total trade with each case country.< 4) 
The weighted world rate of inflation in Libya, WWINFL is 
constructed, for example, by using a weighted average of the rates of 
change in the consumer price index, CPI, of each trade partner that 
contributes 3 percent or more of Libya's total trade. The variables are 
the Italian rate of inflation, CPII, the German rate of inflation, CPIWG 
etc., for all countries and weights, see Table X. Thus, in Libya 
the weighted variable, WWINFL, is defined as: 
WWINFL [(CPII * 35) + (CPIWG * 20) + (CPIFR * 11) 
+ (CPIJ * 10) + (CPIUK * 9) + (CPIUS * 7) 
+ (CPIGR * 4) + (CPISP * 4)]/8 (5.4) 
2) The unweighted world rate of inflation, UWINFL, is measured by non-
weighted average rates of inflation in the country's major trading 
partners. For example, in the case of Libya the unweighted world 
variable is defined as: 
UWINFL (CPII + CPIWG + CPIFR + CPIJ + CPIUK 
+ CPIUS + CPIGR + CPISP)/8 (5.5) 
The empirical estimations of equation (5.3) using both definitions 
of the world inflation variable for the three countries are reported in 
Table XI. The results obtained in the case of Libya and Kuwait do 
support the contention that the inflation rate in the small open economy 
moves with its world counterpart. But, this assumption is not supported 
by the empirical findings in the case of Saudi Arabia. The integrated 
market hypothesis predicts that the constant term is expected to be 
equal zero and the estimated coefficient of the world inflation variable 
to be equal to +1,0. The results presented in Table XI show that, 
whatever the measure of world inflation (WWINFL or UWINFL) used, the 
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TABLE X 
THE WEIGHTS USED FOR CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD RATES 
OF INFLATION USING YEARLY DATA 
Trade Weights 
Partners Libya Kuwait Saudi Arabia 
France (FR) 0. 11 0.05 0.06 
Greece (GR) 0.04 
Holland (HO) 0.05 
India (IN) 0.04 
Italy (I) 0.35 0.08 0.09 
Japan (J) 0.10 0.30 0.29 
South Korea (SK) 0.05 
Spain (SP) 0.04 
Switzerland (SW) 0.03 
U. K. 0.09 0. 1 3 0.09 
U.S.A. 0. 07 0. 21 0. 29 
West Germany (WG) 0.20 0. 1 4 0.13 
Notes: - data on trade for are obtained from various issues of the IMF, 
Direction of Trade Statistics, Year Books: 1971-77, 1980, 1982 
and 1984. 
- All trade partners included have trade not less than 3 percent 
of Libya, or Kuwait ro Arabia's total trade with that country. 
- All data used are yearly trade statistics, where the average 
covering 19~0-79 for Libya, 1973-82 for Kuwait, and 1970-82 in 
the case of Saudi Arabia. 
- The summation of weights equal one: 1 • 0 
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TABLE XI 
ESTIMATION OF THE INTEGRATED WORLD MARKET HYPOTHESIS OF EQUATION (5.3) 
Variables 
-2 Constant WWINFL UWINFL R DW F SER 
Countries 
Libza: 1965-80: 
1. -3. 427 2.830 0.23 1.85 5.5 1 2. 0 5 
( 0. 501 ) (2.343) 
2. -2.001 1 • 51 3 0. 21 1.86 5. 1 13.73 
(0.308) (2.260) 
Kuwait: 1972-82: 
1. -0.988 0. 911 0.324 2. 18b 5.8 4.51 
(0.234) (2.499) 
2. -3. 406 1 .042 0. 386 2.05b 7.3 4.32 
(0.728) (2.780) 
Saudi Arabia: 1968-82: 
1. 0.750 0.797 0.07a 1.479b 1.0 7.83 
(0.953) (1.168) 
2. -1 .060 0.955 o.osa 1 • 5 39 b 1.7 7.64 
(0.136) ( 1 • 460) 
Notes: - The dependent variable is the rate of inflation in Libya, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While the independent variable is 
the world rate of inflation as defined in the text. 
-Regression (1) uses the weighted measure of world inflation. 
- Regression (2) uses the unweighted measure of world inflation. 
a - R2 are adjusted for 
A~abian regressions 
reported. 
the degr~es of freedom, except in the2 
because R are negative the regular R are 
s s 
b - These regressions are corrected for serial correlations using 
the maximum likelihood iterative method. The final values of 
rho are: (0.49, 0.54) and (0.66, 0.65) for Kuwait and Arabia, 
with regressions (1) and (2) respectively. 
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constant term carries its theoretically predicted value for our three 
countries, since it is insignificantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level in each of the three countries. However, the estimates of 
the coefficient of the world inflation variable, using both definitions, 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and have the right 
sign; moreover they also are statistically equal to +1.0. Therefore, 
the assumption that s1 = +1. 0 cannot be rejected in these two cases. 
The results from the Saudi regressions using both definitions of world 
inflation failed to confirm the theoretical prediction of the model 
concerning the estimates of the coefficient of world inflation 
variable. The assumption is rejected since the estimated coefficient is 
statistically equal to zero at the 5 percent level whatever the 
inflation definition of world inflation used. 
Generally, the Kuwait regressions show best results among those of 
the three countries. The Libyan and Kuwaiti regressions have 
significant F statistics and relatively low R2• But, the performance of 
the Libyan regressions must be taken with caution, since both 
regressions have high standard errors, especially for the coefficient of 
the WiHNFL variable. In fact, the regressions using the unweighted 
world inflation show a slight improvement in the Kuwaiti and Libyan 
cases. In Saudi Arabia, whatever the world rate of inflation used 
(WWINFL or UWINFL), no significant change is reported. Both Saudi 
regressions suffer from low R2 and insignificant F statistics which 
indicate the poor performance of the model as far as the Saudi data are 
concerned. Finally, one may conclude that the empirical findings from 
WWINFL and UWINIF regressions, though not impressive, seem to support 
the "integrated market hypothesis" in the cases of Libya and Kuwait, but 
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not in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
The results from the Saudi Arabia regressions may reflect the 
importance of the non-traded goods sector in this economy. The 
observance of a small open economy under fixed exchange rates with a 
rate of inflation different from the world inflation rate is a common 
phenomenon, particularly in the developing economies. This result 
violates the PPP assumption, because these countries face low degrees of 
capital mobility and barriers to trade such as tarrifs, import 
restrictions, export subsidies and the like. Added to these factors the 
existence of a large proportion of domestic goods which compete for the 
available resources but do not enter foreign trade, all may result, even 
in the case of a small open economy under fixed exchange rates, to 
different price levels among countries, at least in the short run. 
The behavior of prices and the BOP in the small open economy in the 
short run will be investigated using the traditional monetary 
analysis. The model of the MABOP developed in the previous chapters 
will be modified to explain the situation where different rates of 
inflation among countries are a possibility. The modified model will 
rely on both the existence of the non-traded goods sector and on the 
money market conditions as used by the standard monetary model. 
However, it differs from the standard model for it not only traces the 
adjustment of BOP to domestic monetary imbalances, but it also traces 
the short run price adjustments to these monetary disturbances as well. 
The Modified Model 
The theoretical development of the modified model follows the works 
of Parkin (1974) and Blejer (1977) and Blejer and Leiderman 1981).( 5 ) 
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The model to be used in this study is composed of the equilibrium 
conditions in the markets for money and the traded and non-traded 
goods. The first five equations are the basic equations of the monetary 
sector of the small open economy used above. In addition, two equations 
to explain the domestic inflation and the ex ante excess flow supply of 
money are derived and added. 
As a starting point, the simple monetary sector in a small open 
economy is given by the first five equations which are used by the 
monetary approach opponents to derive the standard long run model of the 
BOP. Additional equations are added to explain the domestic inflation 
and the ex ante excess flow supply of money. 
modified model is given by: 
(Md/P) d f(y, OC) m 
Md P•m d p •f ( y. oc) 
Ms m•H 
H R + DC 
Ms Md 
The first part of the 
(5.6) 
(5. 7) 
(5.8) 
( 5. 9) 
(5.10) 
These equations have been explained and discussed in Chapter III of this 
research, however, they are repeated here for presentation purposes. 
All variables are as defined before. 
Equation (5.6) presents the real demand for money; equation (5.7) 
shows the same function but in nominal terms; equation (5.8) gives the 
nominal supply of money; equation (5.9) defines the base money; and 
equation (5.10) is the money market clearance condition. The money 
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market is assumed to clear such that the ex post actual stock of money 
is equal to the demand for nominal money balances. However, ex ante, 
the stock of money can differ from its demand. 
The monetary approach views the BOP as an adjustment process that 
works to correct the disturbance in the money market such that the 
market ultimately clears. Therefore, the monetary approach defines the 
BOP as the rate of change of the international reserve holdings of the 
banking system. Now, to view the BOP as an adjustment process in the 
face of a disturbance in the money (stock) market the approach resorts 
to the flow equilibrium condition in the monetary sector,C 6 ) 
i.e. g = g d, which means the rate of change in the supply of money 
Ms M 
equals the rate of change of the nominal demand for money. Therefore, 
utilizing this flow equilibrium condition, substituting for the 
respective relations in both sides and making the necessary arrangements 
we arrive at the BOP equation (what is termed as the standard model of 
the MABOP): 
(R/H)gR (g d + gp) - [gm + (DC/H)gDC] 
m 
(5.11) 
Equation (5.11) expresses the BOP (the rate of change in foreign 
reserves) as a function of the rates of change of nominal demand for 
money as stock and the nominal supply of money under the monetary 
authority's control. This presentation expresses the BOP as a function 
of a "flow excess supply of money.nC 7) Equation (5.11) states that an 
excess of domestic money supply over money demand will result in a BOP 
deficit while the reverse produces a BOP surplus. Equation (5.11) is 
based on a long run analysis, where all needed adjustments to the 
monetary disturbance take place via the adjustment in the BOP [Johnson 
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(1972), Aghevli and Khan (1977) and Genberg (1976)]. 
As Swoboda (1973) has indicated, the presence of some kind of 
barriers to trade and payments and a large proportion of domestic goods 
which do not enter international trade tend to slow the speed of 
adjustment in the face of a monetary disturbance even in the long run. 
In the short run, relative prices can be affected by domestic monetary 
policy. This analysis suggests that society will react to monetary 
disturbances by changing not only the level of the foreign component of 
base money, R, through adjustments in the BOP, but also the rate of 
change in the domestic price level from those of world rates. 
Therefore, the basic model previously used needs to be extended to 
permit the flexibility in relative prices. To meet this requirement, 
Mario Blej er ( 1977, 1981) introduced some modification on the standard 
monetary model which account for the short run variations in prices 
among countries. This modification allows for domestic monetary policy 
to influence not only the BOP but also the domestic price level as 
well. To make the model operational, a new endogenous variable is added 
to account for the rate of change in the domestic price level. Now, the 
modified model has two endogenous variables, the rate of change of the 
domestic price level and the rate of change in net foreign reserves. 
The model is composed of the equilibrium conditions in two sets of 
markets, the money market as presented by the set of equations (5.6) to 
(5.10) and the markets for two classes of goods which are consumed and 
produced in the country. These goods are defined as traded and non-
traded goods [Dornbusch (1973)]. The introduction of non-traded goods 
serves to deal with the situation where relative prices can be affected 
by domestic monetary policy. However, before the introduction of traded 
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and non-traded goods, denote G to represent the difference or gap 
between the ex ante changes in the domestic money supply and the changes 
in the money demand. To obtain the gap, G, substitute the flow of 
nominal demand for money from the flow supply of money variables under 
the monetary authority's control. The difference, or the gap, G, will 
be called the monetary variable, namely the ex ante excess flow supply 
of money, EAEFSM: 
G [(DC/H)goc + gmJ - (g d - gP) 
m 
(5.12) 
Next, assume the economy is producing and consuming the following 
two classes of goods: 
( 1) The first class of goods, the tradables, include both exportables 
and importables. Let PT be the price of this class of goods with Px and 
PM being export and import prices, respectively, and 6 represents the 
share of exportables in the total expenditure on traded goods. Then the 
price of this sector, PT, is given by: 
P = 6P + ( 1 - 6) P T X M (5.13) 
Following the small country hypothesis, the domestic prices in the 
traded goods sector are assumed to be determined by world market 
conditions expressed in domestic currency: Px = E ·Px* and PM = E •PM*, 
where * indicates world, and E is the exchange rate. 
domestic price of traded goods is given by the following: 
E•[6P * + (1-6)P *] X M 
Therefore, the 
E•P * T (5.14) 
where PT* denotes the price of a basket of traded goods in the country 
of consideration expressed in foreign currency [Batiz and Batiz 
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(1984)]. For a small open economy under fixed exchange rates regime, 
PT* is exogenously determined by the conditions in the world markets for 
these goods. This result is in agreement with the standard model, where 
the prices of traded goods, PT is an exogenous variable. 
(2) The second class of goods are those which do not enter world trade, 
the non-traded goods. They are goods which are domestically produced 
and consumed. They compete for the available resources with the traded 
goods. The prices of non-traded goods, PNT' are determined by the 
supply and demand conditions of their domestic markets. However, the 
general price level in the domestic economy is determined by the prices 
in both sectors. Let S represents the share or weight of total 
expenditure allocated to the traded goods sector, then the general price 
level in the economy is given by: 
p (5.15) 
Equation (5.15) states that the price level in the domestic economy as a 
whole is determined by a geometrical weighted average of the prices of 
both classes of goods. The differentiation of equation (5.15) with 
respect to time gives the domestic rate of inflation as: 
g = Sgp + (1-S)g 
p T PNT 
(5.16) 
Equation (5.16) expresses the domestic rate of inflation as a weighted 
average of the rates of change of prices of both goods, therefore, given 
the small country assumption gp equals the world rate of inflation 
T 
[Cross and Laidler (1976)]. 
Assuming both classes of goods are substitutable in consumption and 
in production, they compete for the available resources which are 
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allocated to these goods in accordance with their relative prices. 
Starting from an initial equilibrium point, suppose the monetary 
authority expands the domestic money stock by increasing the domestic 
credits in excess of what society desires to hold. This policy action 
creates a disturbance in the money market in the form of an excess 
supply of money which implies an excess demand for goods traded and non-
traded. This situation will lead to a rise in the price of non-traded 
goods, PNT• while PT stays unchanged, but the relative price will change 
and the BOP will experience a deficit. The process will keep on working 
until equilibrium in the money market is restored, and the actual money 
supplied exactly equals what society demands. The adjustment process in 
this situation works through two variables, the price level (i.e., 
changes in prices of non-traded goods) and the BOP. The relative price 
depends on the excess demand of these goods and, an excess demand for 
goods implies an excess supply of money. Therefore, the assumption here 
is that the relative price between traded and non-traded goods is a 
function of the excess flow supply of money, G.(B) 
Assuming that for each level of an ex ante excess money supply in 
the economy there exists a long run stable relative price of non-traded 
to traded goods, therefore, a functional relationship between relative 
prices and ex ante monetary gap can be shown as follows: 
(5.17) 
where k is a constant and ft. is the elasticity of relative prices with 
respect to the monetary imbalance, G. Equation (5.17) implies that for 
each level of the monetary gap (i.e., for the difference between the ex 
ante rate of money creation and the changes in the demand for money) 
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there exists a unique relative price of non-traded in terms of traded 
goods. However, in the long run, and after the disturbance disappears, 
no further changes in relative prices will take place. To make the 
relationship given by equation ( 5. 17) operational, differentiation of 
equation (5.17) logarithmically produces: 
g - g 
PNT PT 
>.. ( t.G) (5.18) 
Equation (5.18) expresses the rate of change of the prices of non-traded 
goods in terms of the rate of change of prices of traded goods and the 
first difference of the monetary gap: 
g = g + At.G • 
PNT PT 
(5.19) 
In turn, we can express the rate of change in domestic prices, gp, given 
by equation (5.16) as a function of world inflation, gp , and the excess 
T 
flow supply of money without relying on the availability of data on the 
prices of non-traded goods. [The whole model and the derivation of the 
price and the BOP equations in the modified model are shown in Appendix 
B]. The system is solved for both endogenous variables, the domestic 
inflation, gp, and the BOP or the rate of changes ln net foreign 
reserves, gR. The domestic inflation is expressed in terms of world 
inflation the ex ante excess flow supply of money (EAEFSM), and domestic 
inflation in the past period (last quarter), as follows: 
1 •g + >..(1-8) t.[(DC/H) + g - ] 
1 -A ( 1 - 8) P 1 -A ( 1 - 8) • gDC m g d 
T m 
>..(1-8) 
+ ·g 1->..(1-B) P 
-1 
(5.20) 
Substituting for the value of domestic inflation, as given by equation 
( 5. 20), into the standard monetary approach as expressed by equation 
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(5.11), the solution for the BOP is obtained as follows: 
(R/H)gR 1 •g + A(1- S) 6[(DC/H) + ] 1-A(1-S) P 1-A(1-S)' gDC gm- g d 
• T m 
+ A(1-S) • + [ ( I ) ] 1-A(1-S) gp g d - gm - DC H gDC 
-1 m 
(5.21) 
The solution of the system given by equations (5.20) and (5.21) shows 
that, in the short run, the impact of a monetary imbalance is 
distributed between the BOP and the domestic inflation. The final 
distribution depends on the relative weight of traded and non-traded 
goods in total expenditures, S, and on the elasticity of relative prices 
of non-traded to traded goods with respect to the monetary gap, A. 
Blejer and Leiderman (1981) distinguished three clear cases: The first 
extreme case is when relative prices are insensitive to the monetary 
disturbance (A= 0), or when all goods are traded goods (8 = 1). Then 
the model will be reduced to the standard long run monetary approach 
model of equation (5.11). And, the full impact of the monetary 
imbalance falls on the BOP. Another extreme case is when relative 
prices are highly sensitive to monetary disturbance (A = <»). All the 
impact of the monetary disturbance falls on the domestic inflation. The 
third case is when the impact of monetary disturbance falls between the 
two extremes: the higher the A is and the lower the 8 is, the more 
impact of the monetary disturbance falls on the domestic rate of 
inflation and the less on the BOP. The reverse also holds true. 
The Estimation of Prices and the BOP Equations 
"The Estimation of the Modified Model" 
The standard monetary approach assumes the validity of the "law of 
one price" as presented by the integrated market hypothesis. Thus, for 
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the small country case, the price level is the one prevailing in world 
markets, However, causal observations on data in many LDCs show rates 
of inflation which are higher than the world rate. Therefore, different 
rates of inflation across countries are possible. In fact, Blejer 
(1977) and Blejer and Leiderman (1981) incorporate a price equation to 
allow for different rates of inflation between countries. The 
modification of the standard model permits the treatment of price as an 
endogenous variable. The addition of the price equation will serve to 
deal with the phenomenon of price differentials across countries, which 
is assumed absent by the standard monetary model introduced in Chapter 
III. 
The empirical testing of the integrated market hypothesis for the 
Saudi price data failed to confirm the validity of the "law of one 
price". Thus, the modified model as presented by equations (5.20) and 
(5.21) will be estimated using the Saudi price data covering the period 
1970-QII - 1982-QIV. During that time period, the Saudi economy has 
experienced periods of inflationary pressure and periods of price 
instability. Besides the Saudi BOP experienced surplus in most of the 
period under consideration, with the exception of 1978 and 1982(9) 
[Keran and Al-Malik (1982) and Al-Tuwijri (1985)], 
Since the monetary variable is the principle variable in this 
monetary model, the first step is to derive the ex ante excess flow 
supply of money variable which requires the estimation of the demand for 
real money function. The demand for real money balances has been 
previously estimated and summary of the results are reported in Table 
IV. Thus, utilizing this estimated demand for real money equation for 
Saudi Arabia, a series of predicted demand of real money balances, Ad is 
m 
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generated. The predicted values are transformed into rates of 
change, gAd• Now we subtract the rate of change of the estimated demand 
m 
for money balance, gAd, from the rate of change of the money supply 
m 
under the monetary authority's control, [(DC/H)gDC + gm]. By doing so, 
the monetary variable which is called the ex ante excess flow supply of 
money, EAEFSM, is obtained. 
The next step is to obtain the world rate of inflation. To 
generate the price of traded goods, two proxies of the world price 
indices are generated from the world consumer price index, WCPI, and the 
world wholesale price index, WWPI, of the major trading partners of 
Saudi Arabia. The weights used in generating the two indexes are the 
ones reported in Table X. 
technique.< 10 ) 
The two equations were estimated using OLS 
The Transformation of the Variables 
Following the works of Blejer (1977) and Blejer and Leiderman · 
(1981) substitute for the lagged endogenous variable P_ 1 recursively so 
that th·e endogenous variables will be expressed as functions of current 
and lagged values of the world inflation and the domestic monetary 
variable, EAEFSM. The use of this estimation method involves several 
transformations using a lag operator which serves to express equations 
(5.20) and (5.21) in terms of the current and lagged values of their 
independent variables.< 11 ) The model after transformation is given as 
follows: 
:D 
a[ ~ (1-a)i Li (gp )t] 
i=O T 
00 
+ (1-a) {[ L 
i=O 
(R/H)gR 
00 
i i i i+1 (1-a) L - I (1-a) L ][(DC/H)gDC + gm- g~dJ) 
i=O m 
where a = [1->.(1-8)]- 1 
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(5.22) 
(5.23) 
The transformed model which is given by equations (5.22) and (5.23) 
states that the price adjustment (the current rate of inflation) as well 
as the BOP adjustment (the current rate of change in foreign reserves) 
depend on the current and past values of world inflation and the 
EAEFSM. ( 12 ) The current and lagged values of these variables are 
polynomials, which are exponentially decreasing, and the weights are 
functions of the elasticity of relative prices with respect to the 
excess flow supply of money, A, and the share of traded goods in the 
total expenditure, 8. ( l3) Equation (5.22) expresses the domestic rate 
of inflation as a function of world inflation and the EAEFSM. All signs 
are expected to be positive. Equation (5.23) expresses the BOP as a 
function of the difference between the rates of change in real money 
demand plus world prices, (gp + g~d), and the rates of change in the 
T m 
money supply under the monetary authority's control, [gm + (DC/H)g0cJ· 
When [gm + (DC/H)g0 J exceeds (gp + g~d) an adjustment in the BOP takes 
T m 
place. The sign of the coefficient of the difference is expected to be 
negative and equal to one. 
The standard long run monetary approach can be looked at as a 
special case of the above model. If we assume that all goods are traded 
goods, so 8 = 1, then the coefficient of world inflation variable will 
be one. Therefore, equation (5.22) will be reduced to gp = gp and 
T 
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equation (5.23) will be equivalent to equation (5.11). 
The estimation of equation (5.22) and equation (5.23) is carried 
through the construction of the polynomials and the assignment of 
weights to the first quarter lag of each exogenous variable. The 
weights which were used range from 0.2 to 0.9.< 14 ) Thus, by varying the 
weights, different estimates of the coefficients a and ( 1 - a) are 
obtained. This process, in fact, implies assigning different values for 
.X. for a given 8. Then using the OLS estimation technique on different 
combinations of polynomials with the weight for the first quarter lag 
varying from 0. 2 to 0. 9, the estimation is carried out using both 
proxies of the world rate of inflation, the rates of change in WCPI and 
WWPI along with both definitions of money, M1 and M2. The regression 
equations which yield the highest R2 are taken as the ones which 
represent the best estimates for a. Since a = [1-.X.(1-S)]- 1 , the best 
estimate of a implies the best estimate of .X. for a given value of s. 
The combination of polynomials of world rate inflation, PT, and the 
EAEFSM which maximizes R2 , using WWPI and the money M1, have first 
quarter lags of 0.9 and 0.6, respectively.< 15 ) However, when the WCPI 
is used, the combination of the first quarter lags are found to be 0.8 
and 0. 4. When the broad definition of money, M2, is used, almost 
identical weights are obtained. The discussion of the empirical results 
is presented below. 
The Estimates of the Domestic Inflation 
The empirical results from the domestic inflation using equation 
(5.22) are presented in Table XII where the world rate of inflation is 
given by two measures (WWPI and WCPI). Using a one tail t-test, the 
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estimates of the coefficients of world inflation measured by world WWPI 
and the domestic monetary variable, EAEFSM, both are significant at the 
5 percent level. However, when world inflation is measured by the 
world CPI (WCPI) none of the relevant variables are significantly 
different from zero. Whatever the measure of world inflation is used, 
the expected signs are obtained, where domestic inflation is positively 
related to the world rate of inflation as well as the EAEFSM. As far as 
the definition of money is concerned,, no significant change is achieved 
when using the broader definition. The results show that the 
explanatory power of the regression as indicated by the coefficient of 
determination, is very poor, especially when the WCPI is used to 
measure world inflation. At their best, when WWPI is used only 37 
percent of the variation in domestic inflation is explained by the model 
specification. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic identifies the absence of serial 
correlation among residuals when the WWPI is used. But, the use of the 
WCPI as a measure of world inflation indicated the presence of serial 
correlations, and the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique is utilized to 
account for the presence of the first order auto-correlation. The 
empirical results show that the adjustment process takes longer time (12 
quarters) to complete when the world WWPI is used to measure world 
inflation. While the total adjustment to changes in domestic monetary 
conditions is completed in 8 quarters.C 16) The somewhat better results 
obtained from using WWPI as a measure of world inflation may be due to 
the fact that WWPI includes a higher proportion of traded goods than the 
WCPI. This fact is reflected in the higher level of significance of the 
coefficients of world inflation, compared with the poor results from 
TABLE XII 
ESTIMATION OF THE PRICE ADJUSTMENT EQUATION 
FOR SAUDI ARABIA: 1970-QII - 1982-QIV 
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gp= vO + v1gPT + v2~[gm + (DC/H)gDC - g~d] + ~ 
I. Using WWPI to measure world inflation 
II. Using WCPI to measure world inflation 
money 
I. M1 
I I. M1 
I. M2 
II. M2 
Notes: 
Ll[gm+(DC/H)gDC- g~dJ -2 DW RMSE constant gp R rho 
T m 
-0.073 5. 443 0.032 0.314 1. 65 0.034 
(-3.058 (4.305) (2.231) 
0.018 0. 351 0.010 0. 019 1. 13 .427 .050 
(0.478) (0.234) (0.764) 
-0.075 5. 529 0.035 0.329 1.62 0.034 
(3.159) (4.421) (2.427) 
0.018 0.365 0.015 0.038 1 • 11 • 44 0.49 
(0.468) (0.244) (1.127) 
The dependent variable is the rate of domestic inflation in 
Saudi Arabia measured by the rate of change in CPI, 1975 
1 00. 
- The independent variables are the distributed lag polynomials 
of world inflation and the first difference of the EAEFSM. 
- The weights of the first quarter lags for the inflation 
variable are 0.9 and 0.8 for WWPI and WCPI respectively. For 
the money variable the weights for the first quarter lags are 
0.6 and 0.4 for WWPI and WCPI respectively 
- Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
- R2 is adjusted R2• For regressions using WCPI the regular R2 
are reported since the adjusted ones were negative. s 
- D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
- Rho is the estimates of the first order auto-correlation 
obtain by the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. 
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using the WCPI measure. Finally, the empirical test using the Saudi 
Arabian data has failed to support the theoretical expectation that the 
sum of the estimated coefficients Cv1 + v2) adds to unity. 
The Estimates of the BOP 
The empirical testing of the BOP equation (5.23) which specifies 
the BOP as a function of a polynomial of the difference between the ex 
ante excess flow supply of money, [gm - (DC/H)gDC - gAd] and world 
m 
inflation, gp , was done using the polynomial distributive lags (PDL) 
T 
estimation technique. As in the case of testing the domestic inflation, 
a polynomial is constructed as a weighted average of current and past 
values of world inflation. Different weights for the first quarter lag 
were undertaken with the first quarter lag for EAEFSM variable ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.9 in the regression. The value of R2 is maximized when a 
weight of 0. 2 is given to the first quarter lag. This implies that a 
stock disequilibrium in the money market will create a flow process of 
adjustment which will take three quarters to complete. The empirical 
estimation has been performed using both measures of world inflation 
with both money definitions. The results from estimating the BOP 
equation (5.23) are shown in Table XIII. 
Using a one tail t-test, the estimated coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and to carry the 
expected negative sign. However, regressions using the WWPI-based 
inflation measure show slightly better results as indicated by the 
better statistics of R2 , DW and the t-ratios. This again gives support 
to the contention that the WWPI is a more proper measure for the prices 
of traded goods as compared with the CPl. The negative coefficients 
TABLE XIII 
ESTIMATON OF THE BOP ADJUSTMENT EQUATION 
FOR SAUDI ARABIA: 1970-QII - 1982-QIV 
(R/H)GR = o0 + o1[gp - (gm+ (DC/H)gDC- g~d)] + v 
T m 
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I. Using WWPI to measure world inflation 
II. Using WCPI to measure world inflation 
[gp (gm + DC/H)gDC - g~d) J -2 DW RMSE money constant - R 
de f. T m 
I. M1 -0.032 -1.0109 o. 992 2.17 0.1096 
(-1.572) (-74.347) 
II. M1 -0.034 -1 . 01 08 0.991 1. 95 0.1174 
(-1.561) (-69.418) 
I. M2 -0.030 -1.0096 0.991 2.02 0. 11 27 
(-1.427) -72.316) 
II. M2 -0.032 -1.0093 0.99 1. 84 0.1212 
( -1 • 409) (-67.203) 
Notes: - The dependent variable is the rate of change of net foreign 
assets holdings of SAMA, weighted by the share of this foreign 
component of base money. 
The independent variable is the distributed lag polynomial of 
the difference between the rate of world inflation and the 
rate of EAEFSM .• The weight of the first quarter lag used is 
0.2. 
- R2 is the R2 adjusted for the degrees of freedom. 
D.W. is the Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
RMSE is the root mean square error. 
- Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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reflect the inverse relationship between the BOP (rate of foreign 
reserve accumulation) and the rate of change of domestic money supply 
[gm + (DC/H)gDC] over the rates of change in demand for real money and 
world prices, (gp + g~d). In other words, the rate of foreign reserve 
T m 
accumulation varies inversely with the difference between the EAEFSM and 
world inflation. The result indicates that the quarterly movements in 
the Saudi data have shown an inverse one-to-one relation between the BOP 
and the EAEFSM, when world inflation replaced the domestic price level. 
Some Remarks Concerning the 
Performance of the Model 
The modified model is introduced in an attempt to explain how a 
domestic monetary policy expansion, i.e. expanding domestic credits, in 
a small open economy under fixed exchange rate, results in that country 
having a different inflation rate from the ROW. It presents a monetary 
model which aims to illustrate the nature of interaction between the BOP 
and the rate of domestic inflation in response to such monetary 
disturbance. The model provides a short run analysis of the impact of 
external influences as presented by the rate of world inflation and the 
BOP. The model is based on the assumption that, in the short run, as 
the small open economy expands its domestic money stock (the domestic 
money is the money under the control of the monetary authority) at a 
rate greater than that of the money demand, it will suffer a higher rate 
of inflation than the world rate. In brief, the model is concerned with 
the short run explanation of the prices and BOP adjustments in the face 
of a disequilibrium in the domestic money market. The adjustment 
process works via the goods, capital and money markets. When the 
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adjustment process is completed, domestic inflation will converge to the 
world rate, and the excess supply of money created ex ante by the 
monetary authority will be eliminated through the BOP. The testing of 
the modified model provides us with the following concluding remarks: 
1) With respect to the influence on the rate of domestic inflation, 
both independent variables in equation (5.22), gp and ~[gm + (DC/H)gDC 
T 
gAd' are 
m 
magnitude of 
found 
the 
to be important. But the t-statistics and the 
estimated coefficients indicate that the price 
variables play a more significant role than the domestic money in the 
determination of endogenous variable. The following general observation 
may be presented concerning the empirical findings on domestic 
inflation: a) Because the world WWPI cant ains a larger proportion of 
tradables than the WCPI, the coefficients of WWPI turn out to be 
superior to those of the WCPI as a measure of world inflation in terms 
of all statistical measures--higher level of significance, higher R2 , 
lower MSE and absence of serial correlation. b) The use of the broad 
definition of money, M2, gives slightly higher significance levels and 
slightly higher R2s as compared with the results from using the narrow 
definition of money, M1. c) The theoretical presentation of the model 
expected the sum of the estimated coefficients a+( 1-a) to add up to 
unity. However, the empirical findings failed to meet such a condition. 
2) With respect to the BOP as specified by equation (5.23), it is found 
that all coefficients are statistically significant even at the one 
percent level. When the WPI is used to measure the world rate of 
inflation the coefficient of the difference variable (the difference 
between the world rate of inflation and the rate of EAEFSM) carries a 
1 ess significant level and a lower magnitude as compared with the WWPI 
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measure. Moreover, the adjustment process took three quarters to 
complete which is faster as compared with adjustment in inflation, which 
took a longer time span. 
In general, the empirical findings indicate that world inflation 
explains the major part of variations in the rate of domestic inflation 
in Saudi Arabia, while the BOP had borne the major adjustments against 
the monetary disturbance in that country. Such findings, in fact, give 
support to the analysis proposed by this short run dynamic model. 
Finally, some pitfalls in interpreting the regressions should be 
mentioned: (i) The regressions of domestic inflation as specified by 
equation (5.22) have shown consistent low values for the coefficients of 
determination. In fact the best R2 obtained do not explain more than 37 
percent. In contrast, the regressions of the BOP given by equation 
(5.23) have much larger R2 values exceeding 99 percent in all cases. 
( ii) The definition of goods which are not integrated into the world 
economy, i.e., the non-traded goods, is not completely disintegrated 
from the traded ones, particularly for a small developing open economy 
as the Saudi economy. Although the non-traded goods do not enter 
international trade, however, a large proportion of their raw materials, 
or non-finished products, and labor factors are originated outside the 
national borders. (iii) The use of Saudi Arabia's CPI as a measure of 
the rate of domestic inflation, since no Saudi wholesale price index is 
in existence, must be taken with care. The small number of families, 
the basket of commodities included and the weights used in constructing 
the Saudi CPI are changing all the time. If one includes the time 
measure, all these factors may lower the accuracy of the CPI as a 
measure of world inflation. Therefore, the large magnitudes of 
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coefficients of world inflation when world WPI is used and the poor 
results obtained when world CPI is used as a measure for world inflation 
may be aggravated by the method of construction of the domestic CPI. 
ENDNOTES 
1The purchasing power parity, PPP, theory in its absolute form was 
presented by G. Cassel (1923). The theory indicated that national price 
levels are linked together via the exchange rate. I.e., given Ph/Pw = 
E, where Ph/Pw is the ratio of price level between countries, and E is 
the exchange rate, this implies that prices are identical in both 
countries when converted into a common currency unit. Thus, by 
implication, the buying power of both currencies are equal, because 
perfect abitrage of goods and capital markets is assumed. For example, 
suppose the price of corn expressed in a common currency is Pc = A 
c $0.90/bushel in country A and P8 = $1.20/bushel in country B, then the 
commodity arbitragers will start to buy corn in A's market, and sell it 
on B's market, accounting for transport costs. The arbitragers' 
activities will continue until the price of corn per bushel is equalized 
in the two countries. See Humphrey and Keleher (1982), p. 252 and 
Wilson (1986), p.210. 
? 
-Among the different studies that tested the integrated market 
hypothesis are the works of A. Hans Genberg (1976) and Bardo and 
Choudhr i ( 1976). Genberg used the Swedish data and obtained results 
supportive of the integrated market hypothesis. Bardo and Chaudhri used 
Canadian data and rejected the integrated market hypothesis. 
3Apart from the existence of non-traded goods, the price indices 
are affected by the weighting patterns used in the construction of each 
index. In the real world the weighting system is affected by the 
collection practice, timing, coverage, treatment of indirect taxes, 
etc. These differences will be reflected in the construction of the 
indices and will result in an unequal changes jn the price indices 
across countries. See Genberg (1976), p. 299. 
4The major trading partners are chosen according to their 
importance in each case country's foreign trade. Any trade partner 
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whose trade constitutes 3 percent or more of the country's total trade 
is included in the construction of the world rates of inflation. For 
the weights see Table IX in the text. 
5The model which we are going to use in this study relies heavily 
on the model developed by Blejer (1977). 
6This does not mean that the approach is not concerned with the 
stock variables, such as the level of international reserves for 
example, but it focuses its analysis on the stock adjustment. For more 
on this see Chapter III. 
7 The rates of change of nominal demand for money are rates of 
change of stock variables. However, since the rate of change of a stock 
variable is a flow, the BOP is said to be a function of "flow" excess 
supply of (demand for) money. 
8A Walrasian price-based adjustment to excess demand is assumed 
here. However, an excess supply in the money market is used instead of 
excess demand in the goods market as the Walrasian adjustment 
postulates. See Blejer (1977) p. 421. 
9The external sector in Saudi Arabia reflects three basic 
features. (i) The external payments position is almost entirely 
determined by developments on the current account. (i i) The overall 
payments balance shows the net balance between the net deficit non-oil 
sector and the net surplus of the oil sector. (iii) The net surplus of 
the oil sector accrues predominately to the government sector, while the 
net deficit of the non-oil sector originates in the private sector. See 
Hitti and Abed (1974) pp. 298-99. 
10Direct estimation of equations (5.20) and (5.21), using the WWPI 
as a measure of the world inflation and the broad definition of money, 
M2, yielded the following: 
a) The inflation equation: 
gp = 0.002 
(0.216) 
"R2 = o. 162 
+ 0.685gp + 0.018~EAEFSM + 0.323gp 
(1.952) T (2.135) (2.399) - 1 
h=-1.212 rho = -0.055 MSE = 0.001 
b) The BOP equation: 
(R/H)gR 
-2 R 0.99 
-0. 009 
(0.578) 
+ 0.936gp + 0.084~EAEFSM + 0,449gp 
( 1 • 5 91 ) T ( 5. 34 3) ( 1. 7 6 0) - 1 
+ 0.978[gAd - gm - (DC/H)gDC] 
(124.07)m 
D.W. = 2.615 rho -0.324 MSE 0.005 
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Note that the BOP equation was corrected for serial correlation using 
the Cochrane-Orcutt technique for auto-correlations. This estimates are 
obtained using OLS. This direct estimation method, in fact, involves 
econometric problems, since the lagged endogenous variable of domestic 
inflation appears on the right hand side. Mario Blejer ( 1977) argues 
that the use of this direct estimation method is inferior to the 
indirect method which involves the transformation of the variables. See 
equations (5.22) and (5.23) in the text and Appendix B. 
11 The Lag operator for variable z: LZt = zt_ 1 and Lizt 
For more details see Appendix B. 
12The ex ante excess flow supply of money is calculated by adding 
the rate of change of domestic credit creation to the rate of change of 
the money multiplier, and subtracting from this sum, the estimate of the 
rate of change of the real money demand. See Blejer (1977), p. 424. 
13The previous condition remains valid. The lower is A and the 
higher is B, the higher will be the coefficients of world inflation. 
The reverse is true for the coefficient of EAEFSM. 
14For a variable Z where a first quarter lag weight of 0.6 is 
assigned, the polynomial will be generated as follows: 
zt = co.6) 0 (o.4)Zt-o+Co.6) 1co.4)zt_ 1+co.6) 2(o.4)zt_ 2+ •••• 
However, when the next quarter lag term becomes so small that it will 
have almost no effect, a truncation is made. The tr unca ti on is done 
arbitrarily. The role is to include terms up to 0.01 or the twelfth 
quarter lag, whichever comes first. 
15For example using equation (5.22), the R2 which is obtained from 
regressing the domestic inflation in Saudi Arabia (measured by the CPI, 
17 5 
1975 = 100) on polynomials of current and past rates of world inflation 
(measured by the WWPI, 1975 = 100), and current and past rates of 
EAEFSM, are: 
Weights of the First Lag in the EAEFSM 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.3 0. 114 0. 1 22 0. 125 0.073 0.027 
(0.139) (0.108) (0.112) (0.094) (0.037) 
0.4 0. 1 31 0.143 0.149 0.083 0.032 
(0.159) (0.170) (0.173) (0.106) (0.044) 
0.6 0. 182 0.202 0.220 0.216 0.063 
(0.212) (0.232) (0.249) ( 0. 2 39) (0.080) 
0.8 0.278 0.299 0.323 0.357 0.325 
( 0. 304) (0.325) ( 0. 348) (0.381) ( 0. 34 3) 
0.9 0. 329 0.341 o. 353 0. 370 0. 370 
(0.346) (0.357) (0.369) (0.384) (0.383) 
The R2 values on the top are obtained from regressions using the narrow 
definitions of money, M1, while the R2 values between parentheses come 
from using M2. The maximum R2 is obtained from the regression using a 
first quarter lag of 0.9 for WWPI and 0.6 for the EAEFSM. 
16 The weight for the first quarter lags for the polynomial of world 
inflation as measured by the WWPI is 0.9, while the weight for the 
EAEFSM is found to be 0.6. These results imply that the adjustment for 
the world inflation variable is completed in 12 quarters, while it takes 
8 quarters for the adjustment of the monetary variable to complete. A 
similar pattern is found by Blejer for Mexico. See Blejer (1977). p. 
424. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Summary 
This study is an attempt to explore the determinants of foreign 
reserve flows in the oil-based small open economies of Libya, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. The time span of the study encompasses the major oil 
price increases of the 1970s and 1980, which led to very large wealth 
and income (resource) transfers and provided a ready source of 
purchasing power to these developing economies. These oil reserve flows 
and the problem of the efficient recycling of such funds in the world 
economy had produced an adverse impact on all countries of the world. 
The wealth transfers lessened the financial constraints in these oil-
based economies, but they resulted in more external and internal 
problems. Given the limited absorptive capacity to utilize these huge 
transfers of foreign exchanges by these developing economies, the sudden 
wealth contributed to the existing problems of higher inflation, more 
resource waste, income maldistribution, rapid depletion of oil reserves 
and sectoral imbalances. The oil-exporting economies of Libya, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia provide a good case of the small open economy under 
fixed exchange rates. Foreign trade plays an important role in almost 
all sectors of their domestic economies. Trade and exchange systems are 
relatively free from excessive direct government control, except ln the 
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latter years in Libya. And fixed exchange rates have been applied for 
the entire period covered by this study. 
The study examines the empirical validity of a simple monetary 
model of the foreign reserve flows (the BOP) under a fixed exchange rate 
regime using data from these oil-based small open economies. The BOP 
analysis provided by the "elasticities" and "income-absorption" 
approaches, which are known as the traditional approaches, was not 
considered suitable for analyzing the flow of foreign reserves of the 
oil-exporting countries. Given the situation of these oil-based 
economies, the "elasticities" approach is an inadequate tool of analysis 
because oil is highly price inelastic and paid for in foreign currency 
(the u.s. dollar). Meanwhile, the "income-absorption" approach, which 
depends on aggregate demand management, may have a limited impact, since 
the institutional and economic structures of these developing economies 
impose 1 imi ts on their overall level of absorption Therefore, demand 
management is not the major problem as far as the LDCs are concerned. 
The MABOP, which integrates the current and capital accounts into 
the money account of the BOP provides a better tool for the analysis of 
the reserve flows phenomenon in these oil-exporting economies. By 
defining the overall BOP or the money account as changes in net foreign 
reserves of the banking system, the MABOP views the BOP deficits or 
surpluses as stock adjustments to money market equilibrium. The MABOP 
theory asserts that foreign reserve flows can be explained by the 
changes in the variables which determine the demand and supply of 
money. Thus, it uses domestic monetary equilibrium conditions to derive 
an explanation to the overall BOP position of a country. 
In this study the MABOP has been used as an analytical tool to 
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study the changes in net foreign reserves (the BOP) adjustment mechanism 
of the oil-based economies of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The 
approach utilizes the monetary forces in the domestic money market to 
derive a basic BOP equation that explains the monetary nature of the 
BOP. The model used is similar to the standard model which was 
presented by H. G. Johnson (1972), but it accounts for some of the 
institutional constraints imposed by the nature of these oil-exporting 
developing economies. 
Two major modifications were introduced to the standard BOP 
model. The first modification dealt with the problem of reverse 
causation or feedback from the BOP to the domestic credit by treating 
the domestic credit endogenously. Hence, a reaction function was 
specified to explain the behavior of the monetary authorities in each 
country. Then both the BOP and the domestic credit equations were 
treated as a system and estimated simultaneously. The second 
modification dealt with the diversion of domestic inflation from its 
world counterpart. The price analysis relaxes the integrated market 
assumption and allows for the presence of the non-tradable sector using 
a short-run version of the standard monetary model. The modified model 
examines the dynamic adjustments in both prices and the BOP resulting 
from a domestic money disturbance. The econometric testing of all these 
relations was conducted using quarterly data covering. 
In the empirical estimation of the reserve flow (the BOP) equations 
two methods were used: ( i) The direct estimation method where the 
rates of change of the arguments of the demand for real money balances: 
g - s g + s g were used directly d y y e e 
m TI rr 
equations (4.3) and (4.13), where s and s y 
TI 
in the estimation, as in 
are elasticities of demand 
e 
179 
for real money balances with respect to income and expected inflation. 
(ii) The indirect method which is done in two major steps: First, we 
estimated the demand for real money balances using a specified function, 
i.e. (Md/p) = f(y,1Te) + ll, in order to obtain the estimated values of 
demand for real money, ( M/p). Secondly, this generated series of 
predicted real demand was transformed into growth terms and was 
substituted for g d in the reserve flow equation. Then we proceeded 
m 
with the estimation process as given by equations (4.9), (4.10) and 
(4.15). The empirical findings have already been outlined and discussed 
in details in Chapters IV and V. The general conclusions will be 
highlighted here. 
Findings and Conclusions 
This study has applied a monetary framework to interpret and to 
explain the past development of monetary relations in these oil-
exporting developing economies. It is an empirical study using data 
from the case countries to test the validity of the long-run MABOP and a 
short-run version of that standard model to explain adjustments in 
prices and the BOP. The study aims to contribute in the construction of 
a framework for analyzing certain monetary relations and policies with 
its empirical evidence. The main findings can be summarized as follows: 
First, with respect to the BOP adjustment analysis, this study 
found that the three countries support the relationships hypothesized by 
the monetary approach, especially the negative one-to-one correlation 
between the domestic credits and the BOP. The findings support the main 
claim of the monetary approach that an increase of the domestic credits 
component of base money at a rate faster (slower) than the rate of 
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growth of the demand for money will lead to a BOP deficit (surplus). 
The findings have shown that the movements in net domestic credits 
appear to be the most important explanatory variable of the BOP. 
Concerning the performance of the money multiplier, the estimates 
of its coefficient in the BOP equations, whatever the money definition 
(narrow or wide) used, carry the right sign and statistically equal 
-1.0, except in the case of Libya. Since the Libyan reserve requirement 
ratio was unchanged, the finding suggests that the currency ratio might 
have been responsible to a great extent for the fluctuations in the 
money multiplier in Libya. However, the high correlation between the 
rates of change in the money multiplier and the net domestic credit 
suggests that the money multipliers have been influenced by the credit 
policies as well. Thus, it reduces the validity of treating the money 
multiplier as an exogenous variable in the BOP equation. 
The signs of the other explanatory variables in the BOP equations 
were all as predicted by the monetary approach theory. However, their 
magnitudes failed to meet their theoretical expectations especially for 
the real income variable. The direct estimation of the BOP models in 
all cases shows that the coefficients of the rates of change in price 
are positive and statistically equal to unity with the exception of the 
simultaneous estimation in the Saudi case using the 2SLS technique. The 
real income variable carries the expected positive sign in most of the 
regressions, however, in all cases it is statistically not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficient of the expected inflation variable 
carries the correct negative sign, but it is statistically not 
significantly different from zero in all cases. 
The results also suggest that a simultaneous estimation, which 
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accounts for the feedback effect from the BOP to the domestic credits 
via separate specification of a domestic credits equation or reaction 
function into the model, provided better estimates than the single 
equation estimates of the BOP (compare Tables III and V with VII and 
VI II). The improvements in the simultaneous estimation may be due to 
taking account of interdependence between changes in net domestic 
credits and the BOP which led to the reverse causation between these two 
major components of the monetary base. The feedback effect was present 
between the two variables as indicated by the estimate of the reaction 
function (see Table IX). The BOP estimation technique which takes the 
feedback effect into account, in fact, supported the one-to-one inverse 
relation between the domestic credits and the BOP, which the single 
equation estimation failed to support in Libya and Saudi Arabia when the 
interdependence was not counted for. In general, the empirical evidence 
on the BOP estimation provides the following major conclusions: (i) The 
estimated models do explain a substantial portion of the variation in 
the BOP as indicated by the relatively high R2 and significant F-
statistics; (ii) the indirect method of estimation gives better results 
than the direct method which can be observed by comparing Tables III 
with VII and Tables V with VIII; (iii) the poor performance of the 
direct estimation of the BOP may be due to the presence of multi-
colinearity between the rates of changes of prices and the inflation 
expectation; (iv) all the results do support the monetary approach claim 
that prices and real income increases will improve the BOP position of a 
country; (v) all results supports the claim that increases in the growth 
rates of the net domestic credits and/or the expected inflation and/or 
the money multiplier worsen the BOP position of the country concerned; 
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(vi) the results support the monetary nature of the BOP, where an excess 
supply of (demand for) money implies a BOP deficits (surpluses) as shown 
in Tables V, VI and VIII: and (-vii) in the case of Kuwait a significant 
negative one-to-one relation between net domestic credits and the BOP 
was found when the former is considered exogenously determined. 
However, in the case of Libya and Saudi Arabia the significant negative 
one-to-one relation between the two variables was found only when the 
net domestic credit variable is treated endogenously. 
Second, with respect to the reaction function, to account for the 
feedback effect from the BOP to the net domestic credit, the domestic 
money component (domestic credits) is treated endogenously. To test for 
such a feedback, a separate specification of a domestic credits equation 
(reaction function) is required to show the determinants of domestic 
credit. The empirical findings from estimating the domestic credits 
equation (reaction function) are presented in Table IX in the text. The 
findings suggest that the monetary authorities of the oil-exporting 
small open economies of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been 
actively sterilizing the effects of foreign reserve flows in favor of 
maintaining a stable monetary base and total money supply. This fact is 
indicated by the high magnitude of the estimated coefficient of changes 
in net foreign reserves with respect to changes in net domestic 
credits, ag0c/ogR. The results (as shown by Table IX) imply that 
sterilization is complete in Saudi Arabia and nearly complete in Kuwait 
and Libya. But, given the ad hoc specification of the reaction 
function, an alternative specification of this function may provide a 
more consistent and better explanation of sterilization and credit 
policies. 
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Third, with respect to inflation, in the estimated demand for money 
equation, a specification of inflation expectation was used as a proxy 
for the cost of holding inactl ve money balances. The results from the 
estimates of the demand for money (as shown by Table IV) found that 
expected inflation was an unimportant determinant of the public's demand 
for real money balances. 
The MABOP's assumption concerning the purchasing power parity, PPP, 
was tested as well using its relative version. As shown by Table XI, 
the PPP assumption held strongly in Kuwait, weakly in Libya and failed 
to hold for the Saudi case. Therefore, a domestic inflation equation 
was specified as a part of an adjustment process in the face of monetary 
disturbance. Domestic inflation is specified as a function of world 
inflation and a measure of ex ante excess flow supply of money. This is 
done by extending the standard model of the MABOP to allow for the role 
played by the non-tradables sector in the adjustment process of 
imbalances in the domestic money market. A short-run dynamic model 
developed by M. Blejer (1977) was adopted and applied to the Saudi 
data. The results from the short-run dynamic adjustment which allows 
prices to share in the adjustment process with BOP are given in Tables 
XII and XIII. The results of the estimation of the domestic inflation 
equation (see Table XII) support the monetary analysis on the short-run 
price adjustment. However, the regression has a low coefficient of 
determination, R2 , and indicates that world inflation is, in fact, the 
major determinant of the domestic inflation, in spite of the statistical 
significance of the monetary variable. Meanwhile, the empirical 
findings from the BOP equation (see Table XI II) showed a one-to-one 
inverse relatlon between the BOP and a measure of the ex ante excess 
184 
flow supply of money, EAEFSM, in which world prices replaced the 
domestic price level variable used in the standard model. Thus, one may 
conclude that the Saudi data reported findings in support of the 
assumption that it is possible for a small open economy with f'ixed 
exchange rates to experience a rate of inflation different from that of 
the world inflation. Also, both BOP and domestic inflation estimates 
are found to depend on world inflation as well as the excess flow supply 
of money. 
Finally, the results obtained from applying the same models to each 
case country do show some differences due to the institutional and 
structural dissimilarities among these oil-based economies. However, as 
far as the empirical findings are concerned, all models estimated, 
whatever the estimation technique and money definition used, provided 
the following major conclusions: 
a) In all the BOP models tested the most significant explanatory 
variable appears to be the movement in net domestic credits. 
b) Sterilization policies were exercised by the monetary authorities in 
the three countries. In fact, sterilization was complete in Saudi 
Arabia and nearly complete in Libya and Kuwait. However, due to the 
ad hoc specification of the reaction function, the interpretation 
about sterilization should be viewed more as speculation than as a 
firm conclusion. 
c) It is possible for a small open economy under fixed exchange rates 
to experience a rate of domestic inflation different from that of 
the world rate of inflation. 
185 
Some Policy Implications 
The variation in the performance of the models used in the 
empirical testing in these oil-based small open economies is found to be 
very small, which supports the assumption of close similarities among 
these economies. Despite such close similarities, one may say that it 
is not possible to develop a single model that works satisfactorily and 
generates appropriate policy options for these small open economies, let 
alone adopt models which are basically constructed for the developed 
economies. Therefore, for the models to be useful for practical policy 
formulation, the models should be modified to account for, as accurately 
as possible, the specific economic and political realities of any 
country they intend to present. Hence, some of the following policy 
suggestions and implications should be taken into account: 
1. The application of the foreign reserves flow (the BOP) equations 
suggests that an inappropriate monetary policy in a country can lead to 
undesirable consequences for that country's economy and its BOP. For 
example, the results imply that an expansionary monetary or' credit 
policy that leads to a money creation at a rate faster than the rate of 
increase in demand for real cash balances tends to generate a reserve 
loss, and the reverse is true. But, according to the monetary approach 
theory, such deficit (or surplus) is of a transitory nature and if the 
discrepancy is kept constant, it will eventually disappear through the 
BOP automatic adjustment mechanism. Therefore, for these oil-based 
developing economies, to generate foreign reserves flow, aside from 
their oil sectors, they either enforce a policy which increases 
productivity and output or restrains the expansion of their domestic 
money stock. These two policy options may be explained as follows: 
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( i) A policy option which is available via the mobilization of their 
idle resources in an effort to increase the total output accompanied 
with a plan to raise the productivity of the domestic economy; these 
efforts are long-run policy measures. ( ii) The alternative policy 
option is to pursue an expansionary monetary policy, which may cause 
output to grow and reverse the loss of foreign reserves by increasing 
the money demand. Besides, an expansionary monetary policy may generate 
inflation which serves to increase the nominal money demand and to 
reduce the real money supply. 
2. Devaluation is an important instrument of monetary policy for BOP 
adjustment. G. Bird (1978) argues that devaluation tends to reduce the 
foreign reserves loss and help generate a BOP surplus, by switching 
expenditure toward domestic output. In fact, in the LDCs the unemployed 
resources can be utilized to increase the domestic output needed to 
replace the cut in imports. The low integration of the LDCs with the 
rest of the world makes devaluation a more preferred candidate as a 
policy option. However, the poor resource base, in our oil-based 
developing economies, limits the availability of import sJbsti tJtes. 
These economies are highly dependent on imports for most of their needs 
(finished and unfinished products, as well as all type of capital 
goods), while their oil exports are paid for in dollars (not the 
national currencies). These factors put limits on the importance of 
devaluation as a policy option available to these economies. 
3. There are two ways to curb the monetary impact of an increase in 
foreign exchange receipts. One way is to use all the increase in 
foreign reserves to import more goods and services from the rest of the 
world. The other way is to b1Jild higher reserves of foreign exchange, 
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which is a sterilization policy. In fact, our oil-rich economies are 
more concerned with achieving the internal goals of their economic plans 
than maintaining a stable BOP. Therefore, they supply liquidity and 
manage credits in order to serve the economic activities as outlined in 
the economic plans. In other words, the government pursued an active 
sterilization policy as indicated by the empirical results. Such policy 
of negating or neutralizing the impact of foreign reserve flows on the 
base money needs to continue, and can be achieved, if the authorities in 
these developing countries take into account the absorptive capacity of 
the economy at the time of setting the goals of each economic plan. 
Points for Future Research 
In general, the results obtained from the estimation of the various 
models in this study appear to be reasonably good. However, our 
understanding could be improved by future research on some of the 
following points: 
1 - More research needs to be done and on a detailed analysis of the 
determinants of the money multiplier in these countries. 
2 - The study of the money demand and the reserve flow equations could 
be improved if a proper set of quarterly interest rate data is 
found; or, if a wealth variable is used in the demand for money. 
Concerning the reserve flow equation, the interest rate parity was 
assumed to hold since the assumption is not verifiable from the 
existing data on interest rates in these countries. 
3 - The shJrt-run dynamic analysis of the prices and BOP based on the 
framework of the monetary approach as presented by Blejer (1977) and 
Parkin ( 1974) assumed real output was independent of the money 
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supply. The full employment assumption could be relaxed for a more 
reasonable assumption for these developing economies. Therefore, 
real output can be incorporated as an endogenous variable which 
responds directly to changes in the money supply. Bruno ( 1979), 
Taylor (1979) and Cavallo (1981) are examples of studies which 
emphasized strong real output effects of domestic credits, 
particularly in LDCs. M. Khan (1977) presents a model which allows 
fluctuations in real income and/or inflation to characterize the 
path towards the long-run equilibrium. 
4 - A more detailed monetary sector model for an open economy under 
either fixed or "managed floating" exchange rate regimes which takes 
into account the output side may be able to better explain the BOP 
problem in these developing economies. 
5 - An alternative analysis may be found in a modern version of the 
income-expenditure theory, known as "the fiscal approach to the 
BOP," which includes the government budget in the analysis of the 
BOP. It accounts for the effect of the government budget in the 
specification of the BOP. In this analysis, the government budget 
can be assumed exogenous, and only the private sector BOP acts as an 
adjustment to money disturbance. This alternative analysis may 
present an improvement to the monetary analysis to the BOP. [For 
more exposition concerning the "fiscal approach", the works of J. A. 
Bispham (1975), R. I. McKinnon (1976), and R. T. Stillson (1976) may 
be consulted]. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE TECHNIQUE USED TO GENERATE QUARTERLY FIGURES 
FROM ANNUAL FIGURES AND EXPECTATIONS 
AND DATA SOURCES 
201 
A.1 The Interpolation Technique Used to Generate 
Quarterly Income From The Annual Figures 
202 
The quarterly income data are not available for the three case 
countries. Thus, Diz' s ( 1970) technique was used to obtain quarterly 
data from the corresponding annual series. The technique used requires 
that the quarterly sum for each year must add up to four times the 
annual figure. According to this interpolation technique the quarterly 
series are generated as follows: 
where: 
Q1 zt_ 1 + (7.5/12)(Zt- zt_1) 
Q2 zt_1 + (10.5/12)(Zt- zt_ 1 ) 
Q3 Zt + (1.5/12)(Zt+l - Zt) 
Q4 = Zt + (4.5/12) (Zt+ 1 - Zt) 
Z annual income in the current year. 
Zt-l annual income in the previous year. 
Zt+l annual income in the next year. 
i 
Xit the quarterly figures of the current year. 
1 ,2,3,4 
This interpolation technique uses up the first and the last observations 
of the annual series, resulting in a shorter quarterly sample period. 
A.2 The Generation of Inflationary Expectations 
The inflationary expectations variable is directly 
unobservable. Thus, to obtain a series of expected inflation, an 
adaptive expectation of the following specification is used: 
203 
0 < " < 1 
The criterion for choosing the value of A is the minimum S.E. of 
regression. Several values of the adjustment coefficient (!.) have been 
tried. The one reported has a = 0. 9 for Saudi Arabia, and a = 0. 8 for 
both Libya and Kuwait. For example, an adjustment coefficient of 0.9 
implies that for a variable Z, its expected value ze = 0.9Zt + 0.09Zt-l 
+ 0. 009Zt_2 . However, a rule of truncation is applied to disregard 
terms which are considered too small to have any meaningful effect in 
the estimation. 
A.3 Sources of Data 
The data used are obtained from three major sources: 
(i) Central Bank of Libya (CBOL), Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) and publications of the Libyan Secretary of Planning. 
(ii) International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the World Bank 
World Atlas and its World Development Reports. 
(iii) The United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics and 
its Statistical Yearbook. 
APPENDIX 8 
DERIVATION OF THE PRICE AND BOP EQUATIONS 
IN BLEJER'S MODEL 
204 
The Model 
G 
g s 
M 
G d 
M 
e f(y,1T) 
Ms m•H m•(DC + R) 
gm + (DC/H)gDC + (H/R)gR 
[(DC/H)gDC + gm] - (gp - g d) 
m 
g - g A(~G) 
PNT PT 
g s g d 
M M 
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( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
( 7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
For simplicity denote (R/H) = k, then (DC/H) = (1-k). Then substitute 
the terms (2) and (4) for equation (9) we obtain: 
g +(1-k)g +(k)g 
m DC R ( 1 0) 
Solving ( 10) for gp and gR in terms of their exogenous variables and 
lagged endogenous variables produces equations (5.20), (5.21), (5.22) 
and (5.23) of the main text, which are the price and BOP adjustments. 
The Derivation of the Domestic Rate of Inflation Equations 
(a) From equation (7) and by substitution, we obtain: 
+ AL1G 
From (5) and (8), by substitution we obtain: 
Bgp + (1 - B)[gp + A(t.G)] 
T T 
g p + ( 1 - B )A fiG 
T 
gp + (1 - B)AL1[(1 - k)gDC + gm- g d] - (1 - B);\t.gp 
T m 
gp + (1- B)AL1[(1- k)gDC + gm- g d]- A(1- B)gp 
T m 
+ (1 - B);\gp 
-1 
(1 + A + AB)g p gp + (1 - B);\t.Q + (1 - B)Agp 
T -1 
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Thus: 
where: 
Q 
a = 
agp + (1 - a)A~Q + (1 - a)Agp 
T -1 
[( 1 - k)gDC + gm- g d] 
m 
[1 + A - AS]- 1 
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I 
(b) To obtain the domestic price equation (5.22) in the text, we need 
to solve recursively for gp 
-1 
( 1-a)gp 
-1 
2 (1-a) gp 
-1 
agp + (1-a)~Q + (1-a)gp 
T -1 
a(1-a)gp + (1-a)(1-a)~Q_ 1 + (1-8)(1-S)gp 
T_ 1 -2 
i i 
+ (1-a)(1-a) 6Q . + (1-a) g 
-1 p . 
-1 
Note, as i ~ oo, the last term ~ 0. So, gp is the summation of all 
the above terms: 
i 
+ ••• +a (1-a) gp 
T . 
-1 
i + (1-a)(1-a)6Q + ••• + (1-a)(1-a) 6Q + 0 
Now, using lag operator: 
Therefore, the domestic inflation equation can be written as: 
00 00 
i i 
a I: ( 1 -a) L ( g p 
i=O T 
+ (1-a){[ I: (1-a)iLi 
i=O 
00 
I: (1-a)iLi+1JQ} 
i=O 
where Q and a as defined above. 
Solving for the BOP Equations 
(a) From the equilibrium condition of equation (8), we obtain: 
Substituting for gp from result I, we obtain: 
agp + (1-a)6Q + (1-a)\gp - Q 
T -1 
where Q as defined above. 
208 
II 
III 
209 
(b) To obtain the BOP Equation (5. 23), we solve recursively for the 
lagged endogenous variable gp 
-1 
agp + (1-a)~Q + (1-a)gp - Q 
T -1 
ag p + ( 1 -a) Q - ( 1 -a) Q _1 - Q + ( 1 -a.) g p 
T -1 
a.gp - a.Q- (1-a.)Q_1 + (1-a.)gp 
T -1 
Now, substituting for (1-a.)gp 
-1 
a.gp - aQ- (1-a.)Q_ 1 +a.(1-a.)(gp )_ 1 + 
T T 
2 2 (1-a.) ~Q_ 1 + (1-a) g P_2 
a.gp + a.(1-a.)(gp )_1 - a.Q- a.(1-a.)Q_1 + (1-a.) 2 gp 
T T -2 
i 
a.gp + a.(1-a.)(gp )_1 + • • • + Ct. ( 1 -a.) ( g p ) . -
T -1 T T 
i 
a.Q- a.(1-a)Q_ 1 + ••• + a.(1-a) Q_i + 0 
Using the lag operator, we obtain: 
i i L (1-a.) L (gp ) 
i=O T 
+ a 
00 
L 
i=O 
i i (1-a) L (-Q) 
i i 
= a I: ( 1 -a) L [ ( g P ) - ( Q) ] 
i=O T 
Thus: 
00 
i 
I: (1-a) [gp + g d - (1 - k)gDC - gm] 
i=O T m 
-1 
where a = [1 + A - AB] 
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